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Summary of the Thesis 
In a democracy it is the citizens who choose their leaders. Through elections, the people 
constitute government to preside over public affairs. However, in several African countries 
the quality of the elections has been vitiated by fraud, incompetence, unequal playing field 
and violence. Part of the problem is historical. Within the first decade of attaining 
independence in the 1950s and 1960s, many African regimes rapidly descended into 
autocracy and many countries formally recognised one-party regimes. 
Despite many one-party regimes having been abolished after the democratisation wave of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, challenges of holding free and fair elections persist. Several 
elections held since this democratic wave were generally not considered by independent 
observers as free and fair. Indeed Africa has become well known for flawed elections, such as 
was the case in the 2007 elections in Kenya, the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe and the 2010 
elections in Ivory Coast. Due to the stifled democratic climate, where even elections had a 
predetermined outcome, coups became a common and regular method of showing discontent 
or removing government. 
While the phenomenon of problematic elections is going on, at the continental level, Africa 
seems to be making renewed commitment towards democratic governance. With the 
transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) 
through the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000, the AU, inter alia, 
committed to promoting “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and 
good governance” and seems determined to depart from the legacy of poor governance.  
It is in view of the foregoing background that this research sought to investigate the 
challenges the judiciary in Africa has faced in adjudicating presidential election disputes. 
And, in light of the growing trend towards establishing common African democratic 
standards and seeking collective solutions, the research also sought to explore the viability of 
establishing a continental supranational mechanism for resolving disputed presidential 
elections through adjudication. 
Key words: Adjudication; African Union; courts; democracy; elections; judiciary; 
presidential elections; regional integration; sub-regional courts; and supranational 
adjudication. 
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Chapter One 
General Introduction 
 1.1 Background 
In democratic nations, elections are the only recognised way by which governments assume 
authority over society.  Through elections, the electorate confers power upon government to 
preside over public affairs and call government to account.
1
 The major problem for many 
countries in Africa is not that elections are rarely held or not held at all. Many countries 
actually do hold elections routinely. The persistent problem is more about the “quality of the 
electoral process.”2  Within the first decade of attaining independence in the 1950s and 
1960s, many African regimes rapidly descended into autocracy and more than 20 countries 
formally recognised one-party regimes.
3
 Only the countries of Botswana, Mauritius and, to 
some extent, Senegal continued with multiparty democracy from independence.
4
  
Despite many one-party regimes having been abolished after the democratisation wave of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, challenges of holding free and fair elections persist. Forty-four 
out of forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries held elections between 1989 and 2003, but 
three quarters of these elections were generally not considered by independent observers as 
free and fair. 
5As de Smith has correctly observed, “modern African history is littered with 
the debris of sham elections which have purported to be authentic expressions of the people’s 
will.”6  Indeed, Africa has become well known for flawed elections, such as was the case in 
the 2007 elections in Kenya, the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe and the 2010 elections in Ivory 
Coast.
7
 Even when elections are held routinely and regularly in several African countries, as 
Ellis has observed, in the great majority of cases the main function of elections has been less 
to choose a government than as a “form of legitimation of political choices which had already 
been made by other means.”8 
                                                          
1
 Barnette Constitutional and Administrative law 353 
2
 Rakner and  Svasand Uncertainty as a Strategy: Electoral Process in Zambia 1991-2001  2 
3
 Lindberg Democracy and Elections in Africa 48 
4
 Ibid 
5
 Ibid 
6
 de Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions 3 
7
 HURINET-U “Towards Peaceful, Free, Fair and Democratic 2011 Elections in Uganda: An Analysis of Uganda’s 
Electoral Laws”  http://docs.mak.ac.ug/sites/default/files/Election%20reforms (Date of use: 29 March 2015). 
See also Edwin Odhiambo “Can African States Conduct Free and Fair Presidential Elections?” 122-164 
8
 S. Ellis “Elections in Africa in Historical Context” 
http://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/9682/ASC_1241486_319.pdf?sequence=1 (Date of 
use: 2 February 2015) 
2 
 
Due to the stifled democratic climate, where even elections had a predetermined outcome, 
coups became a common and regular method of showing discontent or removing 
governments. There were at least 40 successful coups and several more attempts across the 
African continent in the first twenty years of independence.
9
  From the Egyptian revolution in 
1952 to 1998, there were at least of 85 successful coups and unconstitutional changes of 
government in Africa.
10
 
Where elections have been affected by anomalies and results are disputed, aggrieved parties 
have looked to the judiciary as an institution of last hope to seek redress. The judiciary is thus 
faced with the unenviable task of determining the ultimate outcome of the poll. 
Consequently, in order to protect the right to choice in an election, and to promote and 
safeguard democracy, the judiciary must be perceived as competent, honest, learned and 
independent.
11
 Such a judiciary plays a transformative role in democracy as an impartial 
referee or umpire in the democratic game.
12
  The judiciary, however, has not won the 
confidence of major stakeholders and the general public in this regard. For example, 
following the 1996 and 2001 elections in Zambia, the losing opposition candidates petitioned 
against the declared winner, and the judiciary in both instances, while agreeing that certain 
anomalies and malpractices were proved, declined to annul the elections or offer any other 
remedy.
13
 However, following the 2006 and 2008 elections, the losing opposition parties 
either withdrew or decided not to petition against the elections stating that they could not 
trust the judiciary.
14
 
A similar trend has been observed in several other countries.  In Uganda, for instance, major 
presidential election contests occurred in 2001, 2006 and 2011, which were contested by 
President Museveni as well as his former physician, Dr. Besigye, as the main opposition 
leader. In the aftermath of the 2001 and 2006 elections, which he lost, Dr. Besigye petitioned 
                                                          
9
 Ibid 218. 
10
 Udombana “Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa” 1209-1288 
11
 Muna Ndulo “Rule of Law, Judicial Reform, Development and Post Conflict Societies” 
http://www.sum.uio.no/english/research/networks/anlep/publicaions/anlep-working-paper-2.pdf (Date of 
use: 22 February 2015).    See also Muna Ndulo, “Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in 
Zambia: From a Justice System to a Just System.” 1-26 
12
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against the election of President Museveni. In both instances, (by a majority of 3 to 2 in 2001 
and 4 to 3 in 2006), the Supreme Court upheld the election, despite conceding that serious 
malpractices and anomalies occurred during the electoral process, on the  ground that the 
noted shortcomings  were not substantial as to affect the result of the election.
15
However, 
following the loss of the 2011 election, Dr. Besigye declined to seek redress in court, stating 
that he no longer had faith in the judiciary.
16
 
While the phenomenon of problematic elections is going on, at the continental level, Africa 
seems to be making renewed commitment towards democratic governance. With the 
transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), 
through the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000, the AU, inter alia, 
committed to promoting “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and 
good governance,” 17 and seems determined to depart from the legacy of poor governance. 
This development has been consolidated by the adoption of the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in 2007 and the creation of two major 
courts, that is, the African Court of Justice as well as the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights18, which later merged into the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in 
2008,
19
 which was in 2014 renamed as the African Court of Justice, Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. The court has also been vested with criminal jurisdiction.
20
 
It is in view of the foregoing background that this research sought to investigate the 
challenges the judiciary in Africa has faced in adjudicating presidential election disputes. In 
light of the growing trend of establishing common African democratic standards and seeking 
collective solutions, this research will attempt to explore the viability of establishing a 
continental supranational mechanism for resolving disputed presidential elections through 
adjudication. 
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 1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The main problem this research intends to address can be split into two parts: a) the 
challenges of adjudicating presidential election disputes in domestic courts in Africa, and b) 
the viability of establishing an African continental supranational elections court as a remedy.  
The analysis of the viability of establishing the supranational court will further inquire into 
the practicability of establishing or rather integrating the proposed supranational adjudication 
mechanism into the already existing AU judicial framework. 
The Carter Centre has observed that “failure to create and implement an effective 
mechanism” for the resolution of electoral disputes can have the consequence of gravely 
undermining the legitimacy of an entire electoral process.
21
 Courts, arguably, when 
sufficiently autonomous and competent, are considered rightly placed to resolve electoral 
disputes. Where courts are considered apolitical and a symbol of blind folded justice, society 
is likely to trust them to resolve disputes fairly.  Where aggrieved people avail themselves of 
judicial processes to redress their grievances, the more likely that democracy will grow and 
there will be stability in a country.
22
  However, where the judiciary is seen as inept, partial 
and under the influence of one of the parties to the electoral dispute, or the executive, the 
aggrieved parties may opt not to ventilate their grievances in court. This research, as stated 
above, will investigate the challenges concomitant with the domestic judicial resolution of 
disputed presidential elections and explore the viability of establishing a supranational 
elections court at the AU level. 
The research seeks to answer the following problem research questions: 
1. What is the historical, conceptual and legal framework under which presidential 
elections are held in Africa? 
2. How has the domestic judiciary fared in determining presidential election disputes? 
3. What common standards and mechanisms exist in Africa for holding democratic 
elections? 
4. What is supranational adjudication, and what are its advantages over other forms of 
resolving election disputes? 
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5. What is the viability of establishing an African elections supranational court as a 
possible solution? 
6. What lessons can be learnt from the existing sub-regional tribunals in Africa? 
7. What factors need to be addressed in order to have an effective African supranational 
elections court? 
1.3 Research Methodology 
Although quantitative data has been cited, the research is largely qualitative in nature.  It will 
involve consulting primary sources such as international covenants and national statutes, case 
law both domestic and international, and other documentation of the AU and other relevant 
bodies. In addition, secondary sources such as academic articles in journals, conference 
presentations, internet sources, occasional papers, and newspaper publications are referred to. 
It engaged in a general analysis of the context under which elections are held in Africa, 
seeking to find common standards on democracy and resolution of electoral disputes in 
Africa, and explored the possibility of establishing an African supranational approach to 
adjudication of presidential elections disputes.   
The research has integrated the approaches of several legal disciplines.  These include public 
international law, human rights law, jurisprudence and legal theory, as well as comparative 
constitutional law. It has also applied skills from other disciplines such as history, 
international relations, political philosophy, and political science. 
In this thesis, the term president will be used loosely to mean any elected (as opposed to 
hereditary) head of government or state. 
This thesis is premised on the following assumptions: 
1. That the African continental integration process is, inter alia, designed to lead to good 
governance and legitimate democracy; 
2. That the continental democratic normative frameworks are intended to be enforced 
and realized and are, therefore, not just a set of lofty but empty and meaningless 
statements; 
3. That the conduct of presidential elections in Africa should conform with the 
continental democratic normative frameworks on the conduct of elections; and  
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4. That where African nationals are aggrieved with the conduct of presidential elections 
and results in their states, they should have unconstrained access to the continental 
judicial mechanisms to seek redress. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 General Objective 
The objective of the research is to understand the challenges of adjudicating presidential 
elections disputes domestically and explore the viability of establishing an African elections 
supranational court as a possible remedy. 
1.4.2 Specific Objectives 
Specific objectives for this research are: 
1. To analyse and understand the African drive towards multilateral and ‘supranational’ 
standards on the conduct of democratic elections; 
2. To comprehend the historical, conceptual and legal framework under which 
presidential elections are held in Africa; 
3. To understand the challenges concomitant with the process of determining the 
electoral disputes at municipal level; 
4. To explore the possibility of establishing an African elections supranational court as a 
possible remedy towards addressing identified challenges in adjudicating presidential 
election disputes; 
5. To propose key ingredients that would make a supranational elections court 
successful. 
1.5 Overview of Chapters 
The first chapter of the thesis is the general introduction. It lays background to the research, 
gives preliminary information and an overview of the research. The second chapter discusses 
the conceptual framework underpinning the entire research. Apart from discussing key 
concepts, the second chapter also gives the historical and current context in which 
presidential elections are held in Africa. 
The third chapter looks at the challenges of adjudicating presidential election disputes in 
domestic courts. The chapter analyses key jurisprudence across the continent, discerns 
common trends, and pinpoints the likely causes of dissatisfactory judgments rendered by the 
courts. 
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In the fourth chapter, the sub-regional and African continental framework on democratic 
elections is discussed. The chapter gives both an overview of the historical genesis of the 
normative framework as well as the substantive provisions. The fifth chapter of the thesis 
attempts to respond to all the challenges raised and explores the viability of establishing an 
elections supranational adjudication mechanism. The sixth chapter is the conclusion. It 
summarises the findings of the research and makes recommendations in relation to the 
proposed supranational adjudication mechanism. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework of Concepts and General Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In democratic nations, elections are the only recognised way by which government assumes 
authority over society.  Through elections, the electorate confer power upon government to 
preside over public affairs and call government to account.
23
 The major problem for many 
countries in Africa is not that elections are rarely held or not held at all. Many countries do 
actually hold elections routinely. But often elections have led to disputes, violence and 
instability in some African states. 
This chapter gives a framework of concepts that underpin the whole thesis. It also gives a 
general context under which elections are held in Africa. In discussing the overall context in 
which African elections are held, the chapter discusses the historical circumstances that have 
shaped presidential election contests; the legal frameworks or systems that are used to elect 
presidents; as well as the common problems that account for disputed elections in Africa. 
In terms of concepts, the chapter discusses in detail the interrelated concepts of regionalism 
or integration in the African context; supranationalism; and elections. The three concepts are 
manifestly related. From the pre-independence era, African leaders have always appreciated 
the need for African regional integration in order to find collective solutions to common 
problems. What remained to be solved was the pace of the integration as well as the form it 
should take, with supranationalism generally considered as the ultimate goal.  Disputed 
elections have emerged as a major problem across the continent, often erupting in violence 
and instability. There is, therefore, need to find common regional approaches and solutions 
towards such disputed elections. 
2.2 Theoretical Discussion of Concepts: Regionalism, Supranationalism and Elections 
 
2.2.1 Regional Integration 
Regional integration (sometimes called regionalism) has been defined by Haas as “the 
process whereby political actors...are persuaded to shift their national loyalties, expectations 
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and political activities to a new larger centre.”24 This means that states “voluntarily,” but in a 
formally binding way, choose to associate over certain stated matters and as regards those 
matters, create an entity that will be responsible for supervising their interaction. Integration, 
when fully accomplished, entails formal penetration of binding regional standards into the 
domestic sphere and “takes precedence over domestic law.”25 Such fully accomplished 
integration is alternatively described by the term “supranational,” a term which is discussed 
in more detail below. 
There are many theories that try to account for the phenomenon of regional integration and 
predict its future. They tend to fall into two broad categories: those that emphasize the role of 
states (governments), and those that tend to emphasise the role of non-state actors in the 
integration process. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that the theory of neo-
functionalism tries to account for regional integration by emphasising the role of non-state 
entities in the integration process, while the theory of intergovernmentalism places more 
emphasis on the role of the state in the integration process.  
Haas, the founder of the neofunctional school of thought, described neofunctionalism as the 
theory concerned with explaining “how and why nation-states cease to be wholly sovereign, 
how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the 
factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts 
between themselves.”26 Neofunctionalism considers that the integration process is primarily 
driven by non-state interest groups within the state. These interest groups may have, for 
example, transnational transactions or interactions, but may face uncertainty costs as a result 
of disparity in national rules and standards.
27
 Such interest groups view integration as 
profitable as it creates certainty by creating common standards across national boundaries. 
States are therefore prompted into integration by the interests of such groups.
28
 States, 
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however, still have significance in the integration process as they are the ones that negotiate 
the actual terms and set parameters of the initial agreement.
29
 
Neofunctionalists argue that once states agree on the initial integration mechanism or treaty, 
the subsequent and more important traction in the integration process is not much in the 
hands of the states but mainly in the hands of the “regional secretariat” and non-state actors. 
Regional secretariats or bodies tasked with implementing integration agreements tend to 
subtly and incrementally enhance their mandate to address obstacles encountered in the 
process of integration. This has a reinforcing effect, which leads citizens or non-state actors 
to begin “shifting more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will 
increase the likelihood that integration” will ultimately respond to their socio-economic and 
political needs.
30
  This idea is at the heart of this research and shall be returned to in chapters 
four and five. 
On the other hand, intergovernmentalism is the diametrical opposite of the neofunctionalism 
model. Intergovernmentalism emphasises the significant role played by national governments 
in the integration process. It proceeds on the assumption that in the integration process 
“dominant actors remain sovereign national states pursuing their unitary national interests 
and controlling the pace and outcome through periodic revisions of their mutual treaty 
obligations.”31 This theory conceives of states as rational entities which act purposefully 
towards achievement of certain interests. In order to safeguard those national interests, states 
bargain among themselves and purposefully act towards fulfilment of those goals served by 
the process of integration. Therefore, under this theory, major steps and frameworks of the 
integration process are the product of inter-governmental agreements.
32
 Integration, therefore, 
is an act subsequent to, and dependent on, inter-national relations and sustained throughout 
by states. 
Both the theories of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have inherent weaknesses 
and perhaps should be considered as extreme ends of one continuum. Neofunctionalism, for 
example, assumes that once governments put in place initial cooperation mechanisms, the 
integration process will henceforth  be self-sustaining and self-reinforcing through the 
activities of  “secretariat” and interested non-state actors. As will be seen later below with the 
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African integration process, this has not been the case, despite the initial integration 
framework having been laid down in 1963 when the OAU was founded. 
Intergovernmentalism on the other hand, by over-emphasising the role of the state in the 
integration process, overlooks the role regional institutions and non state actors can play in 
accelerating the integration process. In the context of the EU, for example, the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have played a tremendous role in 
the emergence of the EU as the most successful supranational organisation. 
In Africa, however, the drive for integration has its foundation in the concept of pan-
Africanism. Pan-Africanism is a concept that does not render itself to easy definition, largely 
because it is multifaceted and embodies within it the ideals and history of the struggle for 
African independence and unity. Pan-Africanism can, however, be unpacked and considered 
from at least three perspectives. First, there is racial pan-Africanism, which denotes the 
tendency by people of African descent to unite in common struggle against discrimination 
anywhere and particularly in the context of the struggle for African independence from 
colonial rule.
33
 Second is residential or continental pan-Africanism which denotes the need 
for all Africans to unite in order to preserve their independence and pursue common goals.
34
 
Finally, there is ideological pan-Africanism which refers to efforts by scholars and lobbyists 
who articulate “systematic ideas about how the continent should be liberated and 
reorganised” and united.35 Pan-Africanism, broadly considered, is a movement and school of 
thought that urges a closer unity of African peoples and states.
36
  
Pan-Africanism, as a movement and school of thought, seems to have emerged in response to 
the pain of domination, racism, oppression and exploitation suffered by peoples of African 
origin. It first gained momentum in the diaspora before it spread to the African continent. 
George Charles, then president of the African Emigration Association in the USA is 
recognised by some as the founding father of pan-Africanism. In 1886, George Charles 
declared to the USA Congress that his association intended to establish a United States of 
Africa. Although this never materialised, Charles organised the first pan-African congress in 
Chicago in 1893.
37
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Several conferences were to follow in the early 1900s organised by activists and scholars of 
African descent in the diaspora. These included Marcus Garvey and William E. Dubois, who 
organised several pan-African conferences in Paris in the 1920s, including the 1919 Pan-
African Conference in Paris which coincided with the Versailles Peace Conference aimed at 
promoting self-determination for Africans; 
38
 and Henry Sylvester William, a Trinidad-born 
lawyer living in England, who is believed to have coined the word “Pan-Africanism”, was the 
first to organise a pan-African congress in London in July 1900.
39
 Perhaps the most important 
Pan-African congress held in the diaspora was the one held in Manchester in 1945 and 
organised by Dubois. It specifically addressed the issue of colonialism and gave momentum 
to African independence movements. It was also attended by prominent Africans who were 
later to play key roles in the independence of their countries. These included Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana, Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kamuzu 
Banda of Malawi, and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria.
40
 The conference articulated a clear pan-
African vision for the African continent as:  
a. To achieve independence from colonial rule throughout the continent so that Africans can 
rule themselves democratically 
b. To achieve continental unity so that Africa can: (i) bring about faster economic growth and 
development to catch up with the industrialised countries; and (ii) be strong within the 
international system
41
 
After Ghana gained her independence in 1957, President Nkrumah invested tremendous 
efforts in trying to actualize the pan-African idea of African integration. Nkrumah’s approach 
was double-pronged. In the first instance, he sought to establish an immediate union of states 
that would serve as a model for West African, and ultimately continental African unity. In the 
second instance, he sought to persuade the whole of Africa to pursue immediate political 
unity. 
First, in seeking to set a model for unity, Nkrumah and Sekou Toure of Guinea announced in 
November 1958 that their newly independent states had agreed to unite and form what they 
called the Ghana-Guinea Union (GGU).
42
 Subsequently, Nkrumah and Sekou Toure in May 
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1959 followed upon their earlier announcement by signing a joint declaration to the effect 
that their union was going to be a basis or nucleus for a wider union of African states in 
which member states would surrender part of their sovereignty in the interest of African 
unity.
43
  This was followed by another declaration in 1960 involving Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, 
and Modibo Keita of Mali in which they announced the establishment of the merging or 
union of their three states.
44
 Needless to say, this stated union never materialised for a myriad 
of reasons.
45
 
In the second instance, Nkrumah sought to persuade the whole of Africa to integrate and form 
one union, akin to the United States of America. In 1958, soon after Ghana’s independence, 
Nkrumah convened a conference of independent African states (Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, 
Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Ghana) in Accra. This was actually the first pan 
African conference to be held on the African continent. A year later Nkrumah hosted another 
conference, entitled the “All African Peoples’ Organisation.”  This was in fact a meeting of 
African political parties. In both events, Nkrumah promoted his idea of African unity, arguing 
that in order for Africa to secure the gains of freedom and to stave off pressures of neo-
colonialism, Africa needed to unite into one supranational state, the United State of Africa.
46
 
A few more conferences were held in the aftermath of those conferences called by Nkrumah. 
The most notable is the 1960 conference held in Addis Ababa, which was attended by eleven 
independent African states and other countries on the verge of being independent (these 
included Somalia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mali Federation and Congo Kinshasa).
47
 
It became clear at the conference that there was no consensus on the form the proposed 
African unity should take. The disagreements revolved around two models: whether to cede 
sovereignty and immediately establish a supranational union such as the USA or to simply 
form a loose association of independent sovereign states modelled on the UN system.
48
  
Some leaders, such as Nkrumah, Sekou Toure,  and Modibo Keita favoured an immediate 
political union of African states in order to form the United States of Africa, while others 
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such as Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and William Tubman of Liberia favoured an incremental 
approach, starting with a mere association of independent sovereign states. Azikiwe is known 
to have categorically stated that “if for many years certain parties have fought for their 
sovereignty; it is unlikely that they will surrender that sovereignty to a nebulous organisation 
simply because we feel it necessary to work together.”49 
In order to bridge the divide, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia hosted another conference 
in Addis Ababa in 1963, which was attended by all 32 independent African states then. After 
much haggling, a compromise was reached which gave birth to the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963.
50
 The objectives of the OAU included the promotion of unity 
and solidarity; defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity; eradication of colonialism and 
promotion of international cooperation.
51
 The OAU Charter made it clear that there would be 
“non-interference in the internal affairs of states.”52 Thus African unity took the form of a 
loose association of independent sovereign states. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the desire for African unity is universal. What is at issue 
is the form and pace it should take. From this perspective, the OAU could be viewed as 
simply laying the foundation stone for the future integration endeavours. Indeed, since the 
founding of the OAU several attempts have been made to speed up the integration process. 
Perhaps mention here can be made of two notable ones: the establishment of the African 
Economic Community and the transformation of the OAU into the AU. 
The African Economic Community (AEC) was established by the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community. Its main objectives include the promotion of economic 
development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-
reliance and promotion of cooperation in all fields of human endeavour in order to “raise the 
standard of living of African peoples.”53The Treaty, however, does not make the AEC 
realizable immediately. It provides for a gradual and protracted six-step process. This starts 
with the strengthening and establishment of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) where 
they do not exist, and ultimately ends with the consolidation of the Common African Market, 
the setting up of an African Monetary Union and the setting up of a Pan-African Parliament.
54
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The treaty provides for a transition period not exceeding 34 years.
55
Although the treaty 
entered into force on 12 May, 1994, little progress was made in its implementation. 
While the AEC focused almost exclusively on economic integration, efforts towards more 
comprehensive integration continued and ultimately led to the transformation of the OAU 
into the African Union (AU). This was achieved through the elaboration and passage of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union in Togo on 11 July 2000.
56
 The AU subsumes the AEC 
into its structures
57
and provides for greater avenues for integration. The Constitutive Act 
makes it clear that the establishment of the AU is inspired by pan-African determination for 
“unity, solidarity, cohesion among the people of Africa and African states.”58 Its objectives 
include “greater unity and solidarity” for African states and peoples as well as the 
acceleration of both political and economic integration of the whole continent.
59
 
Although the Constitutive Act shows a greater tendency towards integration than the OAU 
charter, there is still ambivalence in its provisions. On the one hand, there are provisions 
reminiscent of the OAU’s indifference towards internal state problems while on the other 
hand, there are provisions that show a clear departure from that indifference towards the 
possibility of establishing a closely knit African continent. On the conservative side, the 
Constitutive Act, for example, calls for respect of national borders as bequeathed at 
independence and non-interference by member states into internal affairs.
60
However, on the 
progressive side, the Constitutive Act allows for AU intervention in a member state in respect 
of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
61
 The 
Constitutive Act also provides for organs of the AU, some of which shall progressively have 
direct interaction with ordinary citizens in member states. For example, the Pan-African 
Parliament (PAP) is established to “provide a common platform for African peoples and their 
grass-roots” to participate in decision making on matters that affect their continent.62  The 
PAP is designed to evolve into a continental legislature whose members shall be elected by 
nationals of member states by universal adult suffrage and serve in their individual capacity, 
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as opposed to being representatives of their respective states.
63
 However, currently, its 
powers are purely consultative and advisory and its members are simply nominated by 
national governments.
64
 
The foregoing review of the concept and experience of efforts towards regional integration in 
Africa shows that there is unanimity in the desire for unity. However, uncertainty seems to 
hover around issues of the form and pace that integration should take. Extreme points of the 
continuum are, on the one hand, setting up a forum for mere inter-governmental interaction 
and cooperation, as with the case of the OAU, and, on the other hand, setting up a closely knit 
African community with institutions that are responsive and accessible to ordinary people in 
member states. Although the AU is still far from being an institution that reflects a closely 
knit African community, the preamble of the Constitutive Act clearly indicates that the AU is 
inspired by ideas of close cohesion, unity and solidarity of the whole continent. In order to 
have an inter-national institution such as the AU (or at least some of its major organs) to be 
more than a mere forum for inter-governmental cooperation, would require states to cede 
some sovereignty to the regional body and create structures that will have direct  effect on 
both the states and the people. This effectively means turning the AU into a supranational 
organisation, a term we analyse next. 
 
2.2.2 Supranationalism 
Supranationalism is better understood when contrasted with what is considered as classic 
international law. In classic international law theory, the international law system is seen as 
horizontal and composed of independent sovereign states which recognise no sovereign 
power above them.
65
 Therefore, only states are recognised as subjects of international law 
and it is they “that create the law and obey or disobey it.”66  
In contrast, the concept of supranationalism strikes at the heart of classic international law. 
According to Joseph Weiler and Joel Trachtman, supranationalism has the consequence of 
“constitutionalizing” international law through the creation of organisations or institutions  
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capable of exercising authoritative and binding power over its member states.
67
 Supranational 
organisations, so to speak, pierce the veil of classic international law statehood and recognise 
that states are not simply unitary entities but are themselves composed of multifarious non 
state actors such as individuals, groups, corporations and other civil society organisations 
who have a stake in the life of the state.
68
 Supranational organisations directly interact with 
individuals and non state entities within a state and are empowered to make decisions which 
are directly against member states, individuals, commercial entities and other non state 
entities within a state.
69
 This is clearly different from classical international law organisations 
which are generally seen as a mere forum for inter-state cooperation and can only act on the 
consent and instructions of member states. 
Peter Hay identifies four key elements of supranationalism as: 
 Institutional autonomy of an organisation from member states 
 Ability of an organisation to bind its member states by a majority or weighted 
majority vote 
 Direct binding effect of law emanating from the organisation on natural and legal 
persons 
 Attribution of powers which differ markedly from powers bestowed on other 
organisations.
70
 
Further, Joseph Weiler draws a distinction between legal or normative supranationalism from 
decisional supranationalism. Decisional supranationalism relates to ‘political’ decision-
making process whereby institutional policies and measures are in the first place, not only 
debated and formulated, but then promulgated and finally executed.
71
 Normative 
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supranationalism on the other hand means that the laws of an organisation have the following 
three factors: 
 Have direct effect in member states 
 Are superior to the laws of member states 
 Member states are pre-emptied from enacting contradicting legislation.72 
This research is rooted in normative supranationalism, as it explores the possibility of 
supranational adjudication of presidential election disputes. The concept of supranational 
adjudication therefore requires further elaboration here. 
Helfer and Slaughter define supranational adjudication as: 
adjudication by a tribunal that was established by a group of states or the entire international 
community and that exercises jurisdiction over cases directly involving private parties- 
whether between a private party and a foreign government, a private party and her own 
government, private parties themselves, or, in the criminal context, a private party and a 
prosecutor’s office.73 
In essence, in supranational adjudication, courts or tribunals created by states are allowed to 
operate independent of the direct influence of states and are accessible to both state and non 
state entities and individuals. This differs significantly from traditional or classical 
international adjudication where adjudication only involved state-to-state litigation. Because 
supranational adjudication is beyond the direct and immediate influence of states, 
supranational courts have a rare opportunity “where regular politics and the power disparities 
in the world do not shape how the law is interpreted and applied.”74 Thus, unlike traditional 
international adjudication where states control access to international tribunals, supranational 
courts are protected from the direct interference of individual states and, on the basis of pre-
determined rules, make autonomous binding decisions on all the parties. 
It is important to note that although supranational tribunals are insulated from direct influence 
of individual states, they are actually created by the member states themselves. The member 
states can therefore be said to be the ones delegating some aspects of their sovereignty to 
supranational tribunals. All international organisations created by states could be said to have 
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been borne of states delegating some of their sovereign power to them. So what distinguishes 
the kind of delegation states make to supranational tribunals then? 
Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter identify three dimensions of delegation that are specific 
to supranational courts. These are independence, access and embeddedness.
75
 Independence 
refers to the existence of mechanisms that ensure that cases are heard and determined 
impartially, and without the immediate influence of individual state interests. This requires 
that judges should not generally have a partisan background; should have a reasonably long 
tenure; and should have discretion to decide cases on the basis of the law as they see fit, 
professionally; and that judges should have sufficient resources at their disposal to run the 
courts smoothly.
76
 
Access refers to potentially the range of aggrieved parties who have legal standing (locus 
standi) or audience to move the court. As noted above, state and non state entities usually 
have access to supranational tribunals. Embeddedness is about who controls the 
implementation of supranational tribunal’s decisions.77 It is axiomatic that international 
tribunals do not have police and military forces and other coercive powers to help implement 
their decisions. The implementation of their decisions, therefore, depends on how such 
tribunals are able to penetrate into states and build relations of trust, respect and competence 
with municipal actors such as courts, law associations, civil society organisations, police, 
academia and other stakeholders which give international tribunals a sense of relevance, 
credibility and legitimacy before national audiences. 
In sum, supranational tribunals, therefore, tend to be independent, are accessible to both state 
and non state entities and as a result are embedded into municipal legal systems in order to 
help implement their decisions. 
Successful modern supranational adjudication is traceable to the establishment of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1952
78
 as part of the European Coal and Steel Community 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
79
 The ECJ managed to creatively 
transform the treaty of Rome and other Community laws into supreme and directly 
enforceable laws, through cases brought by individuals (private litigants), in national courts. 
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This was largely through the development of the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of 
Community law.  The doctrine of supremacy of Community law entails that Community law 
is supreme over national law and, therefore, national law cannot prevail over community 
law.
80
 The doctrine of direct effect means that Community law “confers rights and duties 
within member states without further legislative participation.”81  The doctrines were 
developed and articulated in some of the earliest cases to reach the court.
82
 The ECHR, on its 
part, allowed for private or non state litigants to have access to it from the beginning.
83
 
The two courts are considered to be the most successful and effective supranational tribunals 
and have become the model for other integration projects across the globe. Effective 
adjudication has been defined as the court’s “basic ability to compel or cajole compliance 
with its judgment.”84 Such compliance depends on the supranational court’s ability to 
develop harmonious relations with municipal justice institutions, with support of civil society 
organisations, to harness the national institutions to use their powers on its behalf.
85
 
Helfer and Slaughter have extensively studied the European supranational courts (ECJ and 
ECHR), and on the basis of the success of the European model, have been able to deduce 
factors that have made these courts effective and successful. They devised a checklist of these 
factors that have influenced the effectiveness of these supranational courts. They divide the 
factors into three categories: those factors within the power of states setting up a 
supranational tribunal; those factors within the power of the supranational tribunals; and 
external general factors about the types of cases presented to the supranational tribunals and 
the municipal political arrangements and ideologies of state parties to the supranational 
tribunals.
86
 These factors can be summarised as follows: 
Factor within the control of state parties: 
 Composition of the tribunal: European supranational tribunals have been successful 
partly because they have been composed of senior, well recognised and respected 
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jurists from member states. This made it relatively easy for municipal courts to accept 
the judgements of the supranational courts. 
 Caseload or functional capacity of the court: The European supranational courts have 
had, over years, a reasonably high caseload, which enabled them to be influential and 
make a mark. A court that is hardly used is of little influence. 
 Independent fact finding capacity:  The courts have an ability to independently test 
the veracity of allegations before them and make an independent decision. 
 Formal authority or status as law of the instrument that the tribunal is charged with 
interpreting and applying: This has to do with whether or not the instrument that the 
tribunal is tasked with interpreting is binding law and consequently whether the 
tribunal’s decisions are equally binding. In this case both the Treaty of Rome 
establishing the ECJ and the European Convention on Human Rights provide that the 
decisions of the two courts are binding on member states.
87
 
Factors within the control of supranational tribunals: 
 Awareness of audience: The supranational courts were able to recognise an audience 
beyond the immediate parties to a dispute at hand and crafted their judgments to 
encourage additional cases by appealing to both the material and professional interests 
of prospective litigants. This also involved fostering harmonious relationships with 
national courts and assuring national courts that they are partners in enforcing 
supranational legislation. 
 Neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests: This has to do with the 
tribunal’s ability to make decisions based on generally applicable laws and decide 
cases impartially, refusing “to pander to governments at whose sufferance it exists.” 
Both courts have been willing to make decisions against governments in big cases. 
 Incrementalism: If a court pushes too fast and too far, member states can act to curtail 
its jurisdiction or urge national courts not to cooperate. Demonstration of autonomy 
must be “tempered with incrementalism and awareness of political boundaries.”88 
 Quality of legal reasoning: well reasoned judgements make decisions of courts more 
acceptable as they give an assurance that the “authority of judgments derives from 
intrinsic rationality rather than from an argument of authority.”89 
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 Judicial cross-fertilisation and dialogue: The ECJ and ECHR were able to enhance 
each other by referring to one another’s decisions.90 
External factors beyond the control of the states and tribunals: 
 Nature of violations: Until the courts are fully respected, usually they are more 
successful in enforcing their decisions in minor violations, which require fewer 
concessions from states. For example, the courts were powerless in the face of serious 
systematic violations of human rights in Greece during the military dictatorships of 
the 1970s. 
 Autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of law and responsive to 
citizen interests: National government institutions committed to the rule of law, 
responsive to the entitlements of individual citizens, and able to formulate and pursue 
their interests independently from other government agencies, is a strongly favourable 
pre-condition for effective supranational adjudication. 
 Relative cultural and political homogeneity of states subject to a supranational 
tribunal: cultural and political homogeneity of the member states makes supranational 
courts relatively easily acceptable.
91
 
It must be noted that these positive views about supranational adjudication are not universally 
shared among scholars. Eric Posner and John Yoo are among the leading critics of the value 
and effectiveness of independent supranational courts. Posner and Yoo’s views are shared by 
other scholars such as John Mearsheimer
92
 and Vitalius Tumonis.
93
 Posner and Yoo’s 
arguments are contained in two articles, which are a response to the works of Helfer and 
Slaughter (referred to above).
94
 Posner and Yoo feel that the spread of supranational 
adjudication is being pushed to extremes, which risks substituting the tyranny of judges for 
that of governments. They argue that in fact such tribunals are a danger to international 
cooperation because they are susceptible of making decisions based on morality which are at 
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variance with interests of states.
95
  They contend that states will be reluctant to use such 
tribunals unless they have control over the judges. 
Contrary to the views of Posner and Yoo, that states are reluctant to create independent 
supranational courts, the model of supranational courts is spreading across the globe. For 
example, in 1985 there were only seven such courts, but by 2008 there were 26, and are 
actually processing several cases as they have made more than 15, 000 judgments since 
1990.
96
 Against such evidence, Posner and Yoo are of the view that states set up such courts 
for symbolic reasons especially to increase their prestige. Apart for reasons of prestige, 
Posner and Yoo concede minimal benefits accruing from supranational tribunals, that is, that 
of enabling states to overcome a few cooperation challenges in international cooperation. For 
example, states with a boundary disputes may prefer to settle such disputes through 
adjudication instead of going to war. In such cases, Posner and Yoo argue, states will comply 
with court decisions because “the cost of compliance is less than the future benefits of 
continued adjudication.”97 Outside such cases, supranational courts are not effective as states 
will not comply with judgements that threaten their interests and will seek to undo the 
tribunals. 
With respect, the views of Posner and Yoo seem to be based on the concept of a monolithic 
and unitary state, as the main player on the international scene. In the contemporary world, 
such a concept of the state is simplistic as the very well being of the state depends on various 
non state entities such as law societies, civil society organisations, labour movements, student 
unions and the like. Enlightened views of such organisations and groups can potentially 
compel democratic states to obey international standards acceded to by their states. Further, 
assertions that tribunals are simply for symbolic reasons of prestige, while true to some extent 
as shall be discussed below, are not entirely correct as such tribunals have made decisions 
against immediate interests of affected states. We shall return to the concept of 
supranationalism in the fourth chapter in the context of discussing the possibility of 
establishing an elections supranational court. 
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2.2.3 Elections 
 
The concept of elections is intrinsically linked to that of democracy and may be considered a 
sub-set of democracy. Therefore, before analysing the concept of democracy, an overview of 
what constitutes democracy is given here. There is no one standard definition of democracy. 
Etymologically, “democracy” derives from the Greek words “people” (demos) and 
“authority” (karatia).98  Democracy, therefor, implies that power to govern derives from the 
people. It is essentially about power, “irrespective of whether it is the use, sharing, control or 
transfer of power, or the accountability of those who wield it and those who seek it.”99  Since 
power lies with the people, it means that in a democracy, people should always have a 
controlling influence over the manner government is constituted and exercises its authority. 
There is no standard mode of a democratic government or system.  Former UN Secretary-
General, Boutros-Ghali, correctly observed that democracy is not a model to be copied from 
certain states, but is something that “may take many forms, depending upon the 
characteristics and circumstances of societies.”100  Rather, there are elements or virtues 
considered essential for any system to be considered democratic. Amartya Sen, for example, 
identifies three virtues upon which democracy rests. These are: 
1. Political participation and human freedom; 
2. Instrumental importance of  political incentives in keeping governments responsible 
and accountable; and  
3. The constructive role of democracy in the formation of values and understanding of 
needs, rights and duties.
101
 
These elements entail that in a democracy, people have political freedom to exercise their 
civil and political rights;  people have space to express themselves and support their claims 
and  their views receive due consideration from those holding public office; and  citizens 
have an opportunity to learn from one another.
102
 Similarly, Claude Ake lists three essential 
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elements of democracy, related to those of Sen. These are widespread participation of the 
people, consent of the governed, and public accountability of those in power.
103
  
There have been claims that democracy is alien to Africa and is at variance with traditional 
systems of governance and culture.
104
 This can only be true if one confuses Western-style 
institutions with democracy. But when one considers constitutive elements of democracy 
such as participation, popular consent and accountability, then it becomes apparent that these 
were never in short supply in many traditional African societies.  
Anthropologists Meyer Fortes and Edward Evans, who analysed traditional African political 
systems, concluded that “the structure of an African state implies that Kings and Chiefs rule 
by consent.”105 Ake further argues that in fact in many traditional African systems, 
accountability was stricter than  even in modern Western societies: 
Chiefs were answerable not only for their own actions but for natural catastrophes such as 
famine, epidemics, floods, and drought. In the event of such disasters, Chiefs could be 
required to go into exile or “asked to die.”106 
Perhaps a better known demonstration of democracy in traditional African societies is to be 
found in Nelson Mandela’s autobiography. In describing how decisions were made, Mandela 
notes that no conclusion was forced upon people but instead all the people were heard and a 
decision was taken together.
107
 In two informative paragraphs, Mandela narrates how this was 
done: 
Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have 
been a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and 
subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and labourer. People 
spoke without interruption and the meetings lasted many hours.
108
 
At first, I was astonished by the vehemence- and candour- with which people criticised the 
regent. He was not above criticism- in fact, he was often the principal target of it. But no 
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matter how flagrant the charge, the regent simply listened, not defending himself, showing no 
emotion at all.
109
  
The fact that elements of democracy such as participation, consent and accountability were 
present in traditional African societies is important considering that, as shall be discussed 
below, there are still three African states (Lesotho, Morocco and Swaziland) that still use the 
hereditary monarch system of governance. As discussed here, democracy is not necessarily 
incompatible with such traditional forms of government. This is discussed further below. 
Turning to the concept of election, the concept of elections has to do with how a state 
constitutes authority (government) to attend to its various common needs and resolve its 
challenges. This authority is seen as necessary for the survival, equilibrium and peaceful 
existence of society. Various theorists and philosophers have crafted explanations for the 
need of such authority. Theorists like Hobbs, Spinoza, Rousseau and Bentham, with 
variations, argue on the basis of a mythical construct of the “state of nature,” where human 
beings left to their own devices, without a compelling authority, life would be chaotic and 
violent.
110
 Without this common power to prevail over society, society would be in perpetual 
warfare of “every man against every man”111 and the life of everyone in society, in the 
famous words of Hobbs, becomes “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”112  In order to 
protect their lives and property, and in order to live happily, orderly and peacefully, it is 
therefore imperative that human beings ‘contract’ or agree to institute a common authority 
(the sovereign) to preside over public affairs. 
Other theorists such as Thomas Paine and John Locke, while not disputing the mythical state 
of nature as the substratum upon which authority in a state is based, emphasise that the will of 
the people is the real basis of authority in a state.  Paine considers government as being born 
of the consent of the people and necessary (in his words “a necessary evil”), but only 
necessary to constrain human vices in order for harmony and prosperity to prevail.
113
 Locke, 
like Paine, considers consent as the basis for government. It is the people who collectively set 
up government to look after their common interests. This invariably means that government, 
which arises from the free will of the people, does not have absolute and unrestrained power 
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over them and, therefore, has to be constrained by respect for basic human rights and 
property rights.
114
  
In theory, there is, therefore, basic consensus for the need for authority or government in 
society. In history, governmental authority is assumed in different ways. These have included 
conquest, heredity, selection by lot, military coup d états and elections. In democratic 
societies, where government ought to be based on the consent of the people, elections have 
become universally acknowledged as the most appropriate demonstration of that popular 
consent for establishing that government. The Zambian Supreme Court aptly stated: 
elections, it goes without saying, are the sole lawful, constitutional, and legitimate 
method for the peaceful and legal acquisition of political power...Those in power 
should govern with the consent and by the will of the governed expressed in periodic 
genuine, open, free and fair elections where the result reflects the exercise of free 
choice.
115
 
To elect is to choose and an election is therefore “a procedure whereby group decisions are 
made on the basis of choices exercised by individual members of the group.”116 In a 
democratic state, elections are an institutionalised method of realising the democratic norm of 
“rule of the people by the people.”117 Elections are the only democratically legitimate 
procedure for translating popular sovereignty into workable executive and legislative 
powers.
118
 For purposes of this research, an election is considered as a method or means by 
which eligible nationals or citizens of a state choose the person or persons to assume the 
highest office in government, particularly the presidency. It is about people freely and 
collectively consenting to the setting up of a government that will preside over their affairs. 
The concept of elections is intrinsically linked to two concepts of representation (or 
delegation) and accountability. Elections are connected with the concept of representation 
and accountability in that those elected into government are considered as representatives or 
delegates of the people and consequently accountable to the people. The people, therefore, 
collectively decide to delegate the running of public affairs to persons they freely elect. 
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Because those elected draw their mandate from the public, this necessarily entails 
accountability as representatives ought to be held responsible for decisions and actions 
undertaken in the name of the people they purport to represent.
119
 Each of the concepts of 
representation and accountability will require further elaboration. 
We start with representation. In ancient times in many societies, when there was a common 
challenge to be resolved in the community, citizens assembled and collectively resolved the 
challenge. The ancient city-state of Athens is a well known example, where almost all major 
political decisions were made directly by the assembly of eligible citizens. For example, at 
the beginning of each year, the Code of existing laws had to be submitted for review, 
amendment or approval to the assembly, which usually voted by a show of hands.
120
 In 
modern states, important government decisions have to be made daily, requiring specialised 
skills and continuous attention. As a result, it is largely impossible that people would gather 
in assembly daily, and collectively run government effectively and efficiently.
121
 As a result, 
if people have to participate reasonably in government, they have to choose a small number 
from among themselves to act on their behalf as their representatives.
122
 
Representation has been defined as: 
The process through which the attitudes, preferences, viewpoints and desires of the 
entire citizenry or part of them are, with their expressed approval, shaped into 
governmental action on their behalf by a smaller number among them, with binding 
effect upon those represented.
123
 
Those elected, therefore, represent the collective will of the voters. However, the concept of 
representation is not without attendant difficulties. Two major weaknesses can be noted here. 
First, the quality of representation that can be attributed to government in power depends on 
the applicable electoral system in a state. For example, in a country that uses the simple 
majoritarian system for electing a president, it is possible that a president may be elected on a 
thin majority and therefore his or her election cannot be said to be reflective of the collective 
or majority will of the people. Such was the case in Zambia during the 2001 elections where 
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the winning candidate only garnered a paltry 29 percent of cast votes.
124
  Similarly, during 
the 2004 Malawian presidential elections, the winning candidate merely got 35 percent of the 
votes.
125
 Secondly, even where a government is elected into power on a certain platform or 
promises, once in office, governments  are usually not under binding instructions to fulfil 
their promises, and in many cases do actually betray campaign promises under which they 
were elected, and pursue personal interests.
126
 
Turning to the concept of accountability, genuine elections have been hailed as “the kernel of 
political accountability and a means of ensuring reciprocity and exchange between the 
governor and governed.”127 Governments are considered accountable to the electorate in the 
sense that elections can be used as a tool to hold governments responsible for consequences 
of actions during their tenure in office. Governments thus are considered to anticipate the 
verdict of voters and as a result are “induced to choose policies that in their judgement will be 
positively evaluated by citizens at the time of the next election.”128 Voters, therefore, could 
use their vote to retrospectively punish an incumbent government for wrong decisions or 
reward them for good decisions and actions. 
The authors Timothy Hellwig and David Summuels have identified several factors, which 
can be reduced into two points, which influence how effective accountability in an electoral 
system will be.
129
 First, it is easier for voters to hold government accountable where one party 
controls the executive and legislative branches of government. But where executive and 
legislative powers of a government are in the hands of a coalition or minority government, 
then it becomes difficulty for voters to assign responsibility. Second, in holding a president 
accountable, it is easier for voters to do so where a president is directly elected by the people 
as opposed to where a president is elected indirectly through parliament or the legislature. 
Two shortcomings of the concept of accountability in elections can be noted here. First of all, 
where national constitutions prescribe term limits and political parties are hardly 
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institutionalised, an incumbent government serving its last term in office would have minimal 
incentives for seeking re-election. Second, electoral accountability only works retroactively 
as generally the electorate have to wait for the next election in order to punish an ill or non 
performing government. This is usually when the damage has already been done.
130
 
Although elections, as an instrument for recruiting government leadership and as a means of 
holding leadership accountable, may have shortcomings as stated above, they still remain the 
only democratic mechanism available for that purpose. Elections afford people, as a 
collective entity, to choose both policy and government leadership and to influence the 
leaders, while in office, to behave appropriately. This function of elections is now universally 
acknowledged and is enshrined in key international treaties. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted “as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and nations,”131categorically stated that “the will of the people shall be the basis of 
the authority of government” and “which shall be expressed in periodic and  genuine 
elections....”132 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arguably the most 
important international human rights instrument incorporating democratic governance, 
equally recognises the right of “everyone to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections....”133 At the African regional level, several instruments recognise the role of 
elections as the only means to constitute a legitimate government.
134
 These instruments and 
provisions shall be discussed and elaborated in more detail in the fourth chapter. 
 
 2.3 Historical Context of Democracy in Africa 
Africa has gone through several cycles in trying to establish and consolidate electoral 
democracy since attaining independence from colonial powers. This section gives an 
overview of these phases. The four phases discussed in this section are:  
a. the independence era of the 1950s and 1960s pregnant with euphoria and expectation 
for genuine democratic governance; 
b. the negation of the promise of independence through the establishment of 
dictatorship, military and one-party regimes from the 1960 to the 1980s;  
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c. the wind of change in the 1980s and 1990s characterised by the demise of 
dictatorships and one party-rule; and  
d. the current and emerging trends affecting presidential elections since the year 2000. 
 
2.3.1 Euphoria of Independence 
Systematic colonisation of the African continent was formally consummated at the Berlin 
Conference in 1884 and 1885. This is when the Western dominant powers arbitrarily divided 
Africa among themselves into territorial units, and without regard for existing states and 
kingdom boundaries, thereby grouping together those who may have been enemies and 
invariably separating those who were homogeneous.
135
 In fact distinguished African scholar 
Claude Ake traces challenges of ethnic conflicts within the modern African state to this 
development. He argues that in many parts of pre-colonial Africa, states and ethnicity 
generally occurred in “a local space where territoriality and ethnic identity roughly 
coincided.”136  By amalgamating distinct ethnic groups into the colonial state, that laid the 
foundation for inter-ethnic conflict within the state because it dissociated “ethnicity from 
autonomous polity and territoriality.”137  The Berlin Conference was held under the 
leadership of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Although fighting slave trade, development of 
trade, and expansion of civilisation were mentioned as the purpose of the dividing and 
sharing the African continent,
138
in reality the conference was about devising methods of 
dividing the African continent and its resources among the European powers. The conference 
agreed, inter alia, that any European  nation that took possession of a coastland (including its 
hinterland) , named themselves as protectorates, had to inform signatories of the Berlin 
Conference Act in order for  their right of possession to be recognised.
139
 
In some cases, and during certain periods, some European powers did not exercise direct 
colonial authority over territories but allowed commercial entities to do so on their behalf. In 
Southern Africa, for instance, this was done through the British South Africa Company 
(BSA). The BSA was granted extensive power which included:  
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to acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty, all or any rights, interests, 
authorities, jurisdictions and powers of any kind or nature whatever, including  powers 
necessary for the purposes of government and the preservation of  public order in or for the 
protection of territories, lands, or property...and to hold, use and exercise such territories, 
lands, property, rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions and powers respectively for the 
purpose of the company, and on the terms of this our charter.
140  
Although there were incidental benefits arising from contact with Europe during colonialism, 
colonialism caused massive disruption of indigenous governance systems and instead 
introduced a system of governance that was centralised, elitist and exercised powers 
absolutely, permitting no room for dissent for indigenous people.
141
 Many consequences 
Africa suffered as a result of colonialism have been documented. But for our purpose it is 
sufficient to say that the colonial system failed to bequeath a legacy of representative and 
accountable democracy, respect for human rights and equitable distribution of resources. 
Africans were generally excluded from government. Benefits accruing from mineral 
resources went to develop European homelands, leaving behind wretchedness and poverty, 
especially in rural areas. Ake considers that, as a result of this legacy, there is an interplay 
between the inherited colonial state that was deficient in democracy and accountability on the 
one hand, and the subsequent (and still continuing) underdevelopment in Africa, on the other 
hand. He concludes that the “absence of democracy is a major cause of underdevelopment in 
Africa.”142 
Over time African voices against colonialism, in preference for self-determination or majority 
democratic rule, started getting stronger. However, colonial powers initially never considered 
that time would come, when they would have to relinquish their hold on “their” African 
territories. The French government, for instance, in 1944 made a declaration that “the 
eventual formation, even in the distant future, of self-government in the colonies must be 
excluded.”143 However, it was not long, before the colonial powers conceded that time for 
change had come, and by the 1950s and 1960s, the colonial authorities began to retreat and 
grant independence to African governments. British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, 
during a tour of Africa in January 1960, acknowledged this and stated: “the wind of change is 
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blowing through the continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact.”144 
In 1956, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan got their independence from colonial rule. But it was 
the independence of the Gold Coast (as Ghana was then known) that resonated across the 
continent, and set the pace for the rest of Africa, especially Anglophone Africa, to follow.
145
 
Once Ghana was independent, the proverbial flood gates opened and decolonisation 
proceeded at frenetic speed, with thirty-five of the fifty-three states achieving independence 
between 1956 and 1966.
146
 By the 1970s, decolonisation was complete, except for a few 
countries (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe) 
under Portuguese rule, which had to wait and fight until the demise of Portuguese 
dictatorship back home in 1974, after which they promptly gained their independence.
147
 
With the attainment of independence, Africa was pregnant with euphoria, new hopes, dreams 
and expectations. Multitudes attended public events celebrating this achievement, with high 
hopes of economic and political prosperity. The economic outlook of Africa looked 
optimistic. The prices of minerals and cash crops such as cocoa, cotton and coffee, which 
Africa produced abundantly, increased sharply between 1945 and 1960.
148
 Moreover, there 
was a lot of good will from both bilateral and multilateral donors. Grants and low interest 
loans from North Africa and Western Europe reached more than USD1 billion by 1964.
149
 In 
1967, World Bank economist, Andrew Karmarck, optimistically remarked: “For most of 
Africa, the economic future before the end of the century can be bright.”150 
Politically, it was expected that the new indigenous governments would build viable 
autochthonous democratic states based on democratic inclusiveness, respect for human rights 
and rule of law. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, captured these expectations 
in his independence speech when he stated that: “today we have awakened. We will not sleep 
anymore. Today, from now on, there is a new Africa in the world.”151 
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2.3.2 Descent into Authoritarianism 
The euphoria of independence was short-lived. Instead of building viable, tolerant and 
inclusive new democratic states that spring from the will of the people and accountable to the 
people, the new governments soon abandoned these expectations and reverted to the 
repressive governance tactics of the colonial masters. As Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn have 
observed, the new African president replaced the colonial governor both in fact and in 
deeds.
152
    In many cases, the independent African state behaved worse than the colonial 
ones and became characterised by at least four notable features:  
(i) power consolidation and one-party rule,  
(ii) corruption and wastefulness,  
(iii)  assassinations and disappearances of critics, and  
(iv)  military interventions.  
We look at each one of these in detail. 
 
2.3.2.1 Power consolidation and one party rule 
Generally, independent African states inherited multiparty constitutions that allowed for 
various political parties to market themselves to the electorates for ascendance into office. 
This however did not last long as the continent descended into power consolidation, 
characterised by one party rule. Power consolidation and one party rule were justified on 
grounds that that it was necessary to forge national unity. Many African leaders argued that 
class divisions that shaped party politics in Europe were absent from Africa, and thus, there 
was no need for many parties. In addition, it was argued that African societies were 
communal and operating on the basis of consensus and, therefore, not suited for adversarial 
politics.
153
  The president, and his party, therefore came to personify the state. As Senegalese 
President, Leopoldo Sedar Senghor, stated: “the President personifies the nation as did the 
monarch of former times his people.”154 Similarly, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania 
argued that the primary duty of the new state was fighting poverty, ignorance and disease. To 
effectively fight these, the state needed to fast-track social and economic development. “We 
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must run, while others walk,” was Nyerere’s approach.155 For this to happen, there was need 
for national harmony and unity, which could only be brought about by a one-party system.
156
 
By 1970, only about three states (Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius) had remained 
multiparty.
157
 
Just as Ghana was the pacesetter for independence, it set the tone for repression, power 
consolidation and one party rule. Ghana’s Constitution was revised in 1960 to the effect that 
the President was now “to rule by decree, dismiss any member of the judiciary and reject 
decisions of parliament.”158 In 1964, Ghana organised a referendum to determine if it was to 
be a one party state or not. By official figures, the people overwhelmingly voted for the 
introduction of the one party system. The results, however, were suspicious as even in the 
opposition stronghold of Ashante region, no single “NO” vote was recorded.159 
Many other countries soon followed the example of Ghana and the one party state, with its 
concomitant repressive laws and practices, became the trade mark of African regimes. A few 
examples are worth mentioning here. In Kenya, soon after independence, the government 
passed a constitutional amendment that increased the period for parliamentary review of 
emergency powers from two to 18 months, which effectively allowed the president to 
arbitrarily imprison, without trial, opposition members and critics.
160
  From 1966 Kenya was 
a de facto one party state until 1982 when it became a de jure one party state, following the 
passing of the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 7 of 1982. For the 1988 election, 
Kenya went beyond just preventing opposition but abolished the secret ballot in primary 
elections, and required voters to simply line up behind the agent holding the picture of their 
preferred candidate.
161
 
In Uganda, Prime Minister Miltone Obote in 1966, forced into exile the President (Sir 
Edward Mutesa II), abrogated the 1962 independence Constitution, and banned all political 
parties.
162
 Yoweri Museveni, who took over power in 1986, introduced the no-party system, 
which effectively was a one party rule as only his National Resistance Movement (NRM) was 
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recognised. In Malawi President Hastings Kamuzu Banda declared himself life president in 
1971 and no opposition was allowed.
163
 
In December 1987, the Zimbabwean government passed a constitutional amendment which 
transformed the office of the Prime Minister (Robert Mugabe) into an all-powerful executive 
president. The same year, after years of persecution, the Prime Minister, and opposition 
leader, Joshua Nkomo, signed an accord that merged Mugabe’s ZANU-PF Party with 
Nkomo’s ZAPU Party, which effectively ended multiparty politics.164 The name of the new 
party after the merger, ironically, came to be known as ZANU-PF, which in reality actually 
meant the dissolution of the opposition ZAPU.
165
 In Zambia, President Kaunda in February 
1972 announced at a press conference that government had decided that Zambia shall become 
a “one-party participatory democracy,”166 and subsequently appointed a Commission to 
simply inquire into the manner that this was to be achieved.
167
 The Zambian constitution was 
duly amended in 1973, and the country became a de jure one party state, with the ruling 
United National Independence Party (UNIP) becoming the only recognised political party. 
Under one party rule, elections loose the cardinal attributes of representation and 
accountability that ought to underpin genuine elections. The electorate lack a choice between 
competing party platforms and since ruling parties entrenched themselves in power, the 
electorate cannot hold them accountable by the ultimate sanction of removal from office. 
 
2.3.2.2 Corruption and Wastage of Public Resources 
The post-colonial African state became characterised with petty and gross corruption. Access 
to power translated into access to public resources, to be assumed for oneself and those linked 
to the politicians. Many politicians mercilessly plundered public resources for personal use 
and distributed to their clients. Frantz Fanon aptly characterised this African state when he 
wrote:  
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Scandals are numerous, ministers grow rich, their wives doll themselves up, the members of 
parliament feather their nests and there is not a soul down to the simple policeman or customs 
officer who does not join the great procession of corruption.
168 
Huge corruption and wastage scandals involving the ruling elite engulfed almost all African 
states. In Nigeria, for example, the Marketing Board, which was created in 1954 with revenue 
of 42 million British Pounds and earned an additional 26.4 million pounds between 1954 and 
1962, was by May 1962, under indigenous leadership, effectively bankrupt due to political 
corruption and wastage.
169
 President Shagari’s government in Nigeria, because of its endemic 
corruption, became known as “the government of contractors, for contractors and by 
contractors.”170 In Kenya, the Justice and Reconciliation Commission found the government 
of the first president Jomo Kenyatta and his successors (Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki) 
to have been guilty of “economic crimes and grand corruption.”171 In fact, due to high level 
corruption, Kenya is said   to have lost in excess of 70,000 heads of elephants during the 
tenure of President Jomo Kenyatta.
172
 The excesses of Jean-Bedel  Bokasa, who took power 
in Central Africa Republic  through a coup, and whose coronation (inauguration) cost in 
excess of $20 million, included seventeen  wives, each with plush palaces, chests of 
diamonds, expensive cars and other exotic toys.
173
  
In some instances, not only was corruption tolerated but in fact was encouraged. Zairian 
President, Mobuto Sese Seko, is known to have told his officials that, “if you steal, do not 
steal too much at a time. You may be arrested...steal cleverly, little by little.”174 In Burundi, 
Joseph Nzeyimana, a well-respected virulent critic of government corruption while in 
opposition, changed his attitude once he was co-opted into government and given a 
ministerial position. He justified his silence in government by quoting a Burundian proverb 
stating that, “a well raised child does not talk when his mouth is full.”175 
Corruption has had a tragic effect on the legitimacy of the government in the minds of the 
people. It engendered feelings of frustration, hopelessness and undermined the people’s faith 
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in the state. Many people even developed nostalgia for the colonial regimes as the 
independent state was increasingly seen as a mere “transformation of the state from an 
instrument of subjugation by an alien people into one of plunder by elected representatives 
who are supposed to administer it as a trust for the people.”176 
2.3.2.3 Extermination and Assassination of Perceived Enemies 
In many countries critics and opponents who could not be silenced by repressive laws and 
brutal power, had to be assassinated and in some circumstances large groups perceived to be 
enemies of the regime had to be exterminated. The regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 
Ethiopia in the 1970s executed more than 60 prominent former leaders and hundreds if not 
thousands of perceived enemies of the regime through his red terror campaign.
177
 In Malawi 
in 1983, three ministers and a Member of Parliament who suggested reforms to the one party 
system were bludgeoned to death by police.
178
The Zairian government, with the collaboration 
of Belgium and the USA, assassinated Patrice Lumumba;
179
 while in Zimbabwe the 
government of Robert Mugabe allegedly exterminated more than 15,000 Ndebele people (in 
the opposition stronghold of ZAPU Party) during the ‘war’ of Operation Gukurahudi 
ostensibly to get rid of dissenters.
180
 In Chad, the regime of Hissene Habre relied on death 
squads to keep its hold on power and is estimated to have exterminated at least 20, 000 
people.
181
 It is important to note that in June 2013, Senegal formally took Habre into custody 
to begin the process leading to his prosecution for these atrocities.
182
 
Kenya had a fair amount of political assassinations of leading critics and opposition leaders 
and perhaps better epitomises the phenomenon of assassinations. The four most devastating 
are probably the assassination of  Pio Goma Pinto, who was killed on 24 February, 1965, and 
whose death marked the beginning of political assassinations by the Kenyatta regime;
183
the 
assassination of Tom Mboya on 5 July, 1969;
184
 the assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki 
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(popularly known as JM), who was found dead on March 3, 1975;
185
 and the 1990 
assassination of  Robert Ouko, Kenya’s well respected foreign affairs minister, who had 
compiled a dossier of high level corruption in the Daniel Arap Moi regime.
186
 
These assassinations had the effect of inflicting terror in the opposition camps and the general 
public. By eliminating opponents and ruling on the basis of terror, African regimes lost the 
basis of constructing legitimacy on the consent of the people and, therefore, no longer truly 
representative of the people and accountable to them. 
2.3.2.4 Military Rule 
As the ruling elite entrenched themselves into power through the one party system, grand 
corruption and elimination of opponents, there was no viable democratic way of changing 
government by the people. Military interventions came to be seen as an answer to acute social 
and political problems and as an answer to national progress and stability.
187
  As a result, 
military coups became the only realistic method of regime change. Indeed military rule came 
to characterise the way power changed hands in Africa, as Joseph rightly stated: 
The African military coup d’état has accomplished the transfer of power and influence...much 
more frequently than have elections and other forms of national politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
188
 
 In the first few years, coups were sporadic and few but later increased in number. The first 
successful military coup to occur in postcolonial Africa was in Egypt in 1952 when a group 
of young military officers, under the leadership of Gamel Abdel Nasser took over power. 
This was followed by military takeover in Sudan in 1958, merely two years after attaining 
independence. From the 1958 Sudanese coup until 1965, only five more coups occurred 
across the African continent.
189
 These were in Zaire in 1960, Togo in 1963, Congo 
Brazzaville in 1963, Benin in 1963 and Gabon in 1964.
190
  
The floodgates opened after 1964. In 1965 and 1966, in the space of about one year, nine 
successful military coups took place and displaced existing regimes in Algeria, Benin, 
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Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Zaire, Ghana and Nigeria.
191
 There 
were eight coups in 1966 alone.
192
 Many more coups and attempted coups were to follow. 
Between 1956 and 2001 there were 108 failed coups across the continent and 80 successful 
ones.
193
  
Although military coups became the most viable practical way of seeking regime change, 
military rule by its nature is an extreme negation of representative and accountable 
government as power is assumed by force. The military, as soon as it assumed office, in 
almost all cases, settled down to be worse than the civilian regimes it had replaced. 
 
2.3.3 Democratic Revival of the Late 1980s and Early 1990s 
By the 1980s the retreat into authoritarianism seemed to be reaching its saturation point in 
Africa and people’s tolerance waned. They were tired of one-party and military dictatorships, 
gross corruption, assassinations and mass poverty caused by all this. Out of about fifty 
African states, by the 1980s only Botswana and Mauritius had remained genuinely 
democratic and conducted free and fair elections routinely.
194
 Elections, when held, were 
mere rituals meant to confirm the incumbent and his party in office. Between 1960 and 1989 
no election in the whole of Africa led to any change of government.
195
  Independence lost 
meaning as people came to see it as a “curse” which had brought them nothing more than 
more exploitation, pain, exclusion, humiliation and hopelessness and consequently tended to 
regard the former colonial years as the lost golden days.
196
 
The drive for democratic governance and multiparty elections erupted in the late 1980s across 
the whole continent. As a result of the pressure for democratic governance, between 1985 and 
1991, at least twenty-eight authoritarian governments in Africa were forced to make political 
and constitutional changes to allow for multiparty democracy, and at least eight credible 
elections were held during that period.
197
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Despite this strong drive for change in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the response to the 
drive was not even. Adejumobi has identified at least four patterns that characterised this 
democratisation wave.
198
 The first pattern was where civil society organisations were strong, 
well organised and took the lead and engaged the state in a fierce battle for reforms. As a 
result electoral laws were amended to allow for multiparty elections and key institutions such 
as the judiciary and electoral management bodies were given an appearance of autonomy. In 
such cases, usually popular civil society movements transformed themselves into opposition 
political parties. Under this pattern, opposition was able to wrestle power from the incumbent 
regimes.
199
  This was the case in countries such as Zambia, Benin, Malawi, Congo and the 
Cape Verde. In March 1991, Benin became the first African country in which the incumbent 
peacefully handed over power to the opposition following the defeat of President Kerekou by 
Nicephore Soglo in an election.
200
 Zambia followed Benin in October 1991 and became the 
first Anglophone African state to transition from one party regime to multipartism, following 
President Kaunda’s defeat by opposition leader Frederick Chiluba.201In Malawi, Kamuzu 
Band lost elections to Bakili Muluzi. 
The second pattern was where civil society took the initiative for change but the process was 
manipulated and hijacked by the ruling elite. The result was that existing laws were either not 
amended or very minimal changes were made to the electoral laws, and the regimes 
maintained firm control over the process.
202
 Under this pattern, elections were either not held 
or when held, they were manipulated and produced no change at all. This was the case in 
Togo, Kenya, Zaire and Gabon. In Zaire, for example, Mobutu initially yielded to pressure 
for democratic change and announced in April 1990 plans for reform. However, a month later 
he discarded the plans for change and openly declared that “never in my lifetime will there be 
multipartism in Zaire.”203  That same year when students in the city of Lubumbashi 
demonstrated against Mobutu’s decision to block reforms, his troops responded by shooting 
dead at least 294 students.
204
 Mobutu held on to power until 1997 when he was forced to flee 
by Laurent Kabila’s advancing forces. In Togo, Kenya and Gabon, Gnassimbe Eyadema, 
                                                          
198
 Ibid 
199
 Ibid 
200
 Souare “The 2011 Presidential Elections in Benin: Explaining the Success of One of Two-Firsts” 73-92 
201
 Barrie “Paradise Lost: The History of Constitutionalism in Africa Post Independence” 289- 322 
202
 Adejumobi “Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?” 59-73 
203
 Reyntjens “The Winds of Change: Political and Constitutional  Evolution in Francophone  Africa 1990-1991”  
44- 66 
204
 Ndikumana and Emizet “The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo”  
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=peri_workingpapers (Date of use: 
22 April 2014) 
42 
 
Daniel Arap Moi and Omar Bongo, respectively, managed to outmanoeuvre the reform 
process. Both Eyadema and Bongo died in office in 2005 and 2009 respectively, while Moi 
only left office in 2003 after surviving two cycles of “democratic” elections.205 
The third pattern is where the state took the front role in reform and offered some form of 
guided democratic reform in which it effectively manipulated the system and managed to 
impose its will. As in the second pattern, little was achieved in terms of electoral results. 
Such was the case in Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Algeria. In 
Algeria and Nigeria, the presidential election results of 1992 and 1993, respectively, were 
annulled when they were won by persons not favourable to the military regimes.
206
 
Finally, the fourth pattern is where the drive towards democratic transformation disintegrated 
and dissolved into conflict and civil war.
207
 This was the case in countries such as Rwanda, 
Burundi and Somalia. In Rwanda, for example, while negotiations were ongoing about 
creating a more inclusive government, President Habyerimana was killed as his plane was 
shot and crashed in April 1994 while approaching the Kigali airport. This triggered an 
unprecedented massive genocide that led to the death of at least 800, 000 people in the space 
of less than 100 days, mostly from the minority Tutsi ethnic group, and the widespread rape 
of women and children.
208
 
There were two major underlying factors that influenced the wave towards democratisation. 
First of all, as noted above, many people within Africa felt betrayed, angry and frustrated 
with the dictatorship regimes that replaced colonialism and plundered public resources for 
personal ends. This anger could, therefore, not be contained any further and it was just a 
matter of time before it exploded. The second factor was external. The demise of the Cold 
War between Russia and the West changed how both blocs dealt with Africa and adopted 
new policies. Russia’s Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s introduced the “new thinking” 
policy whereby Russia began to retreat from Africa and no longer maintained and sustained 
their client regimes that had relied on them for survival.
209
 France’s President Mitterrand also 
in 1990 announced at a Franco-Africa summit in June 1990, to the dismay of his African 
counterparts, that from then onwards democracy would be a necessary condition for receiving 
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French aid and cordial relations.
210
 There was at the same time a change of approach in the 
Western lending agencies. The World Bank, for example, in 1989 published a seminal report 
entitled “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,” in which it linked good 
governance to economic development and recognised the importance of the rule of law, 
freedom of the press and human rights.
211
 With these external changes, it meant that days of 
business as usual for African regimes were numbered. 
 
2.3.4 Emerging and Current Trends 
A lot has been achieved in Africa in terms of representative democracy since the democratic 
wave of the 1980s and 1990s. All over the continent, elections have become the universally 
accepted norm for ascending to power and changing government and are usually held 
routinely. In many countries, such as South Africa, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Zambia and even Nigeria (which has been the epicentre of brutal military rule in Africa), 
power has changed hands relatively peacefully. Some African leaders who lost elections have 
departed from office gracefully, while many others have respected constitutional term limits 
and left office after serving the stipulated terms in office. 
In spite of these achievements, problems still exist. There are also worrisome emerging trends 
which are a cause of concern as they may have negative impact on the conduct of genuine 
presidential elections in Africa. This section discusses current as well as emerging trends in 
Africa that may have a bearing on the conduct of presidential elections. It looks at the time 
from the year 2000 to date. Four trends will be discussed here: (i) The Arab uprising; (ii) the 
growth of Chinese influence on Africa; (iii) the emergence of power sharing deals to resolve 
election disputes; and (iv) regression and defying winds of change. 
 
2.3.4.1 Popular Uprising in North Africa 
African countries in North Africa (mainly Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), 
dominated by Arabic culture and Islamic religion, have since independence, been ruled by 
authoritarian dictators and have long been considered impervious to democracy. The 
democratisation of the 1980s and 1990s scantly affected North Africa. Some scholars have 
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long postulated that Arabic culture and Islamic faith are antithetical to the concepts of 
representative democracy where the people freely elect their governors, who are in turn 
accountable to them.
212
  British historian, Elie Kedourie, in 1992, characterised this view in 
these terms: 
...the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of 
representation, or elections, popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws 
laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an 
independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being composed of a 
multitude of self-activating groups and associations- all of these are profoundly alien to the 
Muslim political tradition.
213 
All this changed with the events of December 2010, which originated in Tunisia and spread 
to other Arabic countries in Africa and beyond the African continent to affect countries such 
as Syria.  It all started with a twenty-six year old street trader, Mohammed Bouazizi’s 
altercation with a policewoman on December 17, 2010, who abused him and confiscated his 
vegetable cart and its contents.
214
 Without education and employment to rely on, this 
threatened Bouazizi’s livelihood, his very survival and the well-being of his family. In 
frustration, he set himself on fire in front of municipal headquarters buildings and 
subsequently died of his wounds on January 4, 2011.
215
 This act sparked public protests, 
which moved from mere solidarity with Bouazizi, to demand for human rights, good 
governance, democracy and the removal of veteran authoritarian ruler President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali and his regime. Within December 2010, Ben Ali’s regime collapsed, 
succumbing to public protests, and he fled the country, bringing his 33 year rule to an abrupt 
halt. 
In Africa, the countries which are most affected as a result of the Arab spring are Tunisia, 
Libya and Egypt, where former veteran rulers were ousted from power. With the ousting of 
these authoritarian rulers, the herculean task of designing a government genuinely elected by 
the people, and government institutions accountable to the people began. However, this task 
has not been smooth sailing but has been attended with several hurdles, some threatening to 
drench the very spirit of the uprising. Here we discuss in outline the efforts of these three 
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(Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) to establish genuine representative governments where 
government serves on the basis of the will of the people. 
In Tunisia, where it all began, the country held its first credible election on October 23, 2011. 
The electorate elected a 217-member Constituent Assembly, whose largest party with a 41 
percent of seats is Ennahda.
216
 The Constituent Assembly set up an interim government and 
elected Hamadi Jebali, as the first interim Prime Minister, and Moncef Marzouki as the first 
interim President, to serve until a new constitution is promulgated and new elections held on 
the basis of that Constitution.
217
 The Constituent Assembly is, inter alia, tasked with writing 
the country’s new constitution. 
The Constituent Assembly has so far produced four draft constitutions and the final version is 
yet to be agreed and enacted. The fourth draft, nevertheless, gives a clear indication of the 
nature of government being crafted for Tunisia and how it will be set up. 
The draft constitution makes it clear that the people are the source of governmental power 
and they shall exercise this power through their freely elected representatives.
218
  It also 
proposes the combination of both the parliamentary and presidential systems, by vesting 
executive and state power into a president and prime minister, with both having real power. 
The president shall be elected for a term of five years “by means of general, free, direct and 
secret elections...by an absolute majority of the voters.”219 Where no candidate manages to 
secure an absolute majority, a run-off election featuring the two candidates with the highest 
votes shall be had.
220
 The Prime Minister, on the other hand, is to be appointed by the 
president from the party having the majority of seats in the legislature, or where two or more 
parties have the same number of seats, the appointment shall be based on the number of votes 
that a party received in an election.
221
  
It seems the Tunisian idea of splitting executive powers and sharing them between the 
president and prime minister is inspired by the experience of “one-man-show” dictators 
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consolidating all power in themselves. This shows a clear desire to cure this mischief so that 
one person or institution does not monopolise power and become so powerful as to enslave 
all other institutions. If the draft constitution is adopted and implemented in good faith, 
Tunisia will have made the tremendous transition from the era of absolute dictatorship to true 
representative democracy where government serves on the basis of the will of the people.  
Unlike Tunisia, Egypt’s transition to democracy seems tumultuous and more worrying. 
Egyptians, inspired by developments in Tunisia, took to the streets to protest against the 
dictatorship of the government of President Hosni Mubarak and demanded his removal. 
Mubarak succumbed to the pressure and stepped down on 11 February, 2011, where upon the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power on an interim basis to help steer 
the country forward.
222
  SCAF dissolved parliament on February 13, 2011, and suspended the 
1971 Egyptian Constitution, and set up a committee of experts of eight persons to revise the 
constitution.
223
  
The committee released its draft revised constitution on February 26, 2011, which was 
subsequently put to a referendum on March 19, 2011 and was adopted by 77 percent of the 
voters.
224
 This was to serve as an interim constitution to guide the transition period until a 
new comprehensive constitution was drafted and approved in a referendum by December 
2012.
225
 On the basis of the interim constitution, presidential elections were held on May 23 
and 24, 2011, and a run-off on June 16 and 17. Mohamed Morsi was elected president with 
51.7 percent of the popular vote.
226
   
The new government of President Morsi was short-lived. Increasing frustration and 
discontent with President Morsi’s governance style led to mass protests in June 2013. 
Protesters called for Morsi to either step down or call for an early presidential election. On 
July 3, General Sisi announced that the 2012 Constitution had been suspended, the president 
relieved of his duties, and an interim government would be appointed to spearhead the nine 
month transition.
227
 He subsequently appointed the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, 
Adly Mansour, as interim president. Mansour on July 8 issued a decree granting him 
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authority to appoint a legal committee to revise the constitution. The revised constitution 
would then be put to voters in a referendum for their approval and there after legislative and 
presidential elections would be held.
228
 In January 2014 a new constitution was put to the 
voters in a referendum. Although only 38 percent of the people turned up for the referendum, 
98.1 percent of the voters affirmed it.
229
 Consequently, presidential elections were held in 
May 2014 and unsurprisingly, General  al-Sisi was elected president, with 93 percent of votes 
( although the voter turnout was just about 46 percent).
230
 He was consequently sworn into 
office on a four year term on 9 June, seemingly ending a protracted period of turbulence.
231
 
Although the election of al-Sisi may have led to restoration of public order, his ascendancy to 
power represents a common phenomenon in Africa where military usurpers of power arrange 
for elections which they easily win and thus legitimise their assumption of power. 
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt where public protests drove their leaders to step down, Libyan 
leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi refused to go, thereby plunging his country into a 
protracted civil war. The UN Security Council, concerned about “the deteriorating situation, 
escalation of violence and the heavy civilian casualties,”232 authorised member states to take 
all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack and established a “no fly 
zone” over Libya. 233 This was the basis for NATO and allied forces’ aerial bombardments on 
Libya’s military targets that weakened Gaddafi’s military capability and enabled the rebel 
forces to capture and kill him on October 20, 2011. The National Transitional Council 
(NTC), which was the de facto government representing forces opposed to Gaddafi, declared 
Libya as liberated on October 23, 2011 and called for cessation of hostilities. 
The NTC was formed on February 27, 2011, as the de facto government for the anti-Gaddafi 
forces during the revolution. To help guide the orderly transition of the country to democratic 
governance, the NTC on August 3, 2011 promulgated a Constitutional Declaration. The 
Constitutional Declaration acknowledges that “the people are the source of powers” of 
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government. 
234
  For the time being, the NTC was the supreme power responsible for running 
government and for passing legislation.
235
 By the Constitutional Declaration, the NTC was 
suppose to dissolve itself after conducting elections of the National Public Conference 
(NPC), which would form the interim legislature and from which government (cabinet) 
would be drawn.
236
  The elections were duly held on July 7, 2012, and the NTC dissolved 
itself, leaving the NPC as the interim government tasked to spearhead the transition period 
and to draft a new constitution that would be put to a referendum for approval, and 
subsequent to this approval, hold legislative and presidential elections.
237
  The NPC, 
however, failed to timely draft the  constitution and had voted to extend the life of the interim 
government, which was due to end at the end of 2013, by another year to enable  the drafting 
of the constitution to be completed. This led to the members of the NTC claiming that the 
NPC was hence unconstitutional and revived itself as the constitutional government. This has 
led into Libya being divided into two groups claiming to be the legitimate government, in 
addition to other less well organised armed groups strewn across the country.
238
 As of March 
2015, under the auspices of the UN, the warring factions have been negotiating the possibility 
of establishing a government of national unity.
239
 
In general, the Arab revolution in North Africa has opened a new possibility, which could not 
have been imagined a few years ago, of establishing genuine representative democracy. 
However, several years of dictatorship that negated the development of strong and 
autonomous democratic institutions means that the democratic process almost starts from 
scratch. New constitutions, electoral laws and institutions have to be crafted to embolden the 
process. In all the three countries most affected by the revolution (Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), 
the old order has died but the new democratic state is yet to be born. The collapse of the 
Morsi government is an indication that the transition process for these countries is replete 
with difficulties and will be protracted. 
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Although the Arab spring did not inspire large scale protests in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was a 
strong reminder across the continent that real power vests in people. In some instances, some 
authoritarian leaders took drastic measures to stave off the possibility of similar protests 
arising in their own countries. In Eritrea, for example, media coverage of the Arab protests 
was forbidden,
240
 while in Zimbabwe, some activists who circulated videos of the Arab 
uprising were arrested.
241
 In Chad, senior military officers and some legislators were 
imprisoned on allegations that they intended to cause Arab-like uprisings.
242
 In Burkina Faso, 
however, protests similar to those of the Arab Spring occurred in October 2014. The protests 
were a reaction against President Blaise Campaore’s attempts to amend the national 
constitution in order to allow him run for another term in office (having already been in 
power for 27 years). The protesters, inter alia, set fire to the parliamentary buildings and 
ultimately led to the resignation of Campaore.
243
 
 
2.3.4.2 The Emergence of China as a Major Donor 
When discussing the revival of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, it was noted above that 
one of the contributing factors was that after the demise of the Cold War, Western states and 
their multilateral financial institutions, now conditioned aid on good governance. This 
compelled many countries to begrudgingly open up the political space in order to receive aid. 
As a result, some measures of success in good governance and democracy have been 
recorded. 
However, the emergence of China as a major player in the African aid industry is considered 
by many as potentially disruptive of the gains made to African democracy because of China’s 
manner of delivering its aid. The emergence of China as a major donor and lender has rapidly 
transformed the foreign aid landscape in Africa as western donors no longer enjoy a 
monopoly.
244
 
The recently held Fifth Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing agreed on a 
Beijing Action Plan 2013-2015. Under this plan, China will provide African countries with 
USD20billion in concessional loans to be applied in the development of agriculture, 
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infrastructure and manufacturing.
245
  This is double the figure that China had pledged in 2010 
and indicates China’s growing intent to engage Africa in this respect. The value of trade 
between Africa and China in 2011 was in excess of USD260billion, a drastic improvement 
from the USD1billion in 1981.
246
 This dovetails with Africa’s strong economic growth over 
the past 10 years. Over the past 10 year, six of the world’s top ten fastest growing economies 
were in Africa and it is estimated that seven of the top 10 fastest growing economies in the 
next five years will be African.
247
 This development has given African states an ability to 
seek new external partnerships, including being able to borrow money directly from the 
markets. The downside to this, however, is that the economic development is largely fuelled 
by the growth in the extractive sector and the benefits from there have not spread enough 
around to ease poverty.
248
 
Chinese funding as compared to traditional Western aid is more appealing to African leaders 
because it is considered not to have any strings attached and does not even consider good 
governance and democracy as conditions for its provision.
249
 China’s funding is also 
preferable because it does not involve complex procedures to access it; and most of it goes to 
priority areas identified by African countries themselves.
250
  
On the other side, China’s unconditional support to Africa has been criticised for its potential 
disruptive effect on democratic consolidation in Africa. First of all, China’s involvement in 
Africa is criticised for lacking normative principles as it deals with all African states in the 
same manner regardless of the country’s human rights and good governance score card. For 
example, China continues to conduct its business smoothly with governments with records of 
gross human rights violations and authoritarianism such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.
251
  
Secondly, Chinese aid is seen as helping many African countries meet public demands for 
development in areas of infrastructure and services. To this effect, roads, hospitals, bridges 
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and schools have been built with Chinese support.
252
 However, this kind of development may 
mask authoritarian regimes as it superficially gives incumbent governments, in the eyes of 
their nationals, some performance legitimacy.
253
 In the long run, governments which were 
making strides towards greater democratisation may stall the process knowing that they have 
carrots to dangle before the electorate, without necessarily undertaking the painstaking and 
risky process of strengthening democratic institutions.
254
  In other words, the manner in 
which Chinese aid is delivered can be said to reduce or in some cases completely remove “the 
incentives for recipient countries’ good governance reforms.”255 This potential regression 
could obviously affect the conduct of democratic elections and the opening up of political 
space.  
Should this trend materialise and Africa regress on the democratic path, then Chinese aid may 
turn out detrimental to Africa’s long term development and good governance credentials. 
However, as noted above, Chinese aid is considered unconditional, that is, the Chinese 
government deals with African governments as they are. It is, therefore, possible that African 
states with relatively strong governance institutions and vibrant civil society organisations 
will not be adversely affected by the increasing aid. This is because where a culture of strong 
and accountable institutions and vibrant civil society has been developed, it is likely that 
Chinese aid will be negotiated in a transparent and accountable manner.  Botswana might be 
a good example here. Bilateral aid and trade between the two countries grew from about zero 
30 years ago to about USD 149 million per annum in 2007.
256
 Yet Botswana’s good 
governance indicators have continued on a positive trajectory as before.
257
  This enables aid 
to be seen as going to the people and not in support of any particular regime. On the other 
hand, weak states without strong governance institutions and wavering or suppressed civil 
society may turn out to be the most adversely affected. However, evidence of Africa going 
into democratic regression as a result of increasing Chinese aid is anecdotal and 
incomplete.
258
 One study comparing good governance indicators (focusing on corruption and 
regulatory quality) between 2002 and 2009 in 16 Sub-Saharan African countries found that 
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Mauritania, which had not received significant Chinese support, was the only one to have 
recorded significant negative changes to its governance indicators, while in others there were 
no significant changes either positive or negative.
259
 
 
2.3.4.3 Power Sharing Agreements 
Power sharing agreements involve “the construction of a more or less inclusive government 
that represents a broad range of concerned parties.”260 This usually involves the sharing of 
senior government portfolios.  Power sharing deals are not new to Africa. They have 
traditionally been used as effective tool of conflict resolution where a war ceases by the 
creation of unity government which includes all major warring parties.
261
  Such deals have 
been employed in countries such as Congo Brazzaville (1999), Sierra Leone (1991, 1996, and 
2001), Ivory Coast (2003), Angola (2002), Liberia (2003), and Burundi (2003).
262
  
Power sharing deals, however, are now emerging as a way of resolving disputed presidential 
elections.  Following the corrupt and fraudulent 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria, for 
example, the new president proposed to form a unity government bringing together all the 
major parties.
263
 This never materialised. It was Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2008) where 
such agreements were consummated following fraudulent and disputed presidential elections. 
In both countries the disputed elections led to the eruption of violence on unprecedented 
scales leading to the death and injury of thousands of people. With the support of the 
international community, power sharing deals were concluded as a means of ending violence 
and resolving the post-election crisis. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the power sharing deal was signed on 15 September, 2008, by 
President Robert Mugabe representing ZANU-PF, Morgan Tsvangirai representing the main 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), and Professor Arthur Mutambara representing 
the breakaway MDC (MDC-M). In it the parties agree to resolve “once and for all” the 
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political crisis and to chart a new political direction for the country.
264
 The parties agreed to 
form a unity government and, ironically, named Mugabe, who had lost the first round of 
elections, as the president, and relegated Tsvangirai, the winner of the first round of elections, 
as Prime Minister, while Mutambara became a deputy prime minister. 
265
 Cabinet positions 
were shared with ZANU-PF being assigned 15, MDC-T 13, and MDC-M 3. At the deputy 
minister level ZANU-PF was assigned 8, MDC-T 6 and MDC-M 1 position.
266
  
The same thing happened in Kenya. Following the disputed elections of December 2007, 
Kenya descended into a theatre of violence that led to the death of at least 1,000 people and 
displacement of more than 350,000.
267
 With the facilitation of the international community, 
the rival parties agreed on a power sharing deal, which was passed as the National Accord 
and Reconciliation Act 2008. The agreement recognised that in the context of the violence 
that followed the disputed elections, neither party would be able to govern without the 
support of the other.
268
 The agreement provided for the formation of coalition government 
and the establishment of positions of a Prime Minister and two deputy Prime Ministers.
269
 
Cabinet and government positions were equitably distributed under the requirement that “the 
composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the relative parliamentary 
strengths of the parties and shall at all times take into account the principle of portfolio 
balance.”270  Under this coalition government, Mwai Kibaki served as president and Raila 
Odinga as Prime Minister. 
Proponents of power sharing agreements see such agreements as the best tool for securing an 
end to conflicts and providing mechanisms for distribution of senior government positions.
271
 
In relation to Zimbabwe, Musunungure argued that the power sharing agreement had the 
following advantages: it set a precedent for peaceful resolution of future electoral disputes; 
opened up political space and set the transition process in motion; and ended the status of 
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Zimbabwe’s isolation in the sub-region.272 It has also been argued that power sharing 
agreements are also good for Africa as they reflect the inclusive nature of traditional African 
society where governance was a consultative and inclusive enterprise.
273
 
It is our view that these supposed advantages are superficial and constitute real danger to the 
consolidation of electoral democracy in Africa as they set  dangerous precedents . In 
discussing the concept of elections above, it was noted that elections, inter alia, are a tool for 
leadership recruitment, which leadership rests on the will of the people. Power sharing 
agreements do not recruit leadership to government on the basis of the decisions of the 
electorate and therefore, negate the concept of representative democracy. Power sharing deals 
turn elections into an “arbitrary bargaining process”274 which enable incumbents to hold onto 
power, despite actually losing elections, as was the case both in Kenya and Zimbabwe. In this 
sense, power sharing agreements actually undermine elections as the vehicle of recruiting the 
nation’s leadership on the basis of the people’s will. As President Ian Khama of Botswana 
aptly observed:  
These power-sharing agreements are not the way to go on the continent. You cannot have a 
situation where a ruling party, when it senses it may lose an election, can manipulate the 
outcome so that they can stay on in power.
275
 
Elections are also a tool in the hands of the electorate to collectively hold those in power 
accountable. Power sharing agreements, however, take away this power to punish or reward 
performance. Where subsequent elections are held after the power sharing government, this 
creates an unnecessary disadvantage for voters as they will find it difficult to identify key 
players and assign responsibility for government’s performance or lack of it.276 
Seeing any advantage in power sharing agreements is missing the point. Power sharing deals 
in the context of disputed elections, as shown by Zimbabwe and Kenya, only reward those 
who created the problems. They are a danger to democracy and should not be set as 
precedents. As a Nigerian newspaper correctly observed,  with regard to Zimbabwe, power 
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sharing agreements are the “sanctification of brigandage and buccaneering and the 
acceptance of brinkmanship as the basis of governance and leadership.”277  
 
2.3.4.4 Regression and Defying Winds of Change 
This section looks at three inter-related trends: long serving leaders who defy the winds of 
change and refuse to go and let democracy prevail; removal of presidential term limits; and 
military coups. These trends not only defy the process of democratic consolidation but are 
also symptomatic of democratic regression. 
Despite the progress made in democratisation since the democratic wave of the 1980s and 
1990s, there are still several African leaders who managed to defy the winds of change. They 
have survived by outfoxing the democratic wave and now, after decades in office, still cling 
to power through personalisation of the state, intimidation of opponents, crashing dissent, and 
outright rigging of elections. Such leaders include Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial 
Guinea who has been in power since 1979; Jose Edwardo dos Santos of Angola in power 
since 1977; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe since 1980; Yoweri Museveni of Uganda since 
1986; Omar al-Bashir of Sudan since 1989; and Idriss Derby Itno of Chad who assumed 
power in 1990.
278
 Each of these has been in power for more than two decades. 
African leaders who overstay in power tend to undermine democratic institutions, consolidate 
power in themselves and abuse public resources for private ends. Museveni of Uganda once 
stated that “no African head of state should be in power for more than 10 years.”279  This 
according to Museveni is because it is difficult to remove such leaders democratically from 
office.  
As part of the democratisation process, many African countries included presidential term 
limits in their constitutions. These basically restricted presidents to serve a maximum of two 
terms. However, since 2000 there has been a trend of eroding this achievement by incumbent 
presidents who have instigated amendments to allow them to serve a third term in office and 
sometimes ad infinitum. In some countries such as Zambia, Nigeria and Malawi, such 
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attempts were defeated by the people. However, in the vast majority where attempts were 
made, they were successful. Such countries include: 
 Senegal, where the Constitutional Council in January 2012 permitted President 
Abdoulaye Wade to run for a third term on the pretext that his term in office  predated 
the two-term  constitutional reform,
280
 
 Uganda, where the constitution was amended in 2005 to abolish term limits281 
 Tunisia, where President Ben Ali in 2002 won 100 percent support to remove term 
limits and run for office without term limits,
282
 
 Namibia, where the constitution was amended to allow Sam Nujoma to serve a third 
term in office,
283
 
 Djibouti, where the legislature in 2010 passed a constitutional amendment  that 
allowed President Ismail Omar Guelleh to run for a third term in office,
284
 
 Chad, where a referendum in 2005 approved an amendment to remove term limits, 
allowing President Idriss Derby to serve unlimited terms,
285
 
 Cameroon: the legislature amended the constitution to remove the two-term limits, 
allowing President Paul Biya to extend his term in office,
286
 
 Algeria, where in November 2008  the legislature lifted presidential term limits, 
allowing President Abdelaziz Boteflika to stay in office without any limit,
287
  
 Burkina Faso, where the Constitutional Court ruled that the constitutional two-term 
limits of 2005 could not be applied retroactively, thereby clearing the way for 
President Blaise Compaore to seek and win re-election in 2010 for a third term in 
office.
288
 Compaore was forced out of office following violent protests against his 
intention to change the constitution and seek another term of office. 
 In Burundi, a Bill was presented to parliament on 21 March 2014 to remove the 
presidential terms limits to allow Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term when his 
term expires in 2015. The Bill failed to pass by one vote. The Interior Minister, 
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Eduard Nduwimana, however, announced that despite the loss in parliament, the 
president will go ahead and run and it will be for the Constitutional Court to settle the 
matter.
289
 In May 2015, the Constitutional Court opened the way for the president to 
run for another term when it ruled that Nkurunziza is not constitutionally barred from 
running.
290
 The decision plunged the country into civil unrest and led to an attempted 
coup.
291
 
 In Congo DR, government introduced a Bill to parliament in January 2015 which 
would have led to the removal of term limits and allowed President Kabila to seek 
another term in office in 2016 when he is due to step down. However, this decision by 
government met massive protests across the country, leading to the death of at least 
45 people.
292
 The Bill was withdrawn pending further consultations.  
 In the case of Rwanda, although the government has not made any official position, 
fears are growing that the incumbent leader, President Paul Kagame, has  plans to 
amend the national  constitution to remove term limits and run for a third term in 
office when his current term expires in 2017.
293
 
Another observable phenomenon is the resumption (or continuing) of military coups as a 
means of displacing regimes. Military coups are about the removal of a government by means 
of military power. This can be directly, where the military takes over the power, or indirectly, 
where, with military instigation or support some other civilians oust government and assume 
power.  In this respect Africa seems to set the wrong and unenviable record of being host to 
at least 10 military coups out of 18 coups that have occurred between 2000 and 2013 
globally.
294
 This is despite the AU taking a strong stand against unconstitutional changes of 
government and not generally recognising governments that come into office 
unconstitutionally.
295
 
                                                          
289
 See http://www.modernghana.com/news/531809/1/rejecting-term-limits-burundi-president-seeks-re-
e.html (Date of use: 2 June 2014)  
290
 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/burundi-court-validates-president-term-bid-
150505095216200.html (Date of use: 20 May 2015) 
291
 Ibid  
292
 “Grief and Anger in Congo Following Violent Protests Against Joseph Kabila”  
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/26/democratic-republic-congo-protests-joseph-
kabila (Date of use: 4 April 2015)  
293
 “Eyes on Rwanda over Plans to Allow Kagame to Seek Third Term in Office” 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/2555122/-/50h00mz/-/index.html (Date of use: 4 April 2015)   
294
 See http://www.privatemilitary.org/adverse/military_coups.html (Date of use: 22 December 2013) 
295
 See Article 23 African Charter on Democracy , Elections and Governance 2007 and Article 4(p) Constitutive 
Act of the AU 2000  
58 
 
The following are some of the military coups that have occurred in Africa since the year 
2000: 
 Egypt: On July 3, 2013 President Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military; 
 Central Africa republic: President François Bozize was deposed by the military in 
March 2013. This was preceded by a coup  in  2003 which ousted prime Minister 
Ange-Felix Patasse; 
 Mali: The military deposed President  Amadou Toumani Toure in March 2012; 
 Niger: In February 2010, President  Mamadou Tandja was deposed 
 Mauritania: On August 6, 2008, President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdllahi was deposed by 
the military. Another coup had occurred in august 2005 which ousted President 
Maaouiya Ould Taya; 
 Togo: A military coup occurred in February 2004 to replace President Etienne 
Eyadema; 
 Guinea-Bissau: The military deposed President Kumba Yala in September 2003; and 
 Sao Tome and Principe, where President Fradique de Menezes was removed from 
office in 2003.
296
 
Military rule is usually assumed through force and continually sustained through threat of 
violence. It is by its nature inimical to representative and accountable democratic governance. 
 
2.4 Presidential Elections in Africa: Theoretical and Practical Issues 
An electoral system is a mechanism by which eligible citizens in a state are enabled to choose 
their elective office bearers. In modern states, the electoral system is usually defined in the 
Constitution of the country and in other written laws and as such it is “a set of essentially 
unchanged election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted in a 
particular democracy.”297 
Broadly speaking, African states choose their leaders under three major electoral systems, 
namely the presidential, parliamentary and monarchical systems. Each of these has essential 
defining features but it is not uncommon to find elements of one in the other. Indeed, as many 
nations re-engineer their systems, sometimes the differences blur. However, it must be noted 
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that these are broad classifications. Glaring differences could still exist in countries that apply 
the same system. As such, this section does not address nuanced differences that may exist 
within the same system but simply focuses on the broad analysis of each system. 
 
2.4.1 Presidential System 
There are many definitions of a presidential system and some are extremely complex.
298
 For 
purposes of this research, a presidential system is defined minimally and considered as one 
where the chief executive of the government or state is elected directly by the people. It does 
not matter how nuanced the electoral rules guiding the elections may be, provided the 
mandate comes directly from the electorate. The presidential system is the dominant model 
on the African continent. With the exception of Lesotho, Swaziland and Morocco which are 
monarchs, there are just about five countries which apply the parliamentary model 
(Botswana, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritius and South Africa). The rest of the Countries apply the 
presidential model where the president is directly elected by the people.
299
 
Two seminal articles of Juan J. Linz entitled “Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary: 
Does it Make a Difference?”300 and “The Perils of Presidentialism”301  are probably the most 
eminent scholarly discussion of the presidential system (in contrast to the parliamentary 
system). In these works, Linz offers a comparative analysis between Presidential system and 
Parliamentary systems and concludes that the presidential system is unsuited for long term 
national stability and democracy. Linz’s analysis and debunking of presidentialism can be 
clustered as resting under the following four themes which are discussed further below: full 
claim to democratic legitimacy; dual legitimacy; rigid or fixed term of office; and zero sum 
game of winner-take-all. 
2.4.1.1 Full Claim to Democratic Legitimacy 
Linz considers that electing a president directly by the people is one of the advantages of the 
presidential system as it clothes the president with democratic legitimacy, knowing that his or 
her mandate is not mediated by parliament but wells up directly from the people who elected 
him or her. This sets the president in charge of the government apparatus and constitutes 
government (cabinet) which is responsive to him/her and exercises full control over it. 
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Linz however notes that it is common place for presidents under this system to be elected, 
where there are several candidates, by a slim majority and thus where this happens, the claim 
to democratic legitimacy upon which they hold power as representatives of the people is 
manifestly nonexistent.
302
 To support this view, Linz cites the example of 1979 Chilean 
presidential elections where Allende was returned to office with a paltry 36.2 per cent of the 
popular vote (whilst his closest opponent Allesandri got 34.9 percent). The fact that the 
president in such a case has not been elected by the majority leads to tension in the country 
and in socially and ideologically divided societies, this may lead to conflict. Even if some 
countries require a minimum percentage of votes (usually 50 per cent) for one to be elected 
president, Linz considers this as negative as it invariably leads to the top two contenders and 
their camps in a bitter battle. For a divided society, this easily leads to instability and is thus a 
major disadvantage of the presidential system, as it leads to polarisation.
303
 
Linz’s view that the presidential system (in contrast to the parliamentary system) leads to 
minority presidents and leads to polarisation in society is, respectfully, incorrect. First of all, 
where a president in a presidential system is elected by a simple majority, there is always the 
possibility of electing a minority president. This was the case during the 2001 Zambian 
elections where the winner, Levy Mwanawasa, only garnered a paltry 29 percent of the 
popular vote.
304
 However, it must be noted that the simple majority is not inherent and a 
necessary concomitant of the presidential system. It is possible to engineer a presidential 
system to ensure that the president is elected by a qualified majority and to have that majority 
defused across the country. The new Kenyan Constitution, for instance, requires that not only 
should the president be elected by more than half of all the votes cast in an election but also 
that she/he should at least garner 25 per cent of the votes cast in each of the more than half of 
the counties of Kenya.
305
 Similarly, the Nigerian Constitution requires that not only should 
the winning candidate obtain the appropriate majority, but must also garner not less than one-
quarter of the votes cast in at least two-thirds of all the federal states including the federal 
capital.
306
 This ensures the president has both majority and national support which reflects the 
national character. 
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In any case, minority leaders can be produced by the parliamentary system as well, contrary 
to the views of Linz. For example, while the Labour Party during the 2005 UK elections won 
an overall majority of 55.1 percent of the seats in the House of Commons, by popular vote 
they only got 35.2 per cent of the votes.
307
 This actually meant that even if the Labour Party 
had gained sufficient numbers of Members of Parliament to form government that 
government actually rested on very thin public support. 
The implication that the presidential system necessarily leads to polarisation, instability and 
conflict is also incorrect. The early conflicts that assailed some Anglophone countries in the 
aftermath of independence are attributable to the unsuitability of the parliamentary system 
actually. Nigeria, for example, attained independence under the Westminster parliamentary 
style, under which “a cluster of ethnic groups from the north had managed to secure a 
majority of seats and shut all other groups out of power.”308  This is considered to have 
precipitated the military coup d’états of 1966 and the Biafra war of secession in Nigeria.309 
Uganda is another example of a parliamentary system that did not lead to democratic 
stability. In 1966, after years of power  struggles between the Prime Minister Milton Obote 
and the  titular President Sir Edward Mutesa II ( the King of the Baganda , Uganda’s largest 
ethnic group), Obote’s military forces invaded Mutesa’s palace and forced him into exile. 
Obote then abrogated the Constitution and turned himself into an executive president.
310
 This 
brought about instability, military coups and war that took Uganda many years to recover 
from. 
2.4.1.2 Dual Legitimacy 
The presidential system necessarily creates two spheres of power, both claiming a direct 
mandate from the people. These are the president and the legislature, as each is elected 
directly by the people. Therefore, even if the president is directly elected and entitled to full 
democratic legitimacy, the legislature too claims the same legitimacy as it is also elected by 
the people. And since the legislature is elected separately, it is possible that it could be 
dominated by another party or parties opposed to the president’s party. According to Linz, 
when the legislature is dominated by another party opposed to the president, and this party is 
cohesive, disciplined and ideologically different, this necessarily creates problems as to who 
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truly represents the people. As Linz asked: “who has the stronger claim to speak on behalf of 
the people: the president or the legislative majority that opposes his/her policies?”311  
In Linz’s view, when this happens, “no democratic principle exists to resolve disputes 
between the executive and the legislature about which of the two actually represents the will 
of the people.”312 He believes that even where constitutional mechanisms exist to resolve the 
impasse, the mechanisms are likely to be “too complicated and aridly legalistic” to be of 
much use to the electorate. As a result, in such cases the armed forces are always tempted to 
interfere as ‘mediators.’ 
It is worth noting, as will be show in the next section that Linz also argues that the 
presidential system is inclined to producing winner-take-all presidents as the race for running 
government is a zero - sum game. This is a clear contradiction in Linz’s thoughts because 
where an election produces an executive and legislature controlled by different parties, then 
clearly this is not a winner-take-all result. As Harowitz has observed, “it is difficult to 
complain about inter-branch checks and balances and winner-take-all politics at the same 
time.”313  Where a party does not get the executive but wins the majority of seats in 
parliament that makes it more likely that there will be a check on executive power. 
In any case, the problem of dual legitimacy is not exclusive to presidentialism but has 
afflicted parliamentary systems as well. This has been a common phenomenon in 
parliamentary systems with bicameral chambers and each chamber is controlled by a different 
party.
314
 It is the duty of framers of a constitution to anticipate the possibility of dual 
legitimacy in modern states and provide for mechanisms of avoiding or resolving competing 
claims. Parliamentary systems with bicameral chambers such as Canada, Germany, and Japan 
have constitutional provisions which give the upper houses more power over lower 
legislatures but are precluded from exercising a vote of confidence against government.
315
  
2.4.1.3 Rigid or fixed Term 
Linz argues that under the presidential system, presidents are elected for a fixed term in 
office, after which they have to seek re-election and in many cases presidential systems have 
term limits. He considers this as causing rigidity to politics as the term cannot be modified, 
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shortened or even prolonged. This turns the political process into “broken discontinuous, 
rigidly determined periods without possibility for continuous readjustments as political, 
social and economic events might require.”316  This, in Linz’s view, creates chaos if midterm 
an incumbent president dies or is incapacitated. The successor, if subjected to a new election, 
may come from a party different from the predecessor or even if he comes from the same 
party as the predecessor, he may simply implement his own policies. Or where the successor 
was the vice president who was elected as a running mate, such a person is considered to 
have been imposed by the president and may not have the support the president had. In fact, 
the president may have resorted to him/her because he/she least presented a threat to the 
president’s hold on power. 
Linz also argues that fixed term limits adversely affect how presidents implement policies to 
which their name is tied. The limited time they have in power encourages a sense of urgency 
in implementing policies which may lead to ill conceived policy initiatives and hasty 
implementation. As a president is racing against time to build a legacy for himself/herself, 
he/she is likely to spend money unwisely. Linz considers that in the presidential system, it is 
difficult to remove an inept president as there is no vote of confidence, leaving only the 
drastic and difficult process of impeachment.
317
 
It is true that fixed terms, without a vote of confidence, in presidential systems can be a 
serious hindrance to check or remove an ill-performing president. However, considering that 
we have defined a presidential system as one where the president is directly elected by the 
electorate, which seems to be Linz’s definition as well, then the issue of fixed and limited 
terms is not peculiar to presidential systems. Under the South African Constitution, for 
example, where the president is elected by parliament, the Constitution provides for fixed 
tenure and limited term in office to two five year terms.
318
 
2.4.1.4 Winner-takes-all 
In Linz’s view the most important negative implication of presidentialism is that it turns 
elections into a zero-sum game which consequently leads to winner-take-all electoral 
outcomes. Linz argues that in parliamentary systems, the winning party may win a majority 
of seats but the minority would still have representation in parliament, which could be used as 
a bargaining chip in coalition building. This is contrary to presidential system which only 
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produces one winner, however slender their victory was. The feeling of being elected directly 
by the people gives the president a “sense of power and mission that might contrast with the 
limited plurality that elected him.”319 
As a zero-sum game, elections mark off winners and losers for the entire duration of the 
presidential term. This is because of the rigidity and fixed term of office of the president 
whereby there is no possibility of expansion of alliances, expansion of government support 
base or holding of new elections in response to major new developments in society. 
As already noted above, Linz’s argument that presidentialism as opposed to parliamentalism 
is more inclined to produce winner-take-all electoral results is incorrect. In the UK, which has 
a long history of the parliamentary system, for example, in the last three decades the ruling 
party often won a decisive majority seats and obtained full control of government, despite 
winning far less than 50 per cent of the popular vote.
320
 During the 2005 elections, as stated 
above, the Labour Party only got 32 per cent of the popular vote but managed to get 55.1 per 
cent of seats in Parliament. In fact, in Africa, many countries that inherited the Westminster 
parliamentary model, such as Ghana and Nigeria, had to abandon it because it produced 
governments that were not inclusive, in preference for the presidential system. The 
parliamentary system bequeathed upon Nigeria at independence, with a titular president to 
mirror the British monarchy and a Prime Minister in charge of government, simply could not 
hold and led to political anarchy. Distinguished Nigerian law scholar, Ben Nwabueze, 
reflecting on some of these challenges stated:  
Ministers in Nigeria never regarded themselves as the president’s ministers or the government 
as his own. If anything, the Prime Minister regarded himself as the President’s superior and 
often behaved as such towards him. There were hardly any attitudes of personal allegiance, of 
reverence or of courtesy towards him; he lacked the attribute of kingly majesty in the eyes of 
the ministers.
321 
Such experiences indicate that most of the shortcomings that are often associated with the 
presidential system are not inherent to it. They exist in other systems as well. What matters is 
to engineer the electoral system to specific circumstances of each state. 
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However, where the presidential system is employed without adequate safeguards for 
inclusiveness, it is likely that it will be inclined towards a winner-take-all result and 
precipitate conflict. This is likely to be the case where the presidential system uses the simple 
majority method of electing presidents. It has been argued that the all-or-nothing structure of 
the 1993 Nigerian presidential election made it possible for the military to annul the election 
results. This is because the losers of the election felt that they had no immediate stake in the 
political outcome and, therefore, readily acquiesced in the annulment of the election in the 
hope of being able to run again.
322
  The same argument is advanced for Jonas Savimbi’s 
resumption of conflict in Angola following his 1994 election loss to Jose Edwardo dos 
Santos. Equally, it was the same with Dennis Sassou Nguesso’s military ousting of his 
successor, Pascal Lessouba, following the Congolese presidential elections of 1992, as it was 
felt that losing a presidential election meant losing all.
323
 
2.4.2. Parliamentary System 
In a parliamentary system the leader of government (whether titled as Prime Minister or 
President) is not elected directly by the electorate but by the people’s representatives in 
parliament. Such a president or leader does not have a direct mandate from the electorate but 
it instead derives from the confidence and consent of Members of Parliament through an 
election. Government or cabinet serves at the pleasure and confidence of parliament. As 
indicated above, very few African countries use this model (Botswana, Ethiopia, Libya, 
Mauritius, and South Africa).
324
 The presidential system is the dominant model in Africa. 
Botswana is an example of a country that applies the parliamentary system. Under the 
Constitution of Botswana, the president is elected by members of the National Assembly.
325
 
Once elected, the president is considered a member of parliament
326
 and his or her tenure is 
for an aggregate period not exceeding 10 years.
327
 The president, including the entire 
government, is removable by a vote of no confidence supported by majority of all members 
entitled to vote.
328
 South Africa is another example of a parliamentary system. Although 
South Africa is usually classified as a mixed system, but going by our minimalist definition 
of a parliamentary system above, South Africa would then offer a good example of a 
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parliamentary system (on account that the President is not elected by the people but through 
the legislature). Under the South African constitutional system, the president, unlike the 
traditional Westminster model where the prime minister only heads government but not the 
state, is the head of both government and state.
329
 The president is elected at the first sitting 
of the National Assembly, or whenever it is necessary to fill a vacancy, from among its 
members.
330
 The South African Constitution provides for a no confidence vote under two 
circumstances: when a majority of the National Assembly pass a motion of no confidence in 
cabinet, but excluding the president, in which case the president has to reconstitute his 
cabinet;
331
 and where the majority of the National Assembly passes a motion of no 
confidence in the president, in which case the president and his entire cabinet have to 
resign.
332
 
As discussed above in contradistinction with the presidential system, apologists of the 
parliamentary system believe that the parliamentary system is the best in ensuring democratic 
stability in any country. As already stated, these advantages  of the parliamentary system are 
said to revolve around four ideas: that in a parliamentary system the  prime minster does not 
claim full democratic legitimacy as his/her  power is proportional to his  or her Party’s 
strength in parliament; that the parliamentary system avoids the challenge of dual legitimacy 
involved in the presidential system as government is based on the confidence of parliament; 
that the parliamentary system is flexible as there are no term limits and fixed terms as 
government can be recalled at anytime by parliament through the  device of the confidence 
vote; and that under the parliamentary system, even the minority parties have representation 
in parliament, hence avoids the zero-sum game of winner-take-all under the presidential 
system. But as has been argued above, these features are rather caricatures of the system that 
do not necessarily exist in one system alone. The defects found in one system can be 
observed in the other.  
2.4.3 Monarchical System 
The concept of elections, as discussed above, is premised on government that wells up from 
the collective consent of the people. Through genuine, free and fair elections, the electorate 
choose their leaders and hold them accountable for their promises and behaviour. 
Government, therefore, derives its existence from the will of the people. It thus goes without 
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saying that in countries where ascent to power is based on heredity, many conceptual and 
practical problems ensue. 
Hereditary leaders’ claim to power usually lies in a long myth-filled tradition which is 
claimed as a matter of right, or as Thomas Paine stated: “that what at first was submitted to as 
a convenience, was afterwards claimed as a right.”333 Paine considers monarchs or hereditary 
leaders to have no more legitimacy than the leader of criminal gangs, whose power is 
maintained by subtlety and savagery:  
Whereas it is more than probable, that we could take off the dark covering of antiquity, and 
trace them to their first rise, we should find the first of them nothing better than the principal 
ruffian of some restless gang, whose savage manners or pre-eminence in subtlety obtained 
him the title of chief among plunderers; and who by increasing in power, and extending his 
depredations, overawed the quiet and defenceless to purchase their safety by frequent 
contributions.
334
 
To address this inherent challenge in state led by hereditary monarchs, many modern states 
have drafted constitutions that constrain the powers of the monarch and provide for the 
election of a government which wields real executive power, while the monarch continues to 
wield residual and ceremonial powers. This is at least the case in the UK, where the monarch 
does not have absolute power and the routine government administration is in the hands of an 
elected government. 
There are currently three African states headed by monarchs. These are Lesotho, Morocco 
and Swaziland. Each one of the three faces the daunting task of crafting a state that is 
premised on the people being able to freely choose leaders of their government while at the 
same time upholding their long monarchical tradition. It is to these three we now turn to see 
how each is struggling to find the right balance between an elected government and a 
hereditary monarch all under one roof. 
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2.4.3.1 Lesotho 
Lesotho got her independence in 1966 under a constitution that provided for a monarch, 
where the King was head of state while an elected prime Minister was head of government.
335
 
However, this did not last long. In 1970, after Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, lost his 
parliamentary majority entitling him to be Prime Minister, he suspended the Constitution and 
assumed all executive power.
336
  
Chief Jonathan was deposed in a 1986 military coup and Lesotho remained under military 
rule until 1993 when democracy was restored. However, this too was short-lived as the 
subsequent 1998 election was disputed, leading to violent protests and paralysis of 
government.
337
 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was compelled to 
intervene and send troops (from Botswana and South Africa) to restore order.
338
 
Following this crisis, the Constitution of Lesotho was amended in 2001 in order to make the 
electoral system more reflective of the will of the people and to enhance the features of 
Lesotho as a constitutional monarch.
339
  The Constitution provides for a constitutional 
monarch, who shall be the head of state.
340
 The King is chosen by a college of chiefs 
according to customary law.
341
 
Lesotho has a bicameral legislature, that is, the Senate and the National Assembly. The 
Senate consists of twenty-two principal chiefs and 11 other senators nominated by the King 
on advice of the council of State.
342
 The National Assembly, on the other hand, consists of 
120 members, 80 of whom are elected directly in constituencies on the basis of first-past-the-
post system while the remaining 40 are allocated on the basis of proportional 
representation.
343
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The King appoints the Prime Minister, a member of the National Assembly, whose party 
commands the support of the majority of the members of the National Assembly.
344
 
 
2.4.3.2 Morocco 
Morocco gained her independence from France in 1956, under King Mohammed V, after 
forty-four years of colonial rule. Mohammed V was succeeded by his son Hassan II in 1961. 
It is Hassan II who transformed the Moroccan monarchy into a strong institution wielding 
absolute executive power.
345
 
The Moroccan monarch’s roots go back to the 1660s346  and its legitimacy is premised on the 
Sharifian doctrine which considers Moroccan rulers to be descendants of Prophet 
Mohammed, the founder of Islam. This makes the King both temporal and spiritual leader.
347
 
Ascent to the crown is hereditary, handed down from father to son “in direct line and by order 
of primogeniture among the off-springs of the King” unless the King during his lifetime did 
“designate a successor among his sons apart from the eldest son.”348 
The King appoints the Prime Minister, but is under no obligation to appoint the leader of the 
party commanding majority support in parliament.
349
 He also appoints cabinet, which serves 
at his pleasure as he can terminate its mandate at his caprice.
350
  
There are, however, signs that Morocco may be moving towards being a genuine 
constitutional monarch where an elected government will have more power to run 
government. The current monarch, King Mohammed VI, in response to the Arab uprisings in 
early 2011, set up a commission to draft a new democratic constitution. This new 
Constitution was approved in a referendum on 1 July 2011. It, inter alia, categorically states 
that the King shall appoint the head of government from within the political party having a 
majority in the Chamber of Representatives and that the King shall appoint cabinet from 
names proposed by the Prime Minister.
351
 Morocco duly held parliamentary elections under 
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the new Constitution in November 2011and the majority of the seats were won by the Justice 
and Development Party, headed by Abdelilah Benkirane. And in line with the new 
Constitution, the King in January 2012 appointed Benkirane as Moroccan Prime Minister.
352
  
If Morocco will continue to efficiently and effectively implement the progressive provisions 
of the new constitution, it will have at long last a government run by a Prime Minister 
assuming office on the basis of the will of the people as reflected by the configuration of 
parliament. 
2.4.3.3 Swaziland 
Swaziland, like Lesotho, at independence (under King Sobhuza II), was bequeathed unto it a 
Westminster style Constitution providing for multiparty elections with a monarch as head of 
state and a Prime Minister, from the leading party in parliament, as head of government. King 
Sobhuza II was uncomfortable with a constraining constitution and multiparty politics and 
considered them as “divisive, alien and incompatible with Swazi traditions.”353 In the years 
leading to independence, Sobhuza, to protect his hold on power, formed his own political 
party, the Imbokodvo National Movement, which formed the ruling government at 
independence. However, in the subsequent election of 1972, although his party won 75 per 
cent of the vote, another party, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), won 20 
per cent of the vote and gained three seats in parliament.
354
  This unsettled the King who saw 
the opposition as making inroads towards power. 
In April 1973 Sobhuza II issued a Proclamation suspending the Constitution, banned political 
parties and trade unions and dissolved parliament. The Proclamation in part stated:  
Now, therefore, I Sobhuza II, King of Swaziland, hereby decree that, in collaboration with my 
Cabinet Ministers and supported by the whole nation, I have assumed supreme power in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland and that all legislative, executive and judicial power is vested in 
myself....
355 
Through the 1973 Proclamation, Swaziland became an absolute monarch in which all power 
vested in the King, who was accountable to nobody. The Proclamation remained in force 
until 2005 when King Mswati III, successor to Sobhuza, assented to a new Constitution.  
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Constitutional analysts consider the 2005 Constitution as hardly an improvement over the 
post 1973 absolute rule era. As Charles Manga Fombad stated: “The pre-2005 
unconstitutional absolutism has now been dressed in a Constitution.”356 
The Constitution vests all executive power in the King, and makes him directly in charge of 
the defence forces; police and correctional services.
357
 In addition, the King has direct 
authority to assent to bills, summon and dissolve parliament, receive foreign envoys and 
appoint diplomats, issue pardons, reprieves or commute sentences, declare state of 
emergency, confer honours, establish Commissions, and order a referendum.
358
  
The electoral system is based on the traditional system of Tinkhundla (constituencies). An 
Inkhundla (singular) is established by the King and consists of one or more chiefdoms which 
act as nomination areas and constituencies for electing members of parliament to the Lower 
House (House of Assembly).
359
 The Constitution states that the King “shall appoint the Prime 
Minister from among members of the House.”360  King Mswati, however, violated this 
provision with impunity in 2008 when he appointed Barnabus Dlamini as Prime Minister 
because Dlamini did not qualify since he was not a member of parliament.
361
 
The King reigns as an absolute monarch and, therefore, the elections by the people do not 
lead to the creation of a government representing the will of the people and accountable to 
them. It is revealing that in September 2013 Mswati decided that the new name for his system 
of government will henceforth be called “monarchical democracy.”362 
The foregoing discussion of Lesotho, Morocco and Swaziland indicates that states under a 
monarch have the general problem of an encroaching monarch.  In addition, they struggle to 
find the perfect balance between a hereditary monarch and vesting executive authority in an 
elected government led by a Prime Minister. While Lesotho and Morocco (to some extent) 
seem to be evolving towards finding that balance, in Swaziland the King still reigns as an 
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absolute monarch and denying the people the experience of electing their own representatives 
who will be accountable to them. 
 
2.5 Common Causes of Flawed Elections in Africa 
There are many causes of flawed and disputed elections in Africa. Some of them are so 
blatant and obvious, such as violence, ballot stuffing and distorting results, while others are 
more subtle and only apparent on careful analysis. This section looks at four of some of the 
subtle major causes of disputed elections in Africa. These are ethnicity, the simple majority 
electoral system, partisan military involvement and compromised electoral management 
bodies. These are not causes in the sense of producing an automatic cause and effect 
relationship, but simply that where these factors are present, it is more likely than not that an 
election may be disputed. 
 
2.5.1 Ethnicity  
Ethnicity generally rests on three dimensions. First it rests on a list of common attributes such 
as shared cultural values and practices, shared language, and common historical narratives, 
myths and legends. Second, and probably more importantly, ethnicity is identified by shared 
common consciousness of belonging to a particular ethnic community. And finally, ethnicity 
assumes the existence of the “other,” that is, those who are demarcated as not belonging to 
the group.
363
 It is, for example, difficulty to delineate what distinguishes the Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnic groups in Burundi and Rwanda because they speak the same language, live in the same 
regions and have a common culture.
364
 
Viewed positively, ethnicity is an instrument of social cohesion, common identity and 
cultural meaning.
365
 It should be, however, be noted that ethnicity is not cast in stone but 
“permeable at the margins.”366 That is, the intensity of ethnic consciousness depends on 
circumstances of each group and matters or resources at stake as a result of claiming or not 
claiming that identity. 
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In pre-colonial times, ethnic groups generally constituted African states. There were no other 
states than these as these performed all the duties of statehood, with chiefs and their councils 
or advisors performing all the necessary functions of government.
367
 This was confirmed by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Western Sahara case.
368
 In this case, the court 
held that “territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organisation 
were not regarded as terra nullius”369 since they lived under chiefs (wielding sovereign 
power) competent to represent them.
370
 
Colonialism disrupted the existence of African states as they were known then. The national 
boundaries created by colonial powers were arbitrary, without regard to existing state 
boundaries and harmonious existence o the people.
371
 As Garth Abraham has stated, the 
colonial boundaries inherited by African countries “united those who should be divided and 
divided those who should be united.”372  The boundaries adopted by colonial powers never 
respected and reflected the way African states were spread. This is clearer from the well 
known words of Lord Salisbury in 1890 when commenting on how the territorial boundaries 
were drawn in Africa by colonial powers: 
We have been engaged...in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever 
trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have 
only been hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where those 
mountains and rivers and lakes were.
373  
After independence, African states decided to maintain the inherited territorial boundaries 
under the doctrine of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis is the international law doctrine to the 
effect that “colonial frontiers [borders] existing at the date of independence constituted a 
tangible reality” which all states had to respect.374 However, that did not resolve the ethnic 
question and in some extreme cases, such as Rwanda and Burundi, there have been mass 
slaughter of one ethnic group against another. But even in countries where there has not been 
protracted ethnic violence, ethnicity is a major issue that usually determines election 
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outcomes.
375
 Many African states have not yet designed electoral systems that take into 
account ethnic diversity and the need for inclusiveness.
376
 As a result, elections are usually 
seen as battle grounds between competing ethnic groups for control of the state and resource 
benefits that go with that. A member of an ethnic group that does not win an election feels 
excluded and marginalised. 
In reference to Nigeria, Kirk-Green, noted that the fear of being dominated and ruled by 
someone from a different ethnic group permeated the whole society and was perhaps the most 
widespread collective fear. That is, the greatest fear is not of physical violence but 
“psychological fear of discrimination, of domination...fear of not getting one’s fair share, of 
one’s desert.”377  Or as a Kenyan respondent in a research answered: 
In Kenya we have a culture that says to help someone who is closer to you, and someone of 
your tribe is closer to you. So if I vote my tribe he’ll develop my rural area, bring 
infrastructure there. If I’m looking for employment it is easier for me if my own is at the 
top.
378
 
Thus, it is assumed that leaders assume power to develop their regions and ethnic groups. 
Elections therefore become war grounds for ethnic control of the state and, unfortunately, 
Africa is replete with examples of these. In Nigeria, for example, elections are usually drawn 
as battles between the North and the South. In Ivory Coast, the electoral impasse of 2011 was 
generally seen as a conflict between Laurent Gbagbo and his southern people on the one hand 
and Alassane Outtara and his northern ethnic group on the other hand.
379
 Gbagbo’s  
government had in fact gone to the extent of limiting registering northerners as voters and 
questioning their citizenship, including the citizenship of Outtara.
380
 In Kenya, both 
governments of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi had their ethnic based militias that 
wreaked havoc on those perceived as political enemies of the presidents.
381
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When elections are framed as ethnic battles for ascent to the state power, it makes it hard for 
elections to be held in a manner that respects the rules of fairness and transparency. Rival 
candidates would consider it failing their ethnic group to lose and election, and thus election 
results in this case inadvertently mark off some groups as failures while others as winners. 
Those not successful would then have to watch on the margins as their colleagues drench 
themselves in state prestige and resources. This makes it fertile ground for disputed elections 
for a lot is at stake. The only way to remedy this is for countries to adopt electoral laws that 
are inclusive and do not leave out any group feeling excluded. 
It should, however, be clarified that while ethnicity has played a major role in voting patterns 
in many African states, ethnicity is not always the single determinant in the outcome of an 
election. Economic factors (such as unemployment); anticipation of future patronage 
rewards; and compulsion have been shown to play a role in election outcomes in Africa.
382
 
 
2.5.2 First Past The Post Electoral System 
Electoral systems clarify how the electorate choose or recruit their leaders. There are many 
electoral systems in the world. However, these systems are broadly categorised into two 
groups: majority systems and proportional representation systems. Majority or majoritarian 
systems are premised on the view that whoever wins or gains more votes than other 
competitors wins the election (regardless of how thin the majority is).
383
 Proportional 
systems, on the other hand, are anchored on the view that one should only ascend to power in 
proportion to the actual votes garnered in an election.
384
  In relation to parliament, it means 
that the composition of parliament bears resemblance as much as possible to the proportion of 
the votes gained by each represented political party. Consequently, where a president is 
elected through parliament constituted by proportional representation, the president’s hold on 
power will be as weak or as strong as his party’s command of the respect of parliament. 
The First-Past-The-Post (or simple majority system) is one of the majoritarian systems and is 
one of the commonly utilised electoral methods in Africa, especially in Anglophone Africa. 
Under this system, a candidate who gets more votes wins the race. Where an election is 
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contested by several candidates, this raises the possibility of splitting votes and that one 
candidate may therefore assume power on a razor thin majority. In Zambia, for example, 
President Mwanawasa was in 2001 elected by a thin majority of 29 percent.
385
  Where the 
president or prime minister is elected through parliament, and members of parliament are 
elected via the simple majority system, there is a potential danger that representation in 
parliament may not reflect the number of votes received but their regional concentration. 
Where a party’s voters are widely spread across the country or too concentrated in one 
region, such a party will be under represented in parliament.
386
 
The whole point is that the simple majority system is ill-devised to create political 
inclusiveness and harmony as the power it gives those who win usually has no relation to the 
amount of votes received. In societies that are ethnically, socially or politically divided, this 
almost always leads to disputed elections as the losers lose everything while the winners take 
all the benefits. As a result, instead of being a tool for clarifying the election of leaders, the 
simple majority system actually tends to be a danger to representative democracy. After 
observing the effect of the simple majority in West Africa, Lewis aptly remarked: “The surest 
way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American system 
of first-past-the-post.”387 
The inadequacy of the simple majority and its contribution towards disputed elections can 
easily be seen from the 1998 Lesotho elections and the conflict that ensued in the aftermath 
of the election. The official results of the election indicated that in an 80 member parliament, 
the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) got only 60.7 percent of votes but got 78 seats, 
representing 98.73 percent of seats. The main opposition, the Busotho National Congress 
(BNC) got 24.4 percent of the votes but only one seat, representing a paltry 1.27 of seats in 
parliament.
388
  
Clearly the outcome of the election was “unbalanced, unrepresentative and inappropriate” for 
nurturing democracy in a divided and unstable society.
389
  Analysts believe that it is this 
outcome, rather than actual rigging that made the losers feel excluded as their votes 
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ultimately counted for nothing and therefore disputed the whole election, leading to 
governmental paralysis.
390
 
 
2.5.3 The “Military” Playing a Partisan Role 
The term “military” is here applied in an omnibus sense to include all categories of armed 
security wings such as the army, navy, air force, paramilitary, police and intelligence 
services. The military play a significant role in preserving security, peace, stability and public 
order, essential ingredients of a credible election. In a democratic society, the military serve 
under the command of a civilian government. The military does not interfere in the civilian 
affairs of running government while government as well does not interfere with the military’s 
operational autonomy.
391
 The military thus refrain from partisan politics while the military is 
afforded professional and operational autonomy. Striking this balance enables the existence 
of a viable democratic society built on popular consensus. 
In many countries in Africa, the balance that separates the government from the military is 
not fully developed. As seen above, military coups have been rampant in the past and 
continue to this day. Military rule, usually maintained by force, is antithetical to rule by 
consensus. 
Apart from cases of military takeovers or coups, perhaps more common are instances where 
the military wings are co-opted to enable the electoral victory of one political party. In many 
instances, this is usually the ruling party. There have been a few extreme cases where the 
military intervened to annul the whole election because their preferred candidate did not win. 
This was, for example, the case with Nigerian military dictator, Babangida’s annulment of the 
election of Mashood Abiola in the 1993 Nigerian elections, which were hailed by many 
observers as the freest and fairest elections conducted in Nigeria.
392
 The same thing occurred 
in Algeria in 1992, where the military annulled the election, removed President Chadli 
Benjedid from office and installed a military government.
393
 
In several other cases the military would usually play a more subtle partisan role to ensure the 
election of the incumbent or preferred candidate. During the 2008 Zimbabwean election, for 
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example, the police and army clearly took it upon themselves to victimise and intimidate the 
opposition and voters.
394
 Many senior army officers openly campaigned for incumbent 
president Robert Mugabe and indicated on various occasions that they would not let anyone 
win against Mugabe. Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested and detained five 
times within the space of 30 days in the run up to the run-off election.
395
 Six months before 
the 2008 Zimbabwean elections, a senior army officer, General David Sigauke was reportedly 
threatening against any government not led by Mugabe:  
As soldiers, we have  the privilege to defend this task (of guaranteeing Mugabe and ZANU-
PF rule) on two fronts: the first being through the ballot box, and second being the use of the 
barrel of the gun should the worse come to the worst. I may therefore urge you as citizens of 
Zimbabwe to exercise your electoral right wisely in the forthcoming election in 2008, 
remembering that Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again.
396
 
Similar patterns have occurred in many other African countries. In Uganda, to cite another 
example, during the 2001 and 2006 elections, there was evidence that soldiers harassed, 
intimidated, arrested and abducted people in order to prevent them from voting.
397
 The 
soldiers deployed around the country during elections and in some instances took command 
of polling stations. This atmosphere, as the Uganda Supreme Court later held, led to 
“intimidation and undermined the principles of free and fair and transparent elections.”398 
Sometimes during elections the military are used for covert operations that usually favour the 
incumbent government. For example, during the presidential election trial following the 
disputed 2001 Zambian elections, both Michael Sata and Vernon Mwaanga, who served as 
the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) Secretary Generals (or party chief 
executives) in the run to and during elections, respectively, testified that the ruling party had 
no resources and depended on the Office of the President (OP)- Special Division (which is 
the Zambian Intelligence organ) for campaign resources.
399
 Sata indicated that campaign 
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vehicles and bicycles were bought by the OP, while Mwaanga indicated that the OP actually 
printed 20, 000 copies of the MMD campaign manifesto.
400
  
These views were confirmed by the Xaviour Chungu, who at the time of the elections served 
as the Director General of the OP-Special Division. Chungu indicated that the then president 
instructed him to raise campaign funds of up to  K22 billion but that he only managed  to 
raise about K16 billion. He further indicated that using OP money they bought about 158 
vehicles, 1,500 bicycles, 300 bales of salaula (second hand clothes) and boats for the MMD 
to use during the elections.
401
 In such a case, the military (intelligence) was basically used to 
steal and launder public funds in order to support the ruling party to secure electoral victory. 
The partisan participation of the military in elections not only is intimidating to the electorate 
but unfairly tilts the balance in favour of their preferred candidate or party. A government 
that assumes authority on the basis of such military support may often lack legitimacy as its 
actual popularity was not genuinely tested under circumstances that allowed for un-vitiated 
public consensus. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that such elections are almost always 
disputed. 
 
2.5.4 Compromised Electoral Management Bodies 
Many analysts of African elections tend to focus on what happens on elections day and pay 
little attention to the institution which organises and conducts the elections. The conduct of 
elections in many African states is assigned to an election management body or Commission. 
The Commission can either be ad hoc or permanent. It can also be an embedded department 
within the executive or it can be an autonomous body. 
Electoral commissions since the 1980s and 1990s have played a significant role in advancing 
democracy. But unfortunately, electoral commissions have also been at the centre of disputed 
elections in Africa. Many factors account for electoral commission’s failure to organise 
impeccable elections. These include inadequate resources and control over budgets, lack of 
experience of key staff, and lack of reliable voter roll. These are all serious challenges but 
when they occur inadvertently, they generally tend to affect the parties to an election in 
similar fashion.
402
 
It is the perception of the electoral commission as being partisan or biased that usually is 
more devastating. This usually turns around the autonomy of the commission and how its 
members or commissioners are appointed. As regards autonomy, many countries now have 
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theoretically autonomous commissions. However, a few countries still consider the conduct 
of elections as an executive duty and as such the executive still organises and conducts the 
elections. In Senegal, for example, until 2005, elections have been organised and 
administered by the ministry of the interior.
403
 However, since 2005 the ministry of the 
interior still organises and conducts the elections and the newly created Autonomous National 
Electoral Commission (Commission Nationale Electorale Autonome- CENA) has the simple 
role of simply monitoring and supervising the interior ministry in the conduct of the 
elections. 
404
  
Even where electoral commissions are created as autonomous bodies, there are still 
challenges on the mode of appointing the commissioners. In some countries, such as Cape 
Verde, the members are elected directly by the legislature,
405
 while in others, such as Benin, 
the members are largely nominated by political parties in proportion to their representation in 
the legislature.
406
 However, in the vast majority, the president appoints commissioners. He 
may do so unilaterally or in consultation with some other body or with the concurrence of the 
legislature. This is the case in Zambia and Uganda, for example. 
The involvement of the president in appointing commissioners is problematic because he or 
she is usually an interested party in the outcome of the elections.  Several times presidents 
have used this privilege to “pack the bus” with pliant, sympathetic or partisan members. In 
Cameroon, for instance, at one time 11 out of 13 commissioners came from the president’s 
ethnic group.
407
 
In Zambia the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) is established by the Zambian 
Constitution as an autonomous body tasked with responsibility “to supervise the registration 
of voters, to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections and to review the boundaries of 
the constituencies into which Zambia is divided for the purposes of elections to the National 
Assembly.”408 The Commission consists of a chairperson and not more than four other 
members, appointed by the president and subject to ratification by the National Assembly.
409
  
Commissioners are appointed for a term not exceeding seven years, subject to renewals and 
ratification by the National Assembly.
410
 Apart from the chairperson, who is required to 
simply hold or have held high judicial office, there is no stated minimum professional or 
ethical standard that the president should consider in appointing commissioners. 
Although the requirement for parliamentary ratification may have been intended as a check 
on the discretion of the president, the fact that the legislature is almost always emasculated 
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and under the tutelage of the executive means that in reality the president acts “with little or 
no restraint under a system that, in practice, [is] often equated with authoritarianism.”411  The 
system of appointing commissioners is therefore, non-inclusive, arbitrary and poorly geared 
towards the building of national cohesion, transparency and inspiring a sense of confidence in 
stakeholders.  
This contrasts sharply with the situation under the South African Constitution. Under the 
South African Constitution, the President appoints members of the commission on 
recommendation by Parliament. Parliament recommends persons for appointment who have 
been nominated by a parliamentary committee proportionally composed of all parties 
represented in parliament.
412
 Once appointed, the commissioners are only removable on 
grounds of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, supported with a finding to that effect by 
a parliamentary committee and a resolution to that effect being supported by the majority of 
parliament.
413
 
 
2.6 Summary 
Elections are a means by which the eligible citizens choose leaders to preside over public 
affairs as a government. This ensures that public consensus is the basis for assuming office. 
Elections also serve as an instrument voters wield to hold government accountable. This is 
because the electorate can use this power to punish an ill-performing government or reward 
good performance. 
Africa has gone through several phases in an effort to build genuine electoral democracy. 
Soon after independence, most African countries descended into military and one-party 
dictatorships. However, this changed with the wind of democratisation in the late 1980s and 
1990s which led to the demise of de jure one-party regimes. This wave of change, however, 
did not resolve many old problems regarding the holding of genuine elections as they still 
occur. 
There are structurally three broad systems under which heads of government or state are 
elected in Africa. These are the presidential, parliamentary and ‘monarchical’ systems. Under 
the presidential system, the president is elected directly by the people while under the 
parliamentary system, the president or prime minister is elected by members of the legislative 
branch of government. In case of the monarchical system, a hereditary monarch is head of 
state, leaving only room for the possibility of electing a prime minister as head of 
government. The examples of Swaziland, Morocco and Lesotho above clearly show that this 
is not easy to achieve. 
The chapter also discussed factors that have had a negative bearing on the conduct of 
presidential elections in Africa. These are ethnicity; the simple majority electoral system; the 
military engaging in partisan politics; and compromised electoral management bodies. 
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The next chapter will discuss the challenges associated with judicial determination of 
presidential election disputes domestically.  
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Chapter Three 
The Challenges of Judicial Determination of Presidential Election Disputes in Domestic 
Courts 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Where elections have been vitiated by anomalies and results are disputed, as is often the case 
in Africa, aggrieved parties have looked to the judiciary as an institution of last hope to seek 
redress. The judiciary is thus faced with the unenviable task of determining the ultimate 
outcome of the poll. Consequently, in order to protect the right to choose in an election, and 
to promote and safeguard democracy, the judiciary must be competent, honest, learned and 
independent.
414
 Such a judiciary plays a transformative role in democracy as an impartial 
referee or umpire in the democratic game.
415
   
This chapter looks at how African courts have handled presidential election disputes. It first 
presents an overview of the role of the judiciary in Africa in resolving disputed presidential 
elections. It identifies common patterns that characterise how the courts dispose of disputed 
presidential elections in Africa, all of which are dissatisfactory and a disincentive for the 
further growth and consolidation of democracy. The chapter further looks at the likely causes 
of judges rendering such decisions and the consequences of those decisions. 
 
3.2 Overview of the Role of Judiciary in Election Disputes 
Elections affirm the sovereignty of the people. Through elections, people constitute 
government and hold government accountable. But as seen, the history of elections in Africa 
has been disappointing. Democratic elections have been rare and disputed elections have 
been the norm. 
Although there have been some improvement since the democratic wave of the 1980s and 
1990s, sham elections are still prevalent across the continent. In Nigeria, for example, all 
presidential elections since the return to civilian rule in 1999 have been disputed. The EU 
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observer mission to Nigeria, for instance, condemned the 2007 Nigerian elections in the 
following terms: 
The 2007 state and federal elections fell far short of basic international and regional standards 
for democratic elections. They were marred by very poor organisation, of essential 
transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of fraud, widespread 
voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for 
political parties and candidates and numerous incidents of violence. As a result the process 
cannot be considered to have been credible.
416
  
In a similar fashion, all election observer missions to Zambia’s 2001 elections, both local and 
international, concluded that the elections were far from being free and fair.
417
 The EU in fact 
took a rare stand to waive the immunity of the head of the observer mission, Michael 
Meadowcroft, to testify for the opposition in the ensuing election petition.
418
  
Steve Huefner categorises causes of disputed or failed elections into two: fraud and 
mistake.
419
 Fraud means the deliberate manipulation of the system unfairly, often by parties, 
candidates or their supporters.
420
 On the other hand, mistake is the unintentional disturbance 
of the election process, usually caused by those administering the election.”421 Whether by 
mistake or fraud, failed elections deny the people their right to constitute government 
according to their will in a transparent way. Distinguished Nigerian law scholar, Ben 
Nwabueze, considers this as “robbery of the right of the people to participate in their own 
government” and “therefore the greatest offence that can be committed against the 
constitution and the people.”422  This is a correct observation because failed elections have 
the effect of taking away the consent of the people as the basis of the right to govern. 
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Almost all African constitutions or electoral laws recognise that things can go wrong with 
elections and provide for the possibility of redress. This is because election wrongs or 
allegations of wrongs often have a bearing on the legitimacy of the electoral process. A fair 
and transparent redress mechanism, which commands respect of the people lends legitimacy 
and credibility to the election and “serves as a peaceful alternative to violent post-election 
responses.”423 On the other hand, failure to put in place an effective electoral dispute 
mechanism “can seriously undermine the legitimacy of an entire electoral process.”424  
This chapter focuses on the post-election redress mechanisms available in the case of 
disputed presidential elections. It discusses how courts have handled complaints that seek to 
correct election results (in whole or in part) or indeed to void the whole election. In almost all 
African countries, this is a task entrusted to the judiciary. The difference only seems to be at 
what stage in the judicial hierarchy the litigation is commenced. In countries such as 
Nigeria,
425
 Namibia,
426
 and Kenya
427
 (prior to the adoption of the 2010 constitution) cases 
begin in lower courts and appealed ultimately to the Supreme Court. In other countries such 
as Ghana,
428
 Zambia,
429
 Kenya
430
 (since 2010), and Uganda
431
 presidential election petitions 
are tried directly by the Supreme Court, allowing for no appeal. 
Tanzania seems to be the only African country with a constitutional provision that ousts the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary from hearing challenges to presidential elections. The Tanzanian 
constitution categorically states:  
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When a candidate is declared by the Electoral Commission to have been duly elected in 
accordance with this Article, then, no court of law shall have any jurisdiction to inquire into 
the election of that candidate.
432 
Such a provision can only assume that elections will always be impeccable, something which 
is of course at variance with the African experience. This is a blatant denial of the possibility 
of seeking judicial redress in case of a grievance. Even where grievances may be ill-founded, 
the offer of a possible judicial remedy provides a peaceful means of venting frustration 
instead of resorting to violent protests. 
Adjudication or judicial determination of election disputes, in order to be of any significance, 
must offer aggrieved persons a genuine possibility of redress for their grievances. In order to 
do this, Huefer identifies at least three factors that need to be embedded in the adjudication 
process. First of all, the process must be fair and perceived as fair by litigants and the 
public.
433
 This requires that the process treats the parties to a dispute equally and offers them 
an equal opportunity to present their cases. It also requires that the process awards resolutions 
impartially and meritoriously. A process that only decides in favour of the incumbent or 
incumbent party, whatever the strength of evidence presented against it cannot be considered 
to be fair. Second, the process must be transparent, that is, when an election is disputed and a 
court adjudicates on the dispute, it must do so in a way that is understandable (based on prior 
existing rules) and fair analysis of evidence as relates to the competing claims.
434
  Finally, the 
process must be prompt and determine cases with finality.
435
 As is often said, justice delayed 
is justice denied. 
Before moving to the next session, which looks at the challenges associated with adjudication 
of presidential election disputes in Africa, the art of adjudication will be briefly discussed. 
The traditional view of adjudication has been that judges simply re-state the law as enacted 
by the legislature and exercise no discretion. Their decisions, therefore, are nothing more than 
a discovery of the intention of the legislature.
436
  This, however, is now recognised as an 
oversimplification as the adjudication process is inherently imbued with discretion.  
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Hart, for example, considers the law to be open textured.
437
 This means that that, “when a 
judge confronts a rule he is not met by a bloodless category but by a living organism which 
contains within itself value choices.”438  Hart offers at least three reasons for this discretion: 
first, that it is due to indeterminacy or ambiguity of language or words; second, that rules 
usually use only general standards (e.g., “reasonableness,” and “just”) which need to be 
related to or distinguished from specific circumstances; and third, the indeterminacy inherent 
in the doctrine of precedents where judges have to relate current decisions with prior 
decisions.
439
  
Although Ronald Dworkin has virulently criticized Hart’s theory of adjudication, for 
purposes of this research it is sufficient to note that Dworkin still recognises that there is 
discretion in adjudication, albeit constrained by law. What Dworkin does is to distinguish 
between “weak” and “strong” discretion.440 Strong discretion is where one is not bound by 
any standards set by the authority in question, while weak discretion is constrained by 
standards.
441
 Dworkin gives as an example the differences between a sergeant who is ordered 
to pick five men for patrol and another sergeant who is ordered to simply select his five most 
experienced men for patrol. The sergeant who is ordered to simply select five men for patrol 
is considered to have strong discretion compared to the one who has to choose five most 
experience men as this is weak discretion.
442
 As can be seen, Dworkin considers that judges 
only have weak discretion as they are constrained by law. 
The point is that adjudication is a value laden process and judges have to choose between 
competing claims and values. As shall be seen in the next section, African judges have almost 
unanimously chosen to undermine democracy, or in the telling words of Muhammadu Buhari, 
have chosen to “stunt the growth of democracy.”443  
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3.3 Challenges Associated With Domestic Adjudication of Presidential Elections 
Disputes in Africa 
This section discusses the record of African courts in adjudicating disputed presidential 
elections. Sifting through the judgements, common threads or patterns emerge that 
disappointingly negate the advancement of democracy. The four patterns discussed here are:  
a) All cases are decided in favour of the incumbent candidate, candidate sponsored by 
the ruling party, or the presumptive winner;  
b) Many cases are dismissed on minor procedural technicalities without consideration of 
merits or there is a misapplication of the substantial effect rule; 
c) In some countries resolution of disputes is inordinately delayed so as to render the 
whole process nugatory; and  
d) Judges simply fail to address the issues presented before them by constraining 
themselves from making appropriate decisions. 
 
3.3.1 All Judgments go in favour of the status quo 
One of the most notable trends in decisions on disputed presidential elections is that all 
decisions of the courts tend to serve one purpose that is, maintaining the status quo. The 
decisions are always given in favour of the incumbent, the candidate sponsored by the 
incumbent party or the presumptive winner of the election. This seems, inter alia, to stem 
from judges’ misconstrued understanding of their role as that of ensuring political stability 
than deciding cases fairly, according to the facts presented to them, in line with the applicable 
law. This seems to be the overriding driving force in adjudication, impelling judges to uphold 
all elections that are brought in litigation for their determination. Judges have often 
categorically stated this, without the slightest remorse. For example, in the judgement 
following the petition to Ghana’s December 2012 elections, the Supreme Court stated:  
For starters, I would state that the judiciary in Ghana, like its counterparts in other 
jurisdictions, does not readily invalidate a public election but often strives in public interest, 
to sustain it.
444
 
As can be seen, “striving” to uphold an election is not a judicial role but a political decision. 
This means, even before the case is presented, the judiciary is only prepared to preserve the 
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election results that have been announced. As a result, any discrepancies are most likely to be 
explained away as inconsequential or, as discussed below, “not substantial.” It is, therefore, 
hardly surprising that despite the African continent being replete with sham elections, the 
judiciary, when called upon to adjudicate, has always (except for the Ivory Coast’s 
Constitutional Council in 2011 discussed further below) upheld these disputed elections, as 
the table below indicates. 
 
Table 1 
Notable Presidential Election Petitions in Africa 
Country Date of 
Election 
Name of Case or main 
contenders 
Name of court 
deciding 
Beneficiary of decision 
Cameroon October 
2004 
 
October 
2011 
John Fru Ndi vs. Paul Biya 
(incumbent) 
 
John Fru Ndi vs. Paul Biya 
(incumbent)  
Supreme Court of 
Cameroon 
 
Supreme Court of 
Cameroon 
Paul Biya (incumbent) 
 
 
Paul Biya (incumbent) 
Ivory Coast November 
2010 
Laurent Gbagbo (incumbent) vs. 
Alassane Outtara 
Constitutional 
Council 
Laurent Gbagbo (incumbent)  
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
November 
2006 
 
December 
2011 
Jean-Pierre Bemba vs. Joseph 
Kabila (incumbent) 
 
Etienne Tshisekedi vs. Joseph 
Kabila (incumbent) 
Supreme Court of 
Justice 
 
Supreme Court of 
Justice 
Joseph Kabila (incumbent) 
 
 
Joseph Kabila (incumbent)  
Egypt June 2012 Ahmed Shafiq vs. Mohamed Morsi 
(presumptive winner) 
Constitutional Court Mohamed Morsi (decision was never 
rendered and overtaken by events after 
Morsi was deposed) 
Ethiopia May 2010 Beyere Petros vs. Meles Zenawi 
(incumbent) 
Supreme Court Meles Zenawi (incumbent) 
Gabon September 
2009 
Pierre Mamboundou vs. Ali Bongo 
Ondimba (incumbent) 
Constitutional Court Ali Bongo Ondimba (incumbent) 
Ghana December 
2012 
Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo 
vs. John Dramani Mahama 
(incumbent) 
Supreme Court John Dramani Mahama (incumbent) 
Kenya December Harun Mwau vs. Daniel Toroichi High Court/Court of Daniel Toroitichi Arap Moi (incumbent) 
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1992 
 
December 
1992 
 
December 
1997 
 
March 2013 
Arap Moi (incumbent) 
 
Kenneth Matiba vs. Daniel 
Toroitichi Arap Moi (incumbent) 
 
Mwai Kibaki vs. Daniel Toroitichi 
Arap Moi (incumbent) 
 
Raila Odinga vs. Uhuru Kenyatta 
(presumptive winner and supported 
by incumbent party) 
Appeal 
 
High Court/Court of 
Appeal 
 
High Court/Court of 
Appeal 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Daniel Toroitichi Arap Moi (incumbent) 
 
 
Daniel Toroitichi Arap Moi (incumbent) 
Uhuru Kenyatta 
 
Uhuru Kenyatta  (Declared winner) 
Malawi May 2004 Gwanda Chakuamba/Aleke Banda 
vs. Bingu Wa Mutharika 
(incumbent) 
High Court Bingu Wa Mutharika (case withdrawn 
and one of the litigants appointed into 
government) 
Namibia November 
2009 
Hidipo Livius Mamulenya vs. 
Hefikepunye Pohamba (incumbent) 
High Court Hefikepunye Pohamba (incumbent) 
Nigeria April 2007 
 
 
 
April 2007 
 
 
 
 
April 2003 
 
 
 
April 2003 
 
 
Atiku Abubaka vs. Umaru Musa 
Yar’adua (candidate for incumbent 
party) 
 
Muhammadu Buhari vs. Umaru 
Musa Yar’adua (candidate for 
incumbent party) 
 
 
Chukuemeka Odumegu Ojukwu vs. 
Olusegun Obasanjo (incumbent) 
 
 
Muhammadu Buhari vs. Olusegun 
Obasanjo (incumbent) 
 
 
Obafemi Awolowo vs. Shehu 
Shagari (incumbent) 
Court of 
Appeal/Supreme 
Court 
 
Court of 
Appeal/Supreme 
Court 
 
 
Court of 
Appeal/Supreme 
Court 
 
Court of 
Appeal/Supreme 
Court 
 
Supreme Court 
 
Umaru Musa Yar’adua (candidate for 
incumbent party) 
 
 
Umaru Musa Yar’adua (candidate for 
incumbent party) 
 
 
 
Olusegun Obasanjo (incumbent) 
 
 
 
Olusegun Obasanjo (incumbent) 
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August 
1983 
 
 
August 
1983 
 
August 
1979 
 
 
Waziri Ibrahim vs. Shehu Shagari 
(incumbent) 
 
Obafemi Awolowo vs. Shehu 
Shagari (incumbent party 
candidate) 
 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Supreme Court 
Shehu Shagari (incumbent ) 
 
 
 
Shehu Shagari (incumbent)  
 
 
Shehu Shagari (incumbent party 
candidate)  
 
 
Sierra Leone  November 
2012 
Julius Maada Bio vs. Ernest Bai 
Koroma (incumbent) 
Supreme Court Ernest Bai Koroma (incumbent)  
Togo March 2010 Jean Pierre Fabre vs. Faure 
Gnassigbe (incumbent)  
Constitutional Court Faure Gnassigbe (incumbent) 
Uganda February 
2006 
 
March 2001 
Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni (incumbent) 
 
Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni (incumbent) 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Supreme Court 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (incumbent) 
 
 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (incumbent) 
Zambia November 
1996 
 
December 
2001 
Dean Mung’omba vs. Fredrick 
Chiluba (incumbent) 
 
Anderson Kambela Mazoka vs. 
Levy Patrick Mwanawasa 
(candidate for incumbent party) 
Supreme Court 
 
 
Supreme Court 
Fredrick Chiluba (incumbent) 
 
 
Levy Patrick Mwanawasa (candidate for 
incumbent party) 
Zimbabwe July 2013 
 
 
 
 
March 2008 
Morgan Tsvangirai vs. Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe (incumbent) 
 
 
 
Morgan Tsvangirai vs. Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe (incumbent) 
Constitutional Court 
 
 
 
 
High Court 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe (case was 
withdrawn but the court still went ahead 
to issue a judgment and declared the 
election free and fair) 
 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe 
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March 2002 
 
Morgan Tsvangirai vs. Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe 
 
 
High 
Court/Supreme 
Court 
 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe 
Source: Compiled by author from various court cases 
 
When that happens, the process of adjudication loses meaning. Adjudication is ideally meant 
to offer litigants a formal method of taking part in the decision making of the court through 
presenting their proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in their favour.
445
 Judges 
should, therefore, only reach a decision after hearing presentation of proofs from both sides 
of the case and make a determination according to the strength of the evidence laid. As Lon 
Fuller stated, “participation through reasoned argument loses its meaning if the arbiter of the 
dispute is inaccessible to reason because he is...hopelessly prejudicial.”446 
Although Ivory Coast’s Constitutional Council decision in 2010 is the only available judicial 
decision to interfere and reverse announced results, its effect is the same as other decisions 
that uphold disputed elections as that decision was made in favour of the incumbent, 
President Laurent Gbagbo, who had clearly lost the election.
447
 Circumstances of this case are 
revealing.  
After years of conflict and instability, Ivory Coast finally held elections in 2010. The first 
round did not produce an outright winner, leading to a run-off election pitting incumbent 
Laurent Gbagbo and main opposition candidate Alassane Dramane Outtara.
448
 The 
chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission, Youssouf Bakayoko, announced 
Outtara as winner, with 54.1 percent of votes against Gbagbo’s 45.9 percent. Gbagbo made a 
prompt appeal to the Constitutional Council to annul the election of Outtara based on claims 
that elections had been rigged in the Northern stronghold of Outtara. Without giving audience 
to the other party, the Constitutional Council hastily invalidated about 600,000 votes from 
Outtara’s stronghold and declared Gbagbo as winner of the election with 51.45 percent.449 
Some of the grounds on which the court based its decision to annul the election of Outtara are 
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clearly spurious. For example, the Court indicated the fact that the results were announced 
from a hotel instead of the offices of the Independent Election Commission was suspicious; 
and that the results were not announced within the prescribed time of three days.
450
 There was 
actually no evidence presented to the court in support of the serious claims of ballot stuffing 
and tempering with results. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the court reached a prompt 
decision to annul Outtara’s election within hours, without affording the other party an 
opportunity to present its case. 
The recent Kenya Presidential petition perhaps better epitomises a judiciary willing to go to 
the extent of legislating and re-writing the Constitution in order to uphold an election. This 
was in the election petition brought by losing presidential candidate Raila Odinga against the 
election of Uhuru Kenyatta in the March 2013 elections.
451
  The Kenyan Constitution enacted 
in 2010, under which the election was held required in part, that only a candidate who had 
garnered “more than half of all votes cast in the election” shall be declared as president.452 
The former Constitution replaced in 2010 had simply required the winner to be the candidate 
“who receives a greater number of valid votes in the presidential election than any other 
candidate.”453 
Following the election, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) 
announced Uhuru Kenyatta as the outright winner, with 6, 173, 433 votes out of a total 
12,338,667 votes (50.07 percent of the votes), while Raila Odinga, the main challenger had 
received  5,340,546 votes (43.31 percent). However, the percentage of which Uhuru was 
declared winner was based on the number of valid votes, contrary to the Constitutional 
provision that required it to be based on “all votes cast in the election.” The importance of the 
difference is that if the computation is based on the percentage of all votes cast, then that 
would take into account all votes, that is, including those declared invalid. The consequence 
would have been that Uhuru would have had less than 50 percent of overall votes to prevent a 
run-off and, therefore, he would not have been declared winner of the election.
454
 Purporting 
to be interpreting the Constitution purposefully, the Supreme Court held that “all votes cast in 
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the election” actually “refers only to valid votes cast”, but does not include rejected votes.455 
If this is correct, why then did the framers of the constitution, and affirmed by the people in a 
referendum, in 2010 deliberately and consciously change the language of this provision? This 
approach obviously altered the language of the framers of the Constitution and effectively 
meant the judiciary clothed itself in a legislative role. It is an approach which assumes that 
the change of wording in the Constitution from “valid votes” to “all votes cast” was a mistake 
and not really what the framers of the constitution wanted. In other words, the framers of the 
constitution did not mean what they wrote. 
As the Nigerian Supreme Court correctly observed, it “is not the duty of a judge to interpret a 
statute to avoid its consequences.”456 The further advice of the Nigerian Supreme Court is apt 
here: 
The consequences of a statute are those of the legislature, not the Judge.  A Judge 
who regiments himself to the consequences of a statute is moving outside the domain 
of statutory interpretation. He has by that conduct engaged himself in morality which 
may be against the tenor of the statute and therefore not within his judicial power. In 
the construction of a statute, the primary concern of a Judge is the attainment of the 
intention of the legislature. If the language used by the legislature is clear and 
explicit, the Judge must give effect to it because in   such a situation, the words of the 
statute speak the intention of the Legislature.
457 
It could also be argued that by framers of the constitution requiring “all votes cast” to be 
considered, they wanted to put the right to choose in an election on the same level as other 
civil and political rights such as the right to freedom of religion which not only includes the 
right to profess a religion but inherent in it is also the right not to profess or belong to any 
religion. Similarly, the right to vote or choose obviously includes the right to out-rightly 
reject any or all candidates offering themselves in an election. Although some rejected votes 
could be due to human error or illiteracy, there is always a possibility of votes deliberately 
disfigured so as not to be a vote for any of the names on the ballot paper. If that is the case, 
then it should be perfectly legitimate to take into account the negative choice of those whose 
votes have been rejected by being wrongly marked when computing the national outlook of 
the election result. This is more so considering that the constitution categorically required that 
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to be the case. It is respectfully submitted that interpreting the provision as it is written in the 
Constitution would not have led to any absurdity. There was, therefore, no need for the 
judiciary to tamper with the language of the Constitution in order to sustain the election. 
 
3.3.2 Sacrificing Substantive Justice for Procedural Technicalities and Misapplication of 
the Substantial Effect Rule 
Adjudication is a formal and institutionalised method of reasoned (rational) conflict 
resolution.
458
 Its goal is to settle disputes fairly and on the basis of applicable laws. In order 
to decide cases fairly and render substantive justice, courts need procedural or technical rules 
to guide the handling of the cases before them. In a way, it can be said that courts fly on two 
wings of rules: substantive and technical or procedural rules. Those rules that apply to the 
fairness or merits of the case are considered substantive rules and those that govern the 
manner of resolving a dispute are considered technical or procedural.
459
 
Procedural rules and technicalities are manifestly “handmaids rather than mistresses”460 of 
substantive justice. These technical rules are instruments available to the judiciary to help 
render substantive justice and are therefore not ends in themselves. This was compellingly 
stated by Lord Penzance in 1878 thus: 
Procedures is but the machinery of the law after all- the channel and means whereby law is 
administered and justice reached. It strangely departs from its proper office when, in place of 
facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct, and even extinguish, legal rights, and is thus made to 
govern where it ought to subserve.
461
 
Although this distinction is obvious in theory, it is usually not so in practice, as the British 
legal historian, Holdsworth, aptly observed:  
One of the most difficult and one of the most permanent problems which a legal system must 
face is a combination of a due regard for the claims of substantial justice with a system of 
procedure rigid enough to be workable. It is easy to favour one quality at the expense of the 
other, with the result that either all system is lost, or there is so elaborate and technical a 
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system that the decision of cases turns almost entirely upon the working of its rules and only 
occasionally and incidentally upon the merits of the cases themselves.
462
 
In modern societies, people submit their conflicts to courts in order that courts may look at 
their merits, without unduly being fettered by technicalities, and have the cases decided 
fairly. Judges, therefore, have a duty to do substantive justice. In some countries, this has 
been made a Constitutional norm. The Constitution of Kenya, for example, requires that 
“justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities.”463 
A review of presidential petitions across Africa, however, reveals a disappointing record of 
courts that “shy away from this sacred duty by hiding behind technicalities.”464 Often 
presidential petitions have been struck out by courts on flimsy and curable technicalities, 
without considering the merits of the case. When an aggrieved petitioner is sent away from 
the court, without consideration of merits, that often shatters their confidence in the justice 
system and negates both the rule of law and consolidation of democracy.
465
 No one has 
captured this better than American Supreme Court Judge, Stevens J, in his dissenting 
judgement in the presidential election dispute of 2000 ( Bush vs. Gore) which the majority 
largely resolved on a controversial technicality without considering merits of the case:  
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true 
backbone of the rule of law....One thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know 
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s presidential election, the 
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial 
guardian of the rule of law.
466
 
Where judges render decisions without much regard for substantive justice, as retired 
Tanzanian High Court Judge James Mwalusanya aptly stated, “the people will offer the 
verdict and  the judiciary will find itself without any credible support.”467 This in effect 
negatively affects the consolidation of democracy in a country. As Julius Nyerere, first 
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President of Tanzania warned, unless judges do their work properly, “none of the objectives 
of our democratic society can be implemented.”468 
Below is a discussion of case examples of how the judiciary in Africa has usually avoided 
doing substantial justice in presidential election cases and dismissed them on flimsy 
procedural technicalities. 
 
3.3.2.1 Mwai Kibaki Vs. Daniel Toroitichi Arap Moi Court of Appeal Civil Application No. 172 
[Election Petition No.1of 1998] 
This was a presidential election petition brought by then main opposition candidate Mwai 
Kibaki against the election of President Daniel Arap Moi, following Kenya’s 1997 elections. 
Mwai had received 1,895,527 votes while Moi got 2,440,801 votes, according to official 
results.
469
 Mwai brought an action to void the election for several electoral malpractices 
violating electoral rules. The petition, however, was thrown out on procedural technicalities 
to do with the service of the petition. 
The relevant rule on serving petitions stated that:  
(1) Notice of presentation of a petition, accompanied by a copy of the petition, shall within 
ten days of the presentation of the petition, be served by the petitioner on the respondent 
(2)Service may be effected either by delivering the notice and copy to the advocate appointed 
by the respondent under Rule 10 or by posting them by a registered letter to the address given 
under Rule 10 so that, in ordinary course of post, the letter would be delivered within the time 
above mentioned, or if no advocate has been appointed, or such address has been given, by a 
notice published in the Gazette stating that the petition has been presented and that a copy of 
it may be obtained by the respondent on application at the office of the Registrar.
470
  
The petitioner had served the petition by way of publication in the government Gazette, since 
the respondent had not furnished details of his advocates as provided for in the rule.  The 
petitioner did not effect personal or direct service because the respondent, as president “is 
surrounded by a massive ring of security which is not possible to penetrate.”471 
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The court held that the rule did not compel the respondent to provide contact details of his 
advocates. According to the court, service through publication in Gazette would only apply if 
the option of personal service, service through advocates and/or registered mail had been 
attempted and failed. Only then could a petition be presented by way of publication in the 
Gazette, and because this was not done, then the petition failed and the court dismissed it for 
improper service.
472
 
In Kenya, this was not an isolated incident but was a systematic way the judiciary took to 
killing off presidential election petitions without hearing the merits. For example, following 
the 1992 presidential elections, losing opposition candidate, Kenneth Matiba brought a 
petition challenging the election of Daniel Arap Moi.
473
 However, before the election Matiba 
became physically incapacitated and unable even to write, and, therefore, unable to 
personally sign the election petition as required by the rules of service. The petition was 
signed by his wife, who he had given power of attorney. The court, however, struck the 
petition for failure to sign the petition personally by the petitioner.
474
  
 
3.3.2.2 Rally for Democracy and Progress and others vs. Electoral Commission of Namibia and 
others [High Court]  Case No.A01/2010 
This was an election petition brought by the opposition following the 2009 presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Namibia. The petition sought to void the presidential election on 
stated grounds.
475
 Section 10 of the Electoral Act (1992) required that election petitions could 
only be presented within 30 days of the results being announced. The petitioners presented 
their petition on the 30
th
 day at 1630hrs and, therefore, within the statutory requirement. The 
Registrar of the High Court accepted the petition. However, a rule of court did not allow 
filing of process any day after 1500hrs. Because the petition was filed after 1500hrs, the court 
held that the petition was invalid for being filed out of time, and therefore, there was no valid 
petition to adjudicate on in the eyes of the law.
476
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3.3.2.3 John Opong Benjamin and others vs. National Electoral Commission and Others SC. 
No.2/2012[Supreme Court of Sierra Leone Judgment of 14 June 2013] 
In this case the petition was brought by losing opposition leader John Opong Benjamin and 
other opposition leaders against the election of Ernest Bai Koroma during the Sierra Leone 
elections of 2012.
477
 Article 55(1) of the Constitution provides that anyone with a grievance 
in a presidential election should petition the Supreme Court within seven (7) days of the 
results being declared. The election was held on 17 November and the results were only 
declared on 23 November.
478
 The petitioners filed their petition on 30 November, the seventh 
day since the declaration of results. Further rules of court required that petitioners leave 
names of their advocates acting for them at the court registry in a separate notice, and that 
within five days of filing the election petition the petitioners make payment for security of 
costs.
479
 The petitioners’ lawyers had indicated their contact details by endorsing them on the 
petition but not in a separate notice and made security of cost payments on 5 December. The 
court, however, struck out the petition, holding that it was filed out of time due to delay in 
payment for costs and for not complying with the need for contacts of lawyers to be on a 
separate notice. 
 
3.3.2.4 Atiku Abubakar and others vs. Umaru Musa Yar’adua and others SC.72/2008 Supreme 
Court of Nigeria Judgment of 12 December 2008 
This is the final case discussing examples of presidential election cases dismissed on the basis 
of procedural technicalities without consideration of the merits of the case. It arose from the 
21 April 2007 Nigerian elections. The petitioner, Atiku Abubakar, had polled 2, 637,848 
votes against winner, Umaru Musa Yar’adua, who got 24, 638,638 votes.480  Prior to the 
election, the Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) had disqualified the 
petitioner from the election and his name was excluded from the ballot papers. This was 
based on INEC’s erroneous view that the petitioner was indicted for corruption and 
embezzlement related criminal offences and therefore unsuited for presidential office.
481
 His 
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name was only finally printed on the ballot paper through a ruling to that effect by the 
Supreme Court, just four days before the election. 
482
  
The petitioner sought to challenge the election of Yar’adua on the following grounds: 
(a) The 1
st
 petitioner [Abubakar] was validly nominated by the 3
rd
 petitioner [Abubakar’s 
party] but was unlawfully excluded from the election; alternatively that: 
(b)The election was invalid by reason of corrupt practices, 
(c)The election was invalid for reasons of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral 
Act, as amended; and 
(d)The 1
st
 respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the 21 April 
2007 presidential election.
483
 
The applicable provision, on which the majority based its decision, states: 
An election may be questioned on any of the following grounds: 
(a)That a person whose election is questioned was, at the time of election, not qualified to 
contest the election; 
(b)That the election was invalid by reason of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Act; 
(c)That the respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election; or 
(d) That the petitioner or its candidate was validly nominated but was unlawfully excluded 
from the election.
484
  
The majority reasoned that grounds (a), (b), and (c) above are separated from ground (d) by 
the use of the word “or”, a disjunctive used to express an alternative or choice.485 Since the 
petitioner’s name ultimately made it onto the ballot paper, and he took part in the election, he 
could not, therefore, plead ground (d) as he was not excluded from the election. In the view 
of the majority, the use of the word “or” meant that the petitioner had to choose between the 
alternatives and could therefore only plead one set of grounds. 
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Having considered that the petitioner’s name was on the ballot paper, the court declined the 
invitation to consider that his initial disqualification may have constituted constructive 
exclusion from the election as it had left him with barely four days to campaign.
486
 But for 
the majority, since the petitioner took part in the election, his petition on the basis of ground 
(d) collapsed and since the word “or” denoted alternatives, the rest of the petition collapsed 
and therefore other grounds would not be entertained.
487
 This decision is surprising 
considering that the same court, but in a different case, strongly condemned judges 
constraining themselves with technicalities at the expense of substantial justice and held that 
judges have a duty to shy away “from submitting to the constraining bind of 
technicalities.”488 
The decision of the majority was fraught with many flaws and at least three of them can be 
noted here. First, the majority claim that petitioners had pleaded two sets of inconsistent 
claims. Even if they were true, there was no legal basis for the court to choose which set of 
the inconsistent grounds to deal with. The court never explained why they chose one ground 
under which to dispose of the petition. They could as well have chosen the set of claims 
which had merit and left the impugned alternative ground.
489
 Second, the practice of pleading 
alternative and even inconsistent claims is long established in the common law tradition. It is 
aimed at staving off the possibility of inundating courts with a multitude of successive suits 
relating to the same facts, and allows courts to deal with all matters in one suit.
490
 This was, 
for example, allowed in the Zambian 2001 presidential election petition.
491
 Similarly, in 
Uganda where trial of the presidential election petitions is largely by affidavits, the court in 
2001 allowed defectively drafted affidavits holding that technical weaknesses should not be 
allowed to vitiate the quality of documents.
492
  Third, the manner in which the majority dealt 
with the principal claim of exclusion was nothing more than a trivialisation of the issue and a 
negation of the right to an effective remedy.  
The evidence, accepted by the court, indicated that INEC went out of its way to exclude the 
petitioner and had printed the first version of ballot papers without his name. INEC was 
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forced to print new ballots four days before the election by order of court. This left the 
petitioner with just four days to campaign and effectively put him at a disadvantage.
493
 The 
court took a narrow and simplistic interpretation of exclusion which negates the need to offer 
candidates equality of opportunities to present their election platforms to the electorate. 
A more concrete example of how the Courts have misapplied technicalities at the expense of 
substantive justice is the way they have made use of the substantial effect rule.  Although all 
stable African countries have laws and regulation that govern the conduct of elections, these 
do not by themselves guarantee free and fair democratic elections. Often election results are 
affected by honest mistakes, incompetence of election officials, corruption, fraud, violence, 
intimidation, cheating and other irregularities. Some of these irregularities may be minor and 
inconsequential. However, a lot others are significant and have a bearing on the fairness and 
legitimacy of an election. 
When courts are faced with an election petition, there is therefore need for a legal device or 
mechanism whereby they will determine which irregularities are minor and inconsequential 
and which are significant and in need of redress. The substantial effect rule does that. For 
many Anglophone African countries, this is an old rule inherited from the English legal 
system. The main point of the rule is that elections should not be nullified for minor 
irregularities or infractions of rules.
494
 
The rule is enacted in the English statute, the Representation of People Act, which has a 
history going back to the 1800s,
495
 thus:  
No parliamentary election shall be declared invalid by reason of any act or omission by the 
returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the 
election or otherwise of the parliamentary election rules if it appears to the tribunal having 
cognizance of the question that- 
(a) the election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to the 
elections; and  
(b) the act or omission did not affect its results.
496
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The idea behind the rule is that flimsy mistakes, omissions and commissions should not  lead 
to an annulment of an election, provided, overall, the fairness of the election was not vitiated. 
Lord Denning identified three strands to this rule: 
1.If the election was conducted so badly that it was not substantially in accordance with the 
law as to elections, the election is vitiated, irrespective of whether the result was affected or 
not. 
2. If the election was so conducted that it was substantially in accordance with the law as to 
elections, it is not vitiated by a breach of the rules or a mistake at the polls- provided that it 
did not affect the results of the election 
3.But, even though the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the  law as to 
elections, nevertheless if there was  a breach of the rules or a mistake at the  polls- and did 
affect the results- then the election is vitiated.
497
 
The substantial effect rule sometimes can be expansive to include criminal acts such as acts 
of corruption, treating and other illegal electoral malpractices. Equally here the rule has three 
strands: 
(a)corrupt or illegal practices or illegal payments...were committed by someone; 
(b)they were committed at an election for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election 
of a candidate; and 
(c)they prevailed so extensively that they may be reasonably supposed to have affected the 
result of the election.
498
 
The substantial effect rule produces a major challenge  where illegal acts or substantial 
flouting  of electoral  laws do not lead to automatic avoiding  the election, unless it be proved 
that that had a bearing on the results. Such a rule is defeatist and a carryover, in the case of 
the British, from the times when electoral corruption and cheating were considered inevitable 
to the electoral process.
499
 It seems inappropriate in a modern democracy to saddle a litigant 
who has proved substantial breach of electoral laws and/or corruption, to also prove that they 
had an effect on results. Every voter in a modern democracy is surely entitled to an honest, 
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fair and transparently democratic election. It would certainly not be appropriate for a 
successful candidate to be heard to say: “I accept I was elected following widespread fraud 
carried out in my favour but, if you cannot demonstrate to a court that the fraud affected the 
result, my election stands.”500  
The substantial effect rule, has worked in the most disingenuous way in Africa to uphold 
elections fraught with major irregularities and fraud. As shall be seen, from the following 
case examples, election petitions that manage to survive being thrown away on technicalities 
usually are decided and dismissed for want of satisfying the substantial effect rule. 
 
3.3.3.1 Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni Presidential Election Petition No.01 of 2006 
This petition was brought by main opposition losing candidate, Dr. Kizza Besigye, 
challenging the election of the incumbent, President Museveni following the February 2006 
election. The relevant statutory provision under which the case was mainly decided states: 
The election of a candidate as a president shall only be annulled on any of the following 
grounds, if proved to the satisfaction of the court- 
(a) non-compliance with the provisions of this Act, if the court is satisfied that the election 
was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in those provisions and that 
the non-compliance affected the results of the election in a substantial manner.
501
  
At the hearing of the petition, the following were framed as the issues for decision by the 
Supreme Court: 
1.Whether there was  non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, Presidential 
Elections Act and Electoral Commission Act, in the conduct of the 2006 presidential election. 
2.Whether the said election was not conducted  in accordance with principles laid down in the 
constitution, presidential Elections Act and Electoral Commission Act. 
3.Whether if either issue 1 or 2 or both are answered in the affirmative, such non-compliance 
with the said laws and principles affected the results of the election in a substantial manner 
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4.Whether the alleged illegal practices or any electoral offences in the petition, were 
committed by the 2
nd
 respondent personally, or  by his agents with his knowledge and consent 
or approval.
502
 
As regards the first two issues, the Supreme Court judges were unanimous that the election 
was vitiated by disenfranchisement of voters by unlawfully deleting their names from the 
voters’ register; wrongful counting and tallying of results; bribery; intimidation; violence; 
multiple voting; and ballot stuffing.
503
 On the third issue, by a majority of four to three, the 
court held that the failure to comply with the provisions and principles in statutes as found in 
issues 1 and 2 did not affect the election in a substantial manner.
504
 On the fourth issue, by a 
majority of five to two, the court held that although there were illegal practices and other 
offences, these were not committed by the respondent or his agents, nor were they committed 
with his knowledge or approval.
505
 
The third issue (substantial effect), however, was the main issue around which the petition 
revolved and was mainly resolved. The majority dismissed the petition, holding that in 
determining if the irregularities and malpractices affected the results in a substantial manner, 
numbers were the sole measuring yardstick. That is, the court could only be moved if “the 
winning majority would have been reduced in such a way as to put the victory of the winning 
candidate in doubt.”506 Since there was nothing indicating that the margin of 1,580,309 votes 
between respondent and petitioner would have been significantly reduced, the election 
therefore stood.
507
  
There are many shortcomings that can be noted from both the wording of section 59(6)(a) of 
the Presidential Election Act which provides for the substantial effect rule, as well as the 
manner the majority applied it. Four of the flaws can be noted here.  
First, section 59(6)(a) requires of the court that it should not just be satisfied  that there was 
non-compliance with electoral laws, but  also that the court must be satisfied that the non-
compliance affected the election results in a substantial manner. This provision is difficult to 
implement objectively as the requirement to evaluate whether or not the non-compliance had 
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effect on election results in a substantial manner is no longer a legal exercise premised on the 
evidence before court. It basically requires judges to make subjective evaluation of 
consequences of their prospective decision. As Kanyeihamba JSC, stated in his dissenting 
opinion, the provision “transports the judge from the heights of legality and impartiality to 
the deep valleys of personal inclinations and political judgment.”508 
Second, the numerical test applied by the majority is manifestly and inherently wrong. While 
certain malpractices like ballot stuffing, voting by ineligible persons and wrong tabulation of 
results may be cured by reference to numbers, others such as intimidation, violence, and 
deploying the military throughout the country cannot be captured in a mechanical sense of 
numbers. If for example, soldiers kill a person and tell many people that anyone who votes 
against the incumbent will meet the same fate, how would this be reflected in numbers? It 
was unanimously accepted by the judges that violence and intimidation were widespread and 
the Constitution and other electoral laws were seriously flouted. This should have been 
enough to assure that there was a necessary deleterious consequence on the election that 
affected their quality. It is strange jurisprudence that after adjudging the election not to have 
been transparent, free and fair, the majority of the court then backtracked and held that the 
irregularities were of no substantial effect. 
Third, the numerical approach taken by the majority seems at odds with the concept of rule of 
law and constitutionalism. The judges were unanimous that the elections were held in a 
manner that violated constitutional and other statutory provisions on the conduct of 
transparent and democratic elections. The decision of the majority effectively means that 
gross violations of the constitution and other laws can be of no consequence provided the 
petitioners cannot by reference to numbers demonstrate that the result gap could have been 
diminished. It goes without saying that this violates the principle of the supremacy of the 
Constitution. 
Fourth and finally, by overlooking serious electoral malpractices at the expense of numbers, a 
dangerous precedent for rewarding electoral cheating is entrenched with the full imprimatur 
of the court. This takes away any incentive for honest behaviour in politics and elections. 
Ironically, it means one has to cheat so much that the gap in results should be numerically 
large to avoid judicial interference with results. It is hardly surprising that exactly the same 
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pattern of electoral irregularities were handled by the Supreme Court during the 2001 election 
petition.
509
 This is because the precedent set by the court offers no disincentive for 
committing electoral malpractices especially by those in power. 
These four shortcomings pointed out here generally apply to other case examples discussed 
below and therefore will not be repeated. 
 
3.3.3.2 Anderson Kambela Mazoka and others vs. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and others 
SCZ/EP/01/02/03/2002 
The case was brought following the 2001 Zambian general elections. In the Zambian 
situation, the substantial effect rule was not a statutory requirement but one which was 
effectively legislated into existence by the Supreme Court in the first ever presidential 
election petition that followed the 1996 general election.
510
 The Supreme Court admitted that 
there were many flaws in the electoral process, which included the use of the national 
intelligence in a partisan way, the unlawful use of public resources by the incumbent party 
and abuse of resources from parastatal companies.
511
 
The supreme court held that it could not grant any remedy or interfere with the result of the 
election because, taking into account the national character of the presidential election 
“where the whole country formed a single electoral college,” it could not be said that the 
proven “defects were such that the majority of the voters were prevented from electing the 
candidate whom they preferred.”512 In the view of the court, the petitioners were supposed to 
prove that the flaws “seriously affected the result” to such an extent that it could no longer be 
viewed as the true reflection of the majority of the voters.
513
  To demonstrate this, the 
petitioners should have proved “electoral malpractices and violations of the electoral laws in 
at least a majority of the constituencies.”514 
While this case was decided in similar ways as the Ugandan one discussed above, it differs 
significantly in that the substantial effect rule here was expanded to include wide 
geographical spread of irregularities, in addition to the numbers. The same flaws noted in 
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relation to the reasoning of the Ugandan Supreme Court apply here. However, the subjective 
and arbitrariness of the decision is made clear when one takes into account that the winner of 
the election and the runner-up were separated by less than two percentage points. It is, 
therefore, possible that any slight anomaly in even one isolated part of the country could have 
had an effect on the results. Considering that the election was very close, it seems that the 
court deliberately added the geographical spread element to the substantial effect rule, 
knowing that the numerical test would not be easy to sustain considering that the result was 
very close. 
 
3.3.3.3 Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo and others vs. John Dramani Mahama and others 
No.J1/6/2013 
The case arose from the 2012 Ghanaian elections. The main issue raised by the petitioners 
include allegations of over-voting; voting without biometric verification as required by law; 
absence of the signatures of presiding officers on some results sheets, contrary to the law; and 
the occurrence of same serial numbers for different polling stations.
515
 The situation was that 
if votes tainted with these anomalies were deducted, then the president elect, Mahama, would 
not have had the 50 percent-plus-one-vote constitutionally required majority to be considered 
elected president. 
Although the majority gave various reasons for upholding the election, the common theme 
was that even if there were these noted anomalies, the election itself was “conducted 
substantially in accordance with” the Constitution and other laws.516  But such jurisprudence 
should be worrying. The anomalies were contrary to the Constitution and other laws, and thus 
could not just be wished away. Taking them into account meant that the declared winner did 
not really win the election. The decision does not seem to be legally supportable and was 
probably based on other considerations. Adinyirwa, JSC, for example, made it clear that in 
her view, “public policy favours salvaging the election and giving effect to the voter’s 
intention.”517 The decision is in sharp contrast with the guidance of Lord Denning, discussed 
above, to the effect that even if an election is substantially held in accordance with the law, 
but is affected by minor infractions that have an effect on the result, then the election is 
vitiated and voidable. 
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3.3.4 Delayed Justice 
An effective judicial mechanism for determination of election disputes should not just be fair, 
but must also be timely and efficient. Many African states allow the swearing-in of the 
president upon declaration of results and the trail of election petitions follows later. In 
Nigeria, for example, Olusegun Obasanjo proceeded to be sworn in 2003, despite a court 
order restraining him and his running mate from presenting themselves for swearing in, 
pending determination of the substantive election petition.
518
 Where a president elect is sworn 
in even before election disputes are settled by the courts, the need for efficient resolution of 
cases becomes even more sensitive. Indeed the element of time is inherent in the concept of 
fair adjudication, making justice a time-bound concept.
519
  
There are some African countries, which are exemplary with regard to timely resolution of 
presidential election petitions. In Uganda, for example, the law requires the hearing and 
determination of presidential election disputes to be done within 30 days of presentation of 
the petition. The Ugandan Supreme court in both the 2001 and 2006 managed to determine 
the cases within the set time limit.
520
 In Kenya, the 2013 election petition, the first since the 
promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010, was promptly resolved within 30 days of 
presentation of the petition.
521
 
There are, however, still several countries where cases are habitually delayed, rendering the 
whole adjudication process an exercise in futility. In Nigeria, for example, it is estimated that 
a presidential election petition takes about two years to complete, which is actually half of the 
presidential tenure.
522
  Perhaps Zambia has the poorest record of inefficiency in adjudication 
of presidential election disputes. The presidential election dispute that arose from the 2001 
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elections, for example, was only determined in 2005, just about a year before another general 
election.
523
 
Delayed determination of election petitions, where one candidate is already sworn in, 
presents numerous challenges. First of all, it raises the issue of legitimacy of appointments 
and decisions made by such a president considering that there is a cloud of uncertainty about 
his or her election until the court finally determines the matter. Second, delays often increase 
uncertainty and anxiety in a nation. It’s not uncommon for delays in determining election 
petitions to precipitate military coups or coup attempts. In Zambia, for example, disputed 
presidential elections of 1996 and the delayed determination of the subsequent election 
petition is thought to have influenced the 1997 military coup attempt.
524
 Similarly, the 
military takeover of July 2013 in Egypt came amidst delayed determination of the election 
petition filed by the losing opposition leader, Ahmed Shafiq, following the 2012 elections.
525
  
Third, although there has been no judicial voiding of a presidential election on the continent 
so far (with the exception of Ivory Coast), where justice is delayed, and where an election is 
overturned, that would lead to distortion of the tenure of the person who merits to be the 
president. In the case of Zambia where, for example, it took almost four years to conclude the 
election petition, had the court determined that the opposition candidate was the rightful 
winner that would have left the genuine winner with just a year of office. The illegitimate 
candidate would then have ruled the country for the better part of the presidential tenure. This 
of course would violate the people’s right to choose their leaders and for the rightful leaders 
in turn to represent their people. 
The Nigerian case of Amaechi vs. INEC
526
, although a governorship case, is illustrative. In 
this case the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the person who was declared winner of the 
state governorship position was in fact not the rightful winner and therefore annulled his 
election and declared the petitioner as the legitimate governor.
527
 In such a case, it means for 
about a year while the case was still being litigated, the wrong person served as governor and 
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consequently the rightful governor had his term unfairly reduced. There are other examples of 
this.
528
 
Fourth, if the election were to be overturned or nullified, it means the wrong person was 
allowed to earn a presidential salary and other benefits for a protracted period, to which he or 
she was not entitled. It is unlikely such benefits would be reimbursed and therefore delayed 
justice leads to ‘abuse’ of public resources. 
The requirement under the new Kenyan Constitution which requires elections to be held prior 
to the expiration of the term of office of the incumbent and that election disputes are resolved 
prior to the swearing-in of the new president would seem to be a better alternative here.
529
  
 
3.3.5 Coming to No Decision 
Courts sometimes constrain themselves from making any meaningful decision or simply 
defer to the executive instead of making a final and binding determination. In the Nigerian 
case of Buhari,
530
 for example, the losing candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, sought and was 
granted an injunction by the court restraining Obasanjo and his running mate from presenting 
themselves for swearing-in into office, pending the determination of the main election 
petition.
531
  The respondents, in violation of the court order, went ahead and were sworn-in, 
where upon the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court for a determination, inter alia, as to 
whether the president was validly sworn-in when it was done in violation of a valid court 
order. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was no longer of any relevance since the 
respondents were already sworn-in and, therefore, the injunction would only be an academic 
exercise that had no res or status quo to protect. In any case, the court thought that the 
injunction was not directed at the Chief Justice not to swear-in the respondents.
532
 The 
Supreme Court considered that the applicants would not suffer any loss as the courts would 
still go ahead and determine the main election petition objectively and on its merits. 
It goes without saying that such an approach can only lead to cynicism about the commitment 
of the court to doing justice. It is common knowledge that a person, once sworn into office 
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can improperly influence the court into passing a favourable decision, considering the state 
power and resources at his disposal. As will be discussed below, the Nigerian Chief Justice 
later revealed that President Obasanjo made efforts to influence the judges by either bribery 
or intimidation.
533
 In this case, the court simply avoided doing its duty by failing to address 
itself as to the consequences of the swearing-in going ahead despite a court order to the 
contrary. 
The Zimbabwe 2008 election is another example of self-imposed impotence by the judiciary. 
Following the March 29, 2008 election, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) delayed 
inordinately to announce the results, prompting the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) to seek an order of the court to compel ZEC to release the results.
534
 Judge 
Uchena accepted that the delay was inexplicable and unjustified.
535
  
However, judge Uchena decided the case on the basis of section 67(A)(7) of the Electoral 
Act, which stated that the Commission’s decision on whether or not to order a recount and 
the extent of the recount “shall not be subject to an appeal.”According to Judge Uchena, this 
provision gave ZEC wide discretion and, therefore, its decisions are final, not subject to 
inquiry by the Court.
536
 The court was therefore “not entitled to intervene and order the 
respondents to announce the results.”537 
The reasoning of Judge Uchena is defective in many ways, as has been pointed by 
Odhiambo.
538
  First of all the action was not an appeal against a decision of ZEC but simply 
sought an order of mandamus to compel ZEC to perform its statutory duty. The provision the 
judge based his decision on was, therefore, completely irrelevant to the case. Second, an 
ouster clause like section 67(A)(7) should not have been applied literally without checking if 
it passed the constitutionality test, especially when important national matters are at stake.
539
 
Judge Uchena had the responsibility to review the consistency of that provision with 
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Constitutional provisions that give courts unlimited power of judicial review of 
administrative action. Third, as stated above, Uchena admitted that the delay was 
unreasonable. This finding by the judge, therefore, required him not to simply restate section 
67(A)(7) but to inquire into the causes of the delay and the consistency of the causes of the 
delay with the Constitutional obligations of ZEC to conduct transparent and democratic 
elections.
540
 
In discussing these shortcomings of judicial decisions in presidential election petitions, it 
should be noted that the desire is not to impress that all petitions presented before court have 
merit and, therefore, judges should have found for the petitioners in all cases. There have 
been some cases genuinely lacking in merit, at least in the way the grievance was framed, and 
rightfully dismissed. For example, in the Nigerian case of  Chukwuemeka Odumegu Ojukwu 
vs. Olusegun Obasanjo,
541
 the main complaint was that Obasanjo was not qualified to serve 
another term in office, owing to the fact that he had served as a military head of state which 
the petitioners construed to have been Obasanjo’s first term in office. This, it was argued for 
the petitioners, was contrary to section 137(1)(b) of the Constitution of Nigeria (1999), which  
required  that “a person shall not be qualified for election to the office of president if he has 
been elected to such office at any two previous elections.” Obasanjo’s ascent to power as a 
military ruler was not on the basis of any election as contemplated under the Constitution and 
therefore the term limit set in the 1999 Constitution did not affect him. The petition was, 
therefore, rightly dismissed. 
Cases dismissed for lacking merit, are however, very few. Many cases, as discussed above, 
usually raise genuine concerns and judges have routinely passed dissatisfactory and poorly 
reasoned decisions. The next section, therefore, looks at three possible explanations for 
judges passing such highly questionable decisions. 
 
3.4 Possible Explanations for such Court Decisions 
Judges are products of their societies and are influenced by their social and political context. 
They don’t just administer the law, but their context influences their justification and 
rationalisation of their decisions. As Haynie correctly observed while studying the behaviour 
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of judges who were administering the apartheid laws in South Africa: “Judges are not 
automatons programmed with statutory construction, legal canon and constitutional doctrine 
to be mechanistically applied to the conflict.”542 Their appreciation of facts and construction 
of law is influenced by the conditions and pressures that impress upon them.  
This section discusses two factors that may influence judges into rendering such 
unsatisfactory decisions when handling presidential election disputes. These are judicial 
corruption and lack of independence and impartiality; and intimidation and judicial timidity. 
 
3.4.1 “Why Hire a Lawyer When You Can Buy a Judge?” Judicial Corruption, and 
Lack of Independence and Impartiality 
This section looks at corruption and lack of judicial independence as possible causes of courts 
rendering decisions as they have done. It starts with a discussion on corruption and ends with 
lack of independence and impartiality.  
There is no universally agreed upon definition of corruption. But most working definitions 
consider corruption to be the “misuse of entrusted power for private gain”543 or “misuse of a 
public or private position for direct or indirect personal gain.”544  In the context of the 
judiciary, corruption usually entails the judiciary passing a favourable judgment to a litigant 
in exchange for favours. Such favours could be in kind; in monetary form (bribery); an 
elevation in status (such as promotion); or simply to secure continued stay on the bench 
(especially where security of tenure is dependent on the executive who may have an interest 
in the outcome of a case). 
Certainly judicial corruption is not limited to African judges. The 2013 Global Corruption 
Barometer, for example, found that globally, the judicially is ranked the second most corrupt 
institution, exceeded only by the police. At least 24 percent of people interacting with the 
judiciary paid a bribe.
545
 However, in Africa, where governance institutions tend to be very 
weak, judicial corruption tends to be more widespread, and cases of judicial corruption have 
been documented. In Kenya, for example, judicial corruption is considered to be so 
widespread that a common expression has been coined: “why hire a lawyer when you can 
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buy a judge?”546 The “Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board”, set up after the promulgation 
of the new Kenyan Constitution in 2010, had by February 2013 found that of the nine judges 
of the Court of Appeal, five ( 50 percent) were unsuitable to remain in office, while of the 44 
High court Judges who had been vetted, 33 (75 percent) were found unsuitable.
547
 
In Zambia, then Chief Justice Mathew Ngulube was in 2002 forced to resign following 
revelations that he had secretly received a total of USD 168,000 from President Fredrick 
Chiluba while he was hearing the presidential election petition before the Supreme Court.
548
 
In Zimbabwe, several judges including Chief Justice Chidyausiku were allocated and 
accepted farms expropriated from white farmers, even while some cases relating to the 
expropriation were still active in court.
549
  In Nigeria, the former Chief Justice, Muhammadu 
Lawal Uwais, is reported to have revealed how President Obasanjo made efforts to bribe and 
intimidate judges who were hearing the presidential election petition challenging Obasanjo’s 
2003 election.
550
 
Corruption in the judiciary has devastating consequences, not only to immediate litigants  
whose cases are no longer determined on merit, but to the whole  of society as the judiciary  
can no longer be trusted as guardian of public interest and rule of law. Judicial corruption 
destroys the public faith in justice, as judges no longer act impartially. It erodes public 
confidence in the judiciary’s ability to check on excesses of government; and to protect the 
weak against the powerful.
551
Where judges are corrupt, there is always a possibility that those 
with power and resources will get cases decided in their favour, including election disputes. 
Considering that incumbents and candidates sponsored by incumbent parties have access to 
state power and resources, it is hardly surprising that judgments have always been given in 
their favour. 
With regard to judicial independence and impartiality, these have been defined by David 
Malcolm, Chief Justice of Western Australia, as:  
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the degree to which judges actually decide cases in  accordance with their own determination 
of evidence, the law and justice, free from coercion, blandishment, interference, or threats 
from governmental or private citizens.
552
 
Independence and impartiality of the judiciary are universally recognised as the cornerstone 
of justice. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, for example, state that “judicial 
independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and fundamental guarantee of fair trial.”553  
The biggest threat to judicial independence and impartiality in Africa has always been an 
encroaching executive.
554
 Although, almost all national Constitutions in Africa have a clause 
guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, the executive manages to interfere with the 
judiciary, usually through the process of appointments and promotion, extension of tenure 
and removal process.
555
 
Notwithstanding Constitutional provisions that guarantee the independence of the judiciary, 
the executive is usually clothed with wide discretion in the appointment of judges. The 
Constitution of Cameroon, for instance, provides that the “judicial power shall be 
independent from the executive and legislative powers.”556 However, this is immediately 
watered down by a provision within the same article which makes judicial independence 
dependent on the president and vests all power of appointing judges in the presidency. It 
reads: “The president of the Republic shall guarantee the independence of judicial power. He 
shall appoint members of the bench and for the legal department.”557  
Such wide discretion in the appointment of judges allows the executive to choose pliant 
judges. Such judges are often chosen for their political inclinations than for their competence. 
Paul Yao Ndre, the President of the Constitutional Council of Ivory Coast, who reversed  
election results to declare Laurent Gbagbo winner, was a founding member of Gbagbo’s  
ruling party, and it is widely believed  that he was appointed to that position on account of his 
loyalty to Gbagbo.
558
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In some countries, there is an anomalous standard in the appointment of judges, whereby 
lower judges are appointed by the president on recommendation or  in consultation with the 
Judicial Service Commission (or an equivalent independent body), while Supreme Court or 
Appeal Court judges are appointed directly by the president. Such is the case, for example, 
under the constitutions of Tanzania
559
 and Zambia.
560
  This is a curious anomaly considering 
that Supreme Courts ultimately determine election petitions and other serious political cases. 
Furthermore, in some situations judges are hired on short term contracts or at least those who 
have attained retirement age are, at the discretion of the president, given new contracts under 
terms determined solely by the president.
561
  This derogates from the principle of security of 
tenure for judges and ensures judges serve at the pleasure of the executive. Zambia, for 
example, has since 2012 had a judge who has attained her retirement age but retained by the 
President to serve as acting Chief Justice with terms of her appointment never disclosed. 
Finally, the removal of judges in many countries is not in the hands of an independent body 
but in the hands of the executive. The Constitution of Malawi, for example, provides that:  
The President may by an instrument under the Public Seal and in consultation with the 
Judicial Service commission remove from office any judge where a motion praying for his 
removal on the ground of incompetence in the performance of the duties of his office or 
misbehaviour has been- 
(a) debated in the National Assembly; 
(b) passed by a majority of the votes of all the members of the Assembly; and 
(c) submitted to the president as a petition for the removal of the judges concerned.
562
 
Leaving such enormous power in the hands of politicians gives them power to intimidate 
judges and ensure a complaint judiciary.
563
 The danger of such a provision was demonstrated 
in 2001 when the Malawian National Assembly moved a motion for the removal of three 
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High Court judges who had passed decisions considered anti-government and pro-
opposition.
564
  
The combined effect of wide discretion of the executive in judicial appointments; award or 
extension of contracts; and removal from office is better characterised by the words of Justice 
Schofield, in relation to his personal experience of the situation in Kenya where he had 
served as a judge:  
The Chief Justice and some of the judges saw it as their duty to assist the president and 
government...thus the superior courts tended to support the government and particularly the 
president grew to expect compliance with his wishes.
565
  
 
3.4.2 Intimidation and Judicial Timidity 
Cases of judges suffering direct or subtle intimidation at the hands of the executive in Africa 
are very common. These could be directed at judges or their family members. Some of the 
common methods that have been used to intimidate judges include rhetorical attacks; sending 
party supporters or military officers to occupy the court premises; threats of violence or 
physical harm; blackmail and, in extreme cases, death.
566
 
The worst instances of intimidation have led to the assassination of judges. The first Ugandan 
Chief Justice, Benedicto Kiwanuka, for instance, was killed by the Idi Amin regime for 
passing decisions not favourable to the regime.
567
  Similarly, in Senegal, Bubacar Seye, the 
Vice President of the Constitutional Council was assassinated in 1993, shortly after elections, 
the validity of which he was supposed to adjudicate.
568
 
Sometimes the executive or incumbent sends a clear message to the judiciary that he will not 
obey judicial decisions that go against his views. President Museveni of Uganda, for 
example, is known to have said that “the major work of judges is to settle chicken and goat 
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theft cases but not determining the country’s destiny.”569 In 2005, when the Uganda High 
Court released suspects on bail, contrary to the wishes of government, Museveni’s 
government sent troops of armed soldiers to surround the Court and re-arrest the suspects.
570
  
Chief Justice Odoki in a statement after this incident indicated that the move was intended to 
intimidate the judiciary.
571
 
In similar fashion, when the Zimbabwe Supreme court declared farm invasions as illegal, 
President Mugabe and his senior ministers, including Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa, 
mounted a vicious attack on the judges. Government supporters were unleashed on the court 
premises in protest and occupied court rooms at the Supreme Court, destructing court 
business.
572
 While they occupied the court rooms, the protesters chanted slogans such as “kill 
the judges”.573 Judges of both the High and Supreme courts subsequently received death 
threats.
574
 This forced the Chief Justice, Roy Gubbey, and other independent minded judges, 
to resign.
575
 
Intimidation of judges inevitably leads to judicial timidity, that is, judges live in fear of 
upsetting the status quo. As Haynie discovered about the art of judging in repressive regimes, 
judges in cases with high stakes or cases that challenge the status quo, almost always decide 
in favour of those with power.
576
 Where judges live in timidity should they upset the status 
quo, in the words of Haynie, “judging is not black and white- judging is a process by which 
the grey is given the appearance of black and white.”577  
It is usually this climate of timidity that produces what is sometimes referred to as the 
jurisprudence of executive deference or “the executive is right”, that is always finding for the 
executive in major political cases. In such cases, judges instead of impartially assessing facts 
before them and decide the case according to law, often detour and make unfounded 
assumptions that allow them to find in favour of the executive. Perhaps the best recent 
example of this is the Zambian case of 2013 in which three judges challenged the process of 
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their removal, following a decision that went against certain allies of the president. In 
dismissing their action for judicial review on the ground of irrationality, inter alia, the 
majority of the Supreme Court stated: 
...we are satisfied that bearing in mind the authoritative position of His Excellency, it would 
be illogical and unreasonable to hold that he did not  receive credible information as President 
for  him to act as he did. He is the overall authority on everything. His sources are exclusive 
to the public domain and must be impeccable.
578
  
How could a competent court come to such a decision, making a fundamental judgment on 
the basis of assumptions and not evidence and law? This is an example of a court that is 
grovelling before the executive and defers its mandate of adjudication to the discretion of the 
executive. 
 
3.5 Consequences of Judicial Decisions in Presidential Election Disputes 
The judiciary derives its very existence from a country’s Constitution and is equal in stature 
with the executive and legislative wings of government.
579
 It is considered as guardian of 
democracy, for it has the final authority in interpreting the law and safeguarding democracy. 
However, where the courts give dissatisfactory decisions and cannot be relied upon to decide 
cases impartially and according to law and evidence, it could have a deleterious effect on the 
consolidation of democracy. 
This section briefly discusses three consequences of the judiciary rendering dissatisfactory 
judgements on presidential election disputes. These are the erosion of confidence in the 
judiciary as an impartial arbiter and dispenser of justice; the entrenchment of unequal playing 
field and reward of culprits; and the possibility of sparking off violence and breakdown of the 
state. 
 
3.5.1 Loss of Confidence in Judiciary 
Judges do not have military forces to help enforce their decisions. Their effectiveness is 
solely dependent on the support of the people, who consider delivery of impartial justice as 
an important common good to be preserved. This public confidence is a treasure and a 
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“vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect liberty, and indeed, the rule of 
law itself.”580 It is this public confidence in the judiciary that assures the effective role of the 
judiciary in contributing to the rule of law and consolidation of democracy. In the words of 
US Supreme Court Judge Stevens, “it is confidence in the men and women who administer 
the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.”581 
In many African countries public confidence in the judiciary as an impartial guardian of the 
rule of law has been fatally wounded by, inter alia, the manner judges have decided 
presidential election disputes. The Nigerian Supreme Court captured this loss of confidence 
when it stated: 
Nigerian judges are called all sorts of names by litigants. They are suspected for the slightest 
action. Parties do not seem to believe that judges can dispense justice in the light of the law 
and the law alone. The insults are getting too much. Some of us have always taken the matter 
as one of occupational hazard. It has gone beyond that and is very very worrying.
582
 
What is clear from this statement is that the lack of faith or confidence in the judiciary is not 
about an occasional disgruntled litigant but an overwhelming problem permeating the nation 
and threatens the legitimacy of the whole judicial department. This growing lack of 
confidence in the judiciary to be able to render impartial justice, especially in presidential 
election disputes, is not limited to Nigeria but ubiquitous and affects almost all African 
countries. 
There are statistics to back these assertions. In a 2013 opinion poll on the levels of public 
confidence in the judiciary in 28 African countries, Gallup Poll, an opinion poll company, 
found that “less than half of sub-Saharan Africans (48%) express confidence in the judicial 
system.”583 Gallup Poll indicates that in fact the level of confidence in the Judiciary in Africa 
is waning as it has declined from a high of 55 percent in 2010 to rest at 48 percent in 2013.
584
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3.5.2 Rewards Culprits, Justifies and Entrenches Unequal Playing Field 
As seen in cases discussed above, courts have usually used technicalities to avoid considering 
merits of petitions. Where cases made it beyond technicalities to be considered on merits, 
most of them get dismissed for want of satisfying the substantial effect doctrine. This is 
usually despite readily accepting that there were serious malpractices violating applicable 
electoral laws. As seen, these violations are not just minor administrative glitches, but serious 
irregularities that go to the heart of an election and vitiate its legitimacy. These include ballot 
stuffing; cheating and altering results; violence; abuse of public resources and facilities; 
involvement of  the military to intimidate voters; and restricting  space for the opposition. 
When the courts make decisions that overlook these flaws, that invariably rewards the 
culprits and takes away any incentive to behave better in future elections. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that despite routine challenges to the validity of elections, the pattern of 
flaws in elections is almost always the same in many countries. For example, the Nigerian 
cases discussed above raise similar electoral malpractices, which have assailed every 
election. Ironically, a commission of inquiry led by former Nigerian Chief Justice Uwais 
reported that “elections conducted by the military tended to be more credible than those 
conducted by civilian authorities.”585 But considering that the courts have overlooked these 
malpractices and irregularities and made decisions in favour of incumbents or candidates 
supported by incumbent parties, this ensures that wrong doers are actually the ultimate 
beneficiaries of their own wrongs. This has the effect of entrenching electoral malpractices as 
there is no incentive for better behaviour in the future. 
 
3.5.3 May Lead to Violence and Breakdown of the State 
Competent and impartial courts enable peaceful resolution of disputes. When courts are 
trusted to render impartial justice, aggrieved parties are able to ventilate in courts without 
resort to street violence or self-help means. 
However, where courts cannot be trusted to render impartial justice, aggrieved parties will 
resort to self-help means to redress their grievance. These may include street protests, 
arbitrary violence and war. In extreme cases, the very life of the state may be at stake as the 
ensuing violence and chaos may overwhelm all institutions of government. To a great extent, 
it can be said that post-election violence in Africa is not so much about unsuccessful 
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candidates failing to concede defeat, but more about lack of faith in the existence of an 
impartial and competent judicial forum in which to seek and find redress. The AU Panel of 
the Wise, for example, considers that with the decline of historic causes of violence in Africa, 
“elections have emerged as one of the major recent sources of conflict across Africa.”586 It 
attributes this in part due to “lack of impartial judiciaries to interpret and adjudicate electoral 
disputes.”587 
There are several examples of post-election violence and conflict in Africa. In Nigeria, for 
example, the 2011 re-election of President Goodluck Jonathan was greeted with mass 
protests, especially in northern Nigeria, which led to the loss of about 300 lives.
588
  In 
Ethiopia, the military killed at least 193 people protesting the results of the 2010 elections.
589
 
Perhaps the most serious recent examples of electoral-related violence that threatened the life 
of the whole state are those of Kenya following the 2007 elections and Ivory Coast following 
the 2010 elections. In Kenya, following the disputed election, the opposition refused to take 
their grievance to the court as they considered the judiciary as not independent. Massive 
violence erupted leading to the death of more than 1000 people and the displacement of more 
than 350,000.
590
 In the case of Ivory Coast, following the Constitutional Council’s arbitrary 
decision to reverse the election of Outtara in favour of Gbagbo, and the failure of peaceful 
resolution of  the matter through diplomatic efforts, full scale war broke out, which led to the 
capture of Gbagbo.
591
 
Lack of confidence in the judiciary and its capacity to administer justice fairly fans violence 
which may affect the very existence of the state. Without confidence in the judiciary, 
aggrieved parties will not ventilate their grievances in the courts, preferring self-help 
methods. 
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3.6 Summary 
It is no secret that many presidential elections in Africa have been assailed with major 
irregularities. When this occurs it usually falls on the judiciary to protect the right of people 
to choose their leaders in a free and transparent atmosphere. The record of the judiciary, 
however, has been overwhelmingly disappointing. The judiciary has routinely upheld clearly 
defective elections, erroneously considering it their duty to salvage defective elections as a 
matter of public policy. To achieve this, the courts have largely applied two techniques. The 
first one is to simply dismiss election petitions on flimsy procedural technicalities, without 
considering merits of the case. Second, the courts have wrongly applied the substantial effect 
rule to uphold disputed elections, even in the face of glaring evidence indicating serious 
violations of Constitutional and other statutory provisions. In other circumstances, judges 
have simply constrained themselves from making an appropriate decision. Further, while in 
some countries judges have been exemplary in determining cases efficiently, in many 
countries such cases are still characterised by inordinate delays that negate the whole purpose 
of adjudication. 
There are several possible reasons that may account for this poor judicial record on 
presidential election disputes. These may include judicial corruption; intimidation of judges; 
and lack of independence and impartiality. This has consequently led to erosion of public 
confidence in the judiciary as an impartial custodian of the rule of law; the entrenchment and 
rewarding of culprits as they continue to benefit from their wrong doing; and in extreme 
cases the breakdown of violence and threat to national cohesion. Ultimately, consolidation of 
democracy suffers a setback with the full complicit of the judiciary. 
The next chapter looks at the normative frameworks at continental and sub-regional level that 
set standards for the conduct of democratic elections in Africa. 
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Chapter Four 
Transnational Approach to Democratic Elections: An Overview of African 
Normative Frameworks 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the African continental and sub-regional normative frameworks that 
have a bearing on the conduct of democratic elections in African states. The norms are 
usually in the form of treaties or other international instruments. However, the norms are not 
restricted to treaties as they are also manifested through consistent behaviour and practices of 
states. 
The chapter is clustered in four parts. The first part looks at the legacy of the Organisation for 
African Unity (OAU) and how it approached the subject of democratic elections. The second 
section looks at the standards developed under the African Union (AU), the African regional 
integration organisation that succeeded the OAU. The important documents discussed here 
include the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance. The third section looks at the normative frameworks at sub-
regional level. Five sub-regions are discussed and these are the East Africa Community, the 
Economic Community of East African States, the Southern African Development 
Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the Arab Maghreb 
Union. The final part is the summary of the whole chapter. 
 
4.2 The OAU Legacy 
 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed on 25 May 1963, following the 
adoption of the OAU Charter.
592
  Circumstances surrounding the formation of the OAU have 
been discussed in chapter two, specifically in the context of the discussion on the concept of 
regional integration or regionalism. This section will, therefore, only discuss normative 
frameworks, or lack thereof, as set by the OAU as regards the promotion of democracy and 
the conduct of democratic elections. The norms and standards set by the OAU are manifest in 
                                                          
592
 See Article I (1) OAU Charter 1963 
126 
 
the OAU Charter, other OAU treaties, Resolutions and Declarations as well as in the actual 
conduct or behaviour of OAU member states as a collective unit that set a pattern of 
behaviour in the area of democratic governance. 
Discussion of the OAU normative legacy on democracy is clustered around the following two 
points: 
a) OAU indifference to undemocratic assumption of power; 
b) The democratic norms articulated with the adoption of the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights; and the OAU paradigm shift in favour of democratic assumption 
of office in the 1990s. 
 
4.2.1 OAU Indifference to Undemocratic and Unconstitutional Change of Government 
The OAU was founded on a weak normative framework as regards the promotion and 
consolidation of democracy in member states. Its founding Charter lacked any reference to 
enhancing democracy and good governance. The OAU founding Charter (OAU Charter) 
states that the purposes of the OAU are the promotion of unity and solidarity of African 
states; coordination of cooperation; defence of their sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence; eradication of all forms of colonialism; and the promotion of international 
cooperation.
593
 In pursuit of these aims, the Charter enjoined the OAU member states to 
observe the following principles: 
1. Sovereign equality of all member states; 
2. Non-interference in internal affairs of states; 
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable 
right to independent existence; 
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration; 
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as 
subversive  activities on the part of  the neighbouring states or any other states; 
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still 
dependant; and  
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.594 
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The principles of sovereign equality of states; respect for sovereign and territorial integrity 
and non-interference coalesced into the devastating norm of indifference to how governments 
in member states assumed office. Thus the OAU could not interfere or be seen as to meddle 
in the domestic affairs of member states. This was well asserted by then OAU chairperson, 
President Sekou Toure of Guinea, when he remarked that the OAU was not “a tribunal which 
could sit in judgment on any member state’s internal affairs.”595  Even the principle 
condemning political assassinations and subversive activities in neighbouring states should 
not be construed as concern for democratic governance but more about self-preservation of 
incumbents. It was included in the Charter in the context of allegations that Ghana (Kwame 
Nkrumah) was sponsoring subversive activities in neighbouring states that did not embrace 
Nkrumah’s influence, and this is believed to have led to the assassination of President 
Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in 1963.
596
 
The OAU firmly asserted the doctrine of non-interference in domestic affairs of member 
states such that it was adopted in its initial Resolution as a norm to guide the relationships 
and conduct among all African states.
597
  In consequence, the OAU paid no attention to how 
governments changed in member states. In the case of elections, this effectively meant that 
the OAU precluded itself from setting standards and inquiring into the fairness and 
genuineness of elections in member states. The problem was compounded, as noted in the 
second chapter, with frequent changes of government through military coups. The OAU 
responded to such situations by applying the traditional public international law doctrine of 
recognition of  governments in its brutal and simplistic form, that is, it never considered the 
constitutional legitimacy of governments in member states but simply considered and 
recognised as governments, those entities in “effective control” of the state.598 Provided it had 
effective control of the state, how a government came to power was not an issue for which 
the OAU would withhold its recognition. Thus governments that held office through 
fraudulent elections, violence and military coups had no major problem securing the 
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recognition of the OAU. It is for this reason that some commentators and scholars referred to 
the OAU as a “Club of Incumbents.”599  
The OAU faithfully applied the doctrine of non-interference and recognition of governments 
with effective control of the state until the 1990s when there was a new wave of 
democratisation on the continent. The consequence of this approach can be seen from how 
the OAU dealt with the recognition of competing representatives of states at OAU meetings 
and events. The cases of Ghana, Uganda, Liberia and Chad are quite illustrative.   
In the case of Ghana, following the military overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah by the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) in 1966, the NLC sent delegates to the Sixth Ordinary 
Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, which led to massive controversy as to their status. 
After much haggling and bargaining, it was resolved to seat the NLC delegates as the 
government of Ghana.
600
  This was the first major recognition problem faced by the OAU and 
the decision of the OAU set a precedent to be followed almost piously in subsequent cases 
and for many years until 1997 when the OAU unanimously rejected the military coup in 
Sierra Leone. 
The next case, of Uganda followed Idi Amin’s overthrow of the Miltone Obote regime in 
1971. Both Amin and Obote sent delegates to the OAU’s Sixteenth Session of the Council of 
Ministers. After much arguing, the OAU settled for Idi Amin’s delegates as they had 
effective control of the state.
601
 In the case of Liberia, the OAU recognised the government of 
Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, who in 1980 overthrew the government of President Tolbert 
and executed him and several other senior government officials.
602
  In similar fashion, the 
government of Hissene Habre in Chad, who overthrew the government of President 
Goukhouni Ouddei in 1982, was recognised, despite protests from the Ouddei faction.
603
 
As discussed in chapter two, no single incumbent African President allowed himself to lose 
an election until the democratic wave of the 1990s. Considering that the OAU lacked a solid 
framework for democratic election and democratic yardstick for recognition of governments, 
this record is then hardly surprising. 
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4.2.2 Democratic Norms in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the OAU Paradigm Shift in Favour of Democracy in the 1990s 
Thomas Franck, in his 1992 seminal article, postulated the emergence in international law of 
the right to democratic governance.
604
  This would be an age where citizens of each state will 
look to international law and institutions for the guarantee of their democratic entitlement. 
According to Franck, for some states, this will simply be an embellishment of already 
existing rights at municipal level, while for others, it would “be the realisation of a cherished 
dream.”605 This, he argues, is due to the regimes’ craving for validation and the pull for 
legitimacy. Regimes are said to crave validation as an indication or measure of their 
legitimacy, while legitimacy is the process and the quality or value that pulls both the “rule 
makers and those addressed by the rules towards voluntary compliance.”606 
Franck points to three democratic norms already widely recognised in international law as the 
basis for the further growth of the entitlement to democratic governance.   These are 
participation in one’s government, self-determination, and freedom of expression.607 
In Africa the first pivotal development towards erecting a continental norm in favour of 
democratic governance was the adoption and entry into force of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (alternatively called the Banjul Charter). The Charter was 
adopted by the OAU in Nairobi, Kenya, on 27 June 1981. It entered into force on 21 October 
1986. In it are at least two provisions that relate directly to democratic governance and have 
been interpreted as having a bearing on the conduct of elections.  These are Article 13(1) 
which guarantees every citizen the right to participate in the government of their country, and 
Article 20 which provides for self-determination.
608
  
As regards the right to participation, the Charter provides thus:  
Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the 
law.
609
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Although it is important that the Charter provides for political participation, it does so with an 
inherent drafting weakness in that the scope of this right is not defined. This can lead to a 
narrow construction of the right. The drafting style of the provision has also been severely 
criticized for its lack of depth as a guiding norm for the conduct of democratic elections. At 
least four weaknesses can be noted here. 
The first notable weakness of Article 13(1) is that it does not expressly include the holding of 
periodic and democratic elections as an aspect of political participation.
610
  Second, the words 
“freely chosen” in the provision may be interpreted narrowly to simply imply the entitlement 
to vote without coercion and nothing more- without requiring that the election results should 
reflect the will of the people. Coercion is not the only electoral malpractice that can vitiate 
the fairness of an election. Third, the provision does not take on board basic standards that go 
with the holding of democratic elections such as universal adult suffrage, non-discrimination, 
and secret ballot.
611
  Finally, the provision requires that the right to political participation be 
enjoyed “in accordance with the provisions of the law.” This may narrowly be interpreted to 
mean that the enjoyment of the right is subject to existing (or even future) national 
constitutions and statutes.
612
 In that case, it could be said to be setting no norm at all as it 
prescribes no quality or value national laws should be measured against. 
Despite these inherent drafting weaknesses, however, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, the treaty body responsible for the enforcement of the Charter, has 
interpreted the provision in a very progressive manner that would advance the conduct of 
democratic elections. In the Nigerian case brought to the Commission by the Constitutional 
Rights Project, following the Babangida government’s annulment of the 1993 election, 
considered to have been free and fair by many observers, the Commission considered the act 
as a violation of Article 13(1). It went on to spell aspects of the right to participation as 
follows: 
To participate freely in government entails, among other things, the right to vote for the 
representative of one’s choice. An inevitable corollary of this right is that the results of the 
free expression of the will of the voters are respected; otherwise, the right to vote freely is 
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meaningless. In the light of this, the annulment of the election results, which reflected the free 
choice of the voters, is in violation of article 13(1).
613
 
The Commission has also developed jurisprudence to the effect that tactics such as the 
enactment of exclusionary clauses so as to disqualify certain persons or sections of the 
population from participating in elections amounts to violation of Article 13(1). In Legal 
Resources Foundation vs. Zambia,
614
 the Commission had to deal with a Zambian 
Constitutional provision passed in 1996, which required any presidential candidate to prove 
that both parents were Zambian citizens by birth or descent.
615
  The provision was not only 
discriminatory but was considered to have been targeted against former President, Kenneth 
Kaunda, who had returned to active politics and was at the time the main opposition 
candidate for  the 1996 general elections. Both his parents were born in colonial Nyasaland 
(current Malawi) but they had migrated to Northern Rhodesia (current Zambia) where he was 
born almost 40 years before independence. The Commission held that the exclusionary 
constitutional provision was a violation of Article 13(1), and that, although the right to 
political participation was supposed to be “in accordance with the provisions of the law,” this 
simply indicated the desire to regulate how the right was enjoyed and not to deny it.”616 The 
Commission categorically stated that: 
The pain in such an instance is caused not just to the citizen who suffers discrimination by 
reason of place of origin, but [by the fact] that the rights of the citizens of Zambia to ‘freely 
choose’ political representatives of their choice is violated. The purpose of the expression ‘in 
accordance with the provisions of the law’ is surely intended to regulate how the right is to be 
exercised rather than that the law should be used to take away the right.
617
 
The second norm under the Banjul Charter that relates to the democratic elections is one on 
self-determination. The Charter provides for self-determination in the following terms: 
1. All peoples shall have right to existence. They shall have the right to unquestionable 
and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political 
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status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy 
they have freely chosen. 
2. Colonised or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds 
of domination by resorting to any means recognised by the international community. 
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the state parties to the present 
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, 
economic or cultural.”618 
Although most of the provision relates to the self-determination of people under colonial rule, 
the first clause has general application and applies even to independent African states. In this 
case, self-determination is considered as the right of people to “organise in an established 
territory to determine its collective destiny in a democratic fashion...”619  In the Nigerian case 
where General Babangida annulled results of a democratic election, the Commission held that 
the right to self-determination is actually connected with the right to participate and includes 
people freely choosing their own government. It stated: 
The right of people to determine their ‘political  status’ can be interpreted as involving the 
right of Nigerians to be  able to choose freely those persons or party that will govern them. It 
is the counterpart of the right enjoyed by individuals under article 13.
620
 
In the Jawara v. Gambia case where the military took over power in 1994 and ousted 
democratically elected President Jawara, the Commission held that the military coup was a 
“grave violation of the right of Gambian people to freely choose their government as 
entrenched in article 20(1) of the Charter.”621 
Although the OAU adopted the Banju Charter, which guaranteed the right to political 
participation, the OAU continued with its non-interference doctrine. Regimes that came after 
the adoption, and even entry into force of the Charter, and in clear violation of its provisions, 
were still recognised. For example, the regime of Hissene Habre discussed above, assumed 
power through a military coup in 1982, and was recognised as the legitimate government of 
Chad. 
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The OAU could however no longer remain indifferent to the winds of change blowing across 
the continent in the 1990s.
622
 It began to depart from its policy of non-interference in 
domestic affairs. The major trigger for this was the June 1997 OAU Summit in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, which took place shortly after  a military coup led by Major Johnny Paul 
Koroma, ousted  the democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah 
of Sierra Leone.
623
 The OAU unanimously and unequivocally condemned the coup as 
contrary to African democratic standards and aspirations and approved military action taken 
by Nigeria-led ECOWAS forces.
624
 The ECOWAS forces removed the military junta and 
restored President Kabbah to power in 1998. This became the first time that the OAU 
unanimously disapproved of a government that came to power through unconstitutional 
means and supported action to restore the legitimate government. 
The next incident that showed a shift by the African leaders in favour of democratic 
governments occurred in 1998, when on June 7, the democratically elected government of 
President Bernado do Nino Vieira was threatened with a mutiny by senior military officers in 
Guinea-Bissau. This led to fierce fighting between mutineers and loyal forces.
625
  In response 
to a request for help from President Vieira, the governments of Senegal and Republic of 
Guinea intervened to quell the mutiny and safeguard the democratically elected government 
of Vieira.
626
 
In the same year South Africa and Botswana troops, on behalf of the SADC regional body, 
intervened in Lesotho to safeguard the democratically elected government of   Prime Minister 
Mosisili.
627
 Following the 1998 Lesotho general election that returned Mosisili’s government 
to power, the opposition and part of the military launched street protests that turned violent 
and threatened to paralyse government. This became the first time in the Southern African 
sub-region that SADC intervened to safeguard a democratically elected government.
628
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Following these incidents, the OAU began to articulate a general policy rejecting all 
unconstitutional assumptions of power in member states. At its 35
th
 Session in Algiers in 
1999, the OAU made a decision that “all member states whose governments came to power 
through unconstitutional means after the Harare Summit [June 1997], should return to 
constitutional legality before the next Summit.”629 The affected states were the Comoros, 
Congo Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, and Niger. The concerned states were, however, allowed 
to participate at the summit, acknowledged their wrong doing and promised rectification of 
the situation in their states.
630
 
At the next Summit in Lome, Togo, in July 2000, the OAU heads of state and government 
adopted the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. The Declaration 
denounced the resurgence of military coups and considered them as a serious setback to the 
process of democratisation in the continent.
631
 It considers military coups unacceptable and 
defined the following as situations that constitute unconstitutional changes of government: 
i. Military coup d’état against a democratically elected government; 
ii. Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; 
iii. Replacement of democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel 
movements; 
iv. The refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after 
free, fair and regular elections.
632
 
The Declaration also required that whenever an unconstitutional change of government 
occurs, the OAU Chairperson shall on behalf of the OAU promptly condemn such a change 
and call for speedy return to constitutional governance.
633
 The perpetrators would be given 
six months within which to return the country to constitutional governance, failure to which 
targeted sanctions may be imposed.
634
 During the six months period, the concerned 
government would be suspended from taking part in policy organs of the OAU.
635
 
There is no doubt that the adoption of the Lome Declaration was ground breaking in norm 
setting in the acceleration of democratic governance on the African continent. It sets a 
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definite departure from the earlier OAU practice of recognising governments in effective 
control of the state, regardless of how they acquired power.  
The Declaration has, however, the weakness of construing unconstitutional changes of 
government narrowly and generally limiting them to military takeovers. At least three of the 
four instances of unconstitutional changes of government relate to the deployment of military 
force in order to take over government power. Only the fourth instance relates to elections. 
But even the fourth one which deals with elections is very narrow and only considers it as an 
unconstitutional change of government when an incumbent loses an election but refuses to 
abdicate. But what of the situation where the incumbent manipulates the electoral system or 
tampers with election results? Such situations have been common in Africa, as shown in the 
two preceding chapters. It is allegations of this nature that vitiated the quality of elections in 
Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 and, to some extent, Ivory Coast in 2010, which led to 
violence and regional instability. 
 
4.3 A New Dawn With the African Union 
At the dawn of the new millennium, the OAU on 11 July 2000, in Lome, Togo, formally 
agreed to transform the OAU into the African Union (AU) by adopting the Constitutive Act 
(CA) of the African Union.
636
 The AU was formally launched on 9 July 2001 in Durban, 
South Africa, with great promise for the future of Africa.
637
 
While the AU was born with a sense of commitment to advance democracy, respect for 
human rights, and development for African people, some scholars have criticized it as 
nothing more than a reincarnation of the old OAU which tolerated dictatorships and 
manifested disdain for human rights. Udombana, for example, considers the AU as nothing 
more than old wine in a new wine skin. Udombana pessimistically states:  
The treaty [AU Constitutive Act] is merely rousing a desire without the possibility of real 
satisfaction, for the simple reason that Africa is a continent built out of the barricades, one 
that slaps a bandage on its worst problems and gives up on the rest. The treaty could actually 
provide a cover for Africa’s celebrated dictators to continue to perpetrate human rights 
abuses... It is even doubtful whether, at the time of adoption of the treaty, African rulers 
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sincerely imagined that there would be a paradigmatic shift towards better human rights 
culture on the continent since they know, or are presumed to know, themselves.
638
 
While this pessimism is understandable, considering the poor human rights and democracy 
record of the continent in the past, there is evidence of some progress both at norm setting 
and implementation, especially as regards democracy and rejection of unconstitutional 
changes of government. This, however, is not to indicate that all is well. There are still 
several challenges that need attention. This section discusses the normative framework set 
under the AU in support of democracy and democratic elections. The discussion focuses on 
three main frameworks:  
a. The Constitutive Act of the African Union;  
b. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and  Governance; and 
c. The NEPAD and APRM process. 
 
4.3.1 The Constitutive Act of the African Union 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA) establishes the AU as the new African 
continental regional integration body, replacing the OAU. Unlike the OAU Charter which 
lacked democratic norms underpinning it, the CA includes among its objectives the 
promotion of “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
governance.”639  It continues with the standard set by the Lome Declaration of condemning 
and rejecting all unconstitutional changes of government,
640
 and provides for the suspension 
from AU activities governments that come to power by unconstitutional means.
641
  
In keeping with the OAU tradition, the CA recognises national territorial boundaries as 
inherited at independence
642
 and prohibits member states from interfering in internal affairs 
of another member state.
643
 However, the AU innovatively departs from the OAU by 
allowing for the “Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
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against humanity.”644  This provision was amended in 2003 to expand the grounds for 
intervention in order to include a new ground which it states as: “a serious threat to legitimate 
order to restore peace and stability to the member state of the Union upon the 
recommendation of the Peace and Security Council.”645 The 2003 amendment, however, is 
yet to come into force. 
While there is no dispute over the AU arrogating itself power to intervene in the case of war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, some scholars consider the additional ground 
of intervening introduced in 2003, that is, where there is a “serious threat to legitimate order” 
to be problematic and likely to be used to undermine democracy by incumbent leaders who 
would want to avoid losing power.
646
  This view is augmented by the fact that the 
Constitutive Act, while proscribing unconstitutional changes in government, does not offer 
any definition of what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government. It is argued that 
the lack of a clear definition of an unconstitutional change of government, and the added 
power in the CA under article 4(j) giving member states the right to request intervention from 
the Union in order to restore peace, could be used by leaders facing legitimate public protests 
or even those who face protests for ‘winning’ fraudulent elections to shield themselves.647 
While these concerns are genuine, the ambiguity of the provision at the same time offers the 
possibility of intervention by the AU in order to support the democratic process. The use of 
the words “legitimate order” if taken to mean government democratically elected and based 
on the will of the people, would support the view of a pro-democracy intervention. This view 
finds support in the way that the AU handled the Arab uprisings that led to the ousting of 
incumbent regimes in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. In all the three cases, the AU sided with the 
public protesters.
648
  
In the case of Tunisia, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU strongly condemned 
the excessive use of force against demonstrators and “expressed its solidarity with the people 
of Tunisia.”649  On Libya, the PSC condemned the excessive use of force and lethal weapons 
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against peaceful protestors and underscored that the aspirations of the Libyans for 
democracy, justice and political reform were legitimate and should be respected.
650
 In relation 
to Egypt, the PSC offered its solidarity with the people and considered their protests, 
demonstrations and desire for democracy as consistent with AU instruments and the 
continent’s commitment towards further democratisation and good governance.651 The 
approach the AU took towards the Arab Spring seems to suggest that the AU is capable of 
understanding what constitutes legitimate order and would not authorise military action 
against civilians protesting against excesses of an authoritarian regime. 
With regard to unconstitutional changes of government, the CA proscribes such under Article 
4(p) and provides for suspension of such governments.
652
  The AU has continued with the 
standard set by its predecessor on this core and has largely implemented its policy of 
rejecting unconstitutional governments consistently. The following are the unconstitutional 
changes of government that have occurred on the continent since 2003 when the PSC of the 
AU was launched and how it has dealt with them: 
 Central Africa Republic (March 2003): The AU strongly condemned the coup d’état 
led by General Francois Bozize that took place on 15 March 2003 and rejected it as an 
unconstitutional change of government.
653
 The AU imposed travel ban and asset 
freeze sanctions on political and military actors involved in the unconstitutional 
change of government.
654
 This became the first time the AU imposed sanctions for an 
unconstitutional change of government. 
 Sao Tome and Principe (July 2003): The AU unreservedly condemned the coup that 
took place in Sao Tome and Principe on 16 July 2003 as contrary to the provisions of 
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the July 2000 Lome Declaration as well as the AU Constitutive Act and called for 
return to constitutional order.
655
 
 Guinea-Bissau (September 2003):  The AU condemned the coup d’état that took place 
on 14 September 2003 as a violation of the principles enshrined in the Constitutive 
Act as well as the Lome Declaration.
656
 
 Togo (February 2005):  The Togolese situation shows AU willingness to  construe 
what constitutes unconstitutional change of government more progressively, and 
needs  to be discussed in slightly more detail.  On 5 February 2005 President 
Gnassingbe Eyadema died suddenly of a heart attack, ending his 38 year rule over 
Togo. The Togolese Constitution provided for the President of the National Assembly 
to succeed the President on an interim basis until an election was held to fill the 
Presidential vacancy.
657
 The president of the National Assembly, Fanbore Natchaba, 
who was out of the country at the time of the demise of the President, had his return 
flight redirected to Benin by the army which also sealed all borders to prevent his 
return. Then on February 6, Togo’s National Assembly elected the son of the late 
President, Faure Gnassingbe Eyadema, as President of the National Assembly and 
consequently entitled to succeed his father according to the Togolese Constitution. 
The Assembly also passed an amendment to avoid a Presidential by-election and 
allow Faure to serve for the remainder of his father’s term until 2008.658 The PSC 
considered this as a disguised coup and the constitutional amendments as simply 
“modifications intended to legally window dress the coup d’état.”659 It demanded the 
resignation of Faure Gnassingbe, and return to constitutional order. It suspended Togo 
from all activities of the AU organs and endorsed sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on 
the regime.
660
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 Mauritania (August 2008):  The PSC of the AU condemned the coup of 6 August 
2008 against President  Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi led by General Mohamed Ould 
Abdel Aziz and declared null and void all the subsequent constitutional, institutional 
and legislative measures taken by the regime.
661
 The AU imposed sanctions in the 
form of visa denials, travel restrictions and freezing of assets until the return to 
constitutional order.
662
 
 Comoros (October 2008): In the case of the Comoros, the AU handled not a typical 
coup but a separatist movement that threatened the territorial integrity of the nation. It 
(AU) imposed sanctions on the separatist movement and its leaders, which took the 
form of travel restrictions and asset freeze.
663
 The AU later authorised military 
intervention.
664
  
 Republic of Guinea (December 2008): The AU condemned the coup d’état of 23 
December 2008 which followed the death of President Lansana Conte. The Guinean 
Constitution required the president of the National Assembly to act as interim 
president in the event of a vacancy in the office of the president. However, Captain 
Moussa Dadis Camara took over power and promised to hold elections in 2010, when 
the President Conte’s term would have ended.665 The AU condemned the coup, 
suspended Guinea from participating in all AU activities and imposed sanctions.
666
 
 Niger (February 2010):  The AU condemned the military coup of 18 February 2010 
and suspended Niger from all AU activities until the restoration of democratic 
governance.
667
  
 Madagascar (March 2009): On 17 March, 2009, President Marc Ravalomanana, under 
pressure from the opposition and the army, resigned and handed over power to the 
army, which  in turn handed it over to Andry Nirina Rajoelina, the former mayor of  
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the capital city. The AU condemned this as an unconstitutional change of government 
and suspended Madagascar from its activities. It imposed sanctions that included 
travel bans, freezing of funds and assets, and diplomatic isolation against Rajoelina 
and other officials involved.
668
 
 Mali (March 2012): The AU condemned the military coup of 22 March, 2012, 
suspended Mali from AU activities and imposed sanctions on the military regime that 
took over power.
669
  
 Central Africa Republic (March 2013):  The AU strongly condemned the takeover of 
power by the Seleka Rebel Group, in violation of existing ceasefire agreements. It 
suspended the Central Africa Republic from all AU activities and imposed sanctions 
(travel bans and asset restrictions) on all the leaders involved.
670
 
 Ivory Coast (December 2010): Following  the Incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo’ 
failure to transfer power to Alassane Outtara as President of Ivory Coast after losing 
the election, the  AU withdrew its recognition of  Gbagbo as president, and suspended 
Ivory Coast from AU activities until Outtara was installed as president.
671
 
 Egypt (July 2013):  President Mohamed Morsi was deposed by the military on 4 July 
2013, following street protests against his government. The army suspended the 
constitution and appointed a caretaker government. The AU condemned the 
development as an unconstitutional change of government and suspended Egypt from 
all AU activities, pending return to democratic order.
672
 
This list, contrary to the pessimistic views like those of Udombana, show that to some extent 
the AU has permanently departed from the OAU’s doctrine of non-interference and has 
consistently rejected unconstitutional changes of government since 2003. From this angle, it 
can be firmly stated that the AU has established a firm norm and practice of not recognising 
unconstitutional changes of government in member states. However, this does not mean all is 
smooth and democracy is flourishing uninhibited on the continent. In some cases, individual 
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leaders have been openly opposed to the collective actions of the AU. For example, President 
Thabo Mbeki was opposed to the imposition of sanctions on Ivory Coast and took sides with 
President Gbagbo. He portrayed the whole electoral conflict as nothing more than the United 
Nations “entrenching former colonial powers on our continent.”673  As shall be seen below, 
there is still a major weakness in the AU system relating to the holding of governments to the 
standards of conducting democratic elections. 
 
4.3.2 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) was adopted by the 
AU heads of state and government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 30 January 2007. It entered 
into force on 15 February 2012, pursuant to Article 48 which required it to enter into force 30 
days after the deposit of the 15
th
 instrument of ratification. ACDEG is a treaty of the AU that 
consolidates the AU commitments to democratic governance and rule of law. It builds on 
previous commitments by both the OAU and AU and establishes common standards for 
democratic governance, and democratic elections.
674
 As such, it is the most comprehensive 
legally binding AU treaty committing its members to “deepening and consolidating 
democratic governance.”675  
ACDEG draws its legitimacy from the Constitutive Act of the AU, particularly Articles 3 and 
4 which stress the importance of “good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and 
human rights.”676 In adopting the treaty, the AU sought to entrench a political culture of 
changing power on the basis of regular, transparent, free and fair elections.
677
  Its objectives 
include the promotion of “holding of regular free and fair elections to institutionalise 
legitimate authority of representative government as well as democratic change of 
governments.”678  
Unlike the Lome Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government, which did not 
specifically address itself to certain standards for holding and managing democratic elections, 
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ACDEG has a specific article that sets standards for democratic elections. States parties to 
ACDEG commit to holding transparent, free and fair elections and are required to: 
1. Establish and strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for 
the management of elections; 
2. Establish and strengthen national mechanisms that redress election-related disputes in a 
timely manner; 
3. Ensure fair and equitable access to contesting parties and candidates to state controlled media 
during elections; 
4. Ensure that there is a binding Code of Conduct governing legally recognised political 
stakeholders, government, and other political actors prior, during and after elections. The 
Code shall include a commitment by political actors to accept the results of the election or 
challenge them through exclusively legal channels.
679
 
These elements constitute important elements of a credible election whose result would be 
acceptable to both loser and winner. Without an impartial and independent Electoral 
Management Body, election results will always be viewed with suspicion. Without an 
impartial forum for the resolution of electoral disputes, aggrieved parties will resort to self-
help measures to vent their anger. Without fair and equitable access to public media, the 
electorate would be denied an opportunity to make informed decisions when voting. And 
without a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct, electoral rules and standards of fair play 
lose meaning as their breach will attract no consequence. These are, therefore, cardinal 
electoral standards that would contribute significantly to holding credible democratic 
elections. 
One major weakness, however, is that ACDEG does not clearly provide for a remedy or 
sanction where these provisions under Article 17 are violated. As will be discussed below, 
ACDEG provides for the imposition of sanctions for violation of its provisions, but these 
appear to be limited to unconstitutional changes of government.
680
 Violations of standards set 
under Article 17 do not attract the same sanctions as they do not fit in the definition of 
unconstitutional changes of government for which sanctions are prescribed. 
ACDEG, in line with the Lome Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and 
the CA, also proscribes unconstitutional changes of government.
681
 It subsumes the four 
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instances defined as constituting unconstitutional changes of government, and adds a fifth 
one, thereby expanding the factors that constitute unconstitutional changes of government. 
The five factors are: 
1. Any putsch or coup d’état against a democratically elected government; 
2. Any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; 
3. Any replacement of a democratically elected government by armed rebels or dissidents; 
4. Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or 
candidate after free, fair and regular elections; 
5. Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instrument, which is an infringement 
on the principles of democratic change of government.
682
 
There is uncertainty about the meaning of the fifth factor or element of unconstitutional 
change of government introduced in ACDEG. Sturman, for example, argues that the 
provision expands the definition of unconstitutional change of government to bring within its 
ambit the constitutional amendments that remove term limits to allow presidents to run for 
office indefinitely.
683
  As discussed in the second chapter, there has been a developing 
phenomenon of undoing constitutional term limits to have incumbent presidents serve 
indefinitely. A closer look at the provision, however, does not seem to support the view that 
the provision is aimed at curing this mischief.  ACDEG allows amendments to national 
constitutions, provided the amendment is based on national consensus, and, if need be, 
through a referendum.
684
  In Chad, for example, the constitutional amendment that removed 
term limits in 2005 was put to a referendum and received an affirmative vote.
685
  
A better view would be that the provision is intended to overcome the mischief of disguised 
coup d’état, which are given a coat of legal legitimacy, as was the case with Togo in 2005 
and Republic of Guinea in 2008. In both instances, as discussed above, the legislature with 
support (or at the instigation) of the army passed constitutional amendments, following the 
death of sitting presidents, aimed at circumventing the succession process and bestowing  
power on a different person other than the rightful successor. The provision proscribes only a 
constitutional amendment which is “an infringement on the principles of democratic change 
of government.” This seems to be merely referring to the first four instances of 
unconstitutional change of government and basically tries to avoid a situation whereby 
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through legal ingenuity the first four instances are rendered nugatory, as was done in Togo 
and Republic of Guinea. 
This position finds support and fortification in the drafting history of the provision. Initially, 
the provision read as follows: “Amendment or revision of constitutions and legal instruments, 
contrary to the provisions of the constitution of the state party concerned, to prolong the 
tenure of office for the incumbent government.”686 There was, however, lack of consensus 
over the phrase “to prolong the tenure of office for the incumbent government.” Those in 
support of it were of the view that there was need for limiting  presidential terms  so as to 
allow for  free democratic alternation of power in order to avoid attempts to remain in power 
indefinitely.
687
  However, opponents, led by Ugandan delegates, were of the view that 
maintaining a government in office is the democratic expression of the people within national 
legal frameworks and therefore should not be constrained by such a provision.
688
 As can be 
seen from the provision in its current form, the phrase that was intended to prevent removal 
of term limits was removed to accommodate those opposed to it. ACDEG, therefore, does not 
provide for presidential term limits as instances of unconstitutional changes of government. 
Providing for term limits could contribute towards overcoming the phenomena of overstaying 
leaders who personalise state institutions and feel have to win elections at any cost. 
Although ACDEG is important for setting democratic standards in one comprehensive treaty, 
it seems weighted heavily towards preventing military coups. Most of the unconstitutional 
changes of government it prohibits have to do with forceful seizure of power. While this is 
important in view of the history of frequent military coups on the continent, it at the same 
time ignores other aspects that are inimical to democratic constitutional government. In the 
cases of Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2008, the electoral malpractices that led to violence 
and instability do not fall within the definition of what constitutes unconstitutional change of 
government as defined by ACDEG. Electoral malpractices such as widespread violence, 
corruption, abuse of public resources, partiality of electoral officials, and manipulation of 
results do not fall into any of the categories of what is defined as constituting an 
unconstitutional change of government. Where an election is tainted with these malpractices, 
there is no adequate remedy provided for under ACDEG. Defective elections are, therefore, 
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not given the same significance as military coups. This leads to an anomalous situation where 
there is no AU remedy under ACDEG for defective elections, but self-help means to get rid 
of a self-imposing government are prohibited. Sturman calls this anomaly as the democrat’s 
dilemma.
689
  
 
4.3.3 The NEPAD and APRM process 
This section briefly discusses two interrelated good governance initiatives of the AU. These 
are the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM). The NEPAD Declaration was adopted in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia 
by the OAU Assembly. NEPAD has been described as the African “continental development 
blueprint.”690 This is because the primary concern of NEPAD is to extricate the African 
continent from “underdevelopment and exclusion” and put the continent “on a path of 
sustainable growth and development.”691  
The NEPAD initiative is based on the acknowledgement that genuine “development is 
impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good 
governance.”692 The objective of NEPAD is, therefore, to consolidate democracy and sound 
economic management of the continent,”693 through strengthening the political and 
administrative framework of participating states.
694
 
The NEPAD Implementation Committee in June 2002 adopted the Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (NEPAD Declaration, or the 
Declaration). In it, participating states commit to implement democratic and good governance 
standards of the AU and other international obligations.
695
 In addition, participating states 
agree to work together in policy and action in order to achieve the following objectives: 
democracy and good political governance; economic and corporate governance; socio-
economic development; as well as the African Peer Review Mechanism.
696
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The APRM is NEPAD’s principal mechanism for achieving its goals. AU member states 
wishing to participate in the APRM are required to sign the Memorandum of Understanding 
of the African Peer Review Mechanism (MOU).
697
 Member states signing up to the MOU 
submit to be peer-reviewed on how they measure up to the objectives of NEPAD and “accept 
that constructive peer dialogue and persuasion would be exercised...in order to encourage 
improvements in country practices and policies.”698 
The APRM process is completely voluntary. Its primary goal is to “foster the adoption of 
policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth and 
sustainable development.”699 
The APRM has four types of review. These are: 
 The first country review which is  the base review and is to be undertaken within 
eighteen months of a country becoming a member of the APRM process; 
 A periodic review to be carried out  every two to four years; 
 A review called by a concerned state for  its own reasons and which falls outside of 
the mandated periodic reviews; and  
 A review at the instigation of heads of state of member states when there are early 
signs of impending political or economic crisis in a spirit of helpfulness.
700
 
The APRM process has four main stages. The first stage is the study of the political, 
economic and corporate governance of the concerned state by the APRM secretariat. This is 
followed, in second stage, by a visit to the concerned country by the Review Team. The 
purpose of the visit is to carry out wide consultations with government officials, political 
parties, parliamentarians and civil society organisations.
701
 
The third stage is the preparation of the APRM Review Team Report on the basis of 
information gathered from the APRM secretariat and the country visit. The first draft of the 
report is shared with the concerned state in order to give the government an opportunity to 
put forward its views and suggest how the identified shortcomings shall be addressed.
702
 In 
the fourth stage, the Review Team’s Report is submitted to the heads of state of participating 
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countries through the APRM secretariat. The heads of state then consider and adopt it and use 
it for the actual “peer-review” at the APR Forum when the heads of state engage their peer 
from the reviewed state on the findings of the report.
703
 
There are so far 35 AU member states that have joined the APRM process.
704
 Seventeen of 
these have already undergone the initial review. These are Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Algeria, South Africa, Benin, Uganda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia.
705
  
Many positive developments have been attributed directly to the APRM process in some 
participating member states. Ghana, for example, made the following governance policy 
reforms after its initial review: 
 Development of draft land-use master plan; 
 Establishment of the ministry of chieftaincy and cultural affairs; 
 Increased district assemblies from 138 o 166; 
 Passed legislation on human trafficking, disability, and gender violence; and  
 Reduced the number of cabinet ministers.706 
Where recommendations from the review are earnestly implemented, that can contribute to 
deepening of democracy, good governance and economic development. That would also 
create an ideal environment for the conduct of democratic elections in member states. 
However, the fact that the whole process is voluntary entails that there are no major 
consequences for defaulting on some undertakings. Thus, even where initial improvements 
have been made, there is nothing preventing the same government or another future 
government reversing some positive policy decisions. Ghana, for example, had significantly 
reduced the number of cabinet ministers following the initial review, but soon increased the 
size of cabinet after a change of government.
707
 
Although positive policy reforms have been attributed to the review process, in some 
countries it has been argued that the whole process is merely used as a public relations tool of 
foreign policy interests. In South Africa, for example, Turianskyi argues that the APRM 
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process does not inform national planning and policy reform, but that South Africa instead 
reports as APRM achievements initiatives that have been achieved through other unrelated 
interventions.
708
  
The peer-review process at the APRM Forum (which is the meeting of heads of states of 
participating countries) has also been criticised for being more of a self-praise event than an 
occasion for in-depth and critical constructive dialogue that should lead to serious reforms in 
the concerned state. Instead of asking critical questions and urging genuine reforms, heads of 
state have often treated the occasion to heap underserved praises on concerned states. Jerry 
Okungu, a Kenyan official who attended Kenya’s initial review in 2006, is reported to have 
remarked thus: 
I counted the number of leaders who spoke after President Kibaki had responded to Dr. 
Machel. They were from Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda and Nigeria. Not one of 
them posed a question to Mr. Kibaki. They all praised the report and commended Kenya for 
being candid, thorough and open. They pledged to support Kenya in seeking solutions to its 
constitution review and diversity problems.  
When it was all over, Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia expressed relief and promised to go on with the process, after realising that it was 
not a life-and-death situation.
709
  
Despite all these weaknesses and challenges, if the aim of using the APRM as a tool to 
support good governance and economic development is pursued vigorously, that would lead 
to an environment that would significantly contribute towards the holding of democratic 
elections in Africa. That would mean participating states faithfully implementing continental 
standards on democracy and good governance. Where, however, elections are disputed, the 
APRM would be of little use as it was not designed to specifically respond to such a 
challenge. 
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4.4 An Overview of Sub-Regional Normative Frameworks on Democratic 
Elections 
This section discusses democratic normative frameworks existing at sub-regional level. It 
focuses on five sub-regions, that is, East Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa 
and the Maghreb Africa. Although these are not the only sub-regions in Africa, discussing 
them gives a feel of the major African geographical blocks, cultures and regional histories. 
 
4.4.1 East African Community 
The East African Community (EAC) was founded in 1999, with the adoption of the Treaty 
for the Establishment of the East Africa Community (The Treaty) by Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania, which are the three founding members.
710
 The treaty allows for the granting of 
membership to other states,
711
 and pursuant to this Rwanda
712
 and Burundi
713
 became 
members. The new state of South Sudan is in the process of joining the EAC. 
The East Africa Community has a very weak normative framework on democracy and the 
conduct of democratic elections. In the whole of the Treaty, there is no stand alone provision 
dedicated to articulation of norms for the conduct of democratic elections in member states. 
In fact, the term democracy is only glossed over, and in the whole Treaty just mentioned in 
three instances. 
The first instance is in the context of considering the application of a foreign country to 
become a member of the East Africa Community (EAC). In considering such an application, 
the EAC shall, inter alia, take into account that country’s “adherence to universally 
acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human 
and social justice.”714 
The second instance is in the context of stating the fundamental principles of the EAC. These 
are stated as including  “good governance including adherence to the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law...promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”715  
Although there is no further elaboration, the treaty’s reference to the African Charter on 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) could be construed as recognising and subsuming 
ACHPR standards into the EAC system. If this were the case, then it could be argued that the 
EAC recognises the democratic rights enshrined in ACHPR, particularly the right to political 
participation and also self-determination. 
The third instance where there is reference to the democratic norm is in the context of the 
eventual establishment of the Political Federation of the Partner States. As part of this process 
of moving towards a political federation, the member states are required to develop common 
foreign and security policies. The objectives of these common policies shall, inter alia, be to 
“develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”716 
Outside these three contexts, there is no reference to any democratic standards and absolutely 
no reference to the holding of democratic, free and fair elections. The EAC seems aware of 
this shortfall and has been working to ameliorate it. It has developed a draft East African 
Community Principles for Election Observation, Monitoring and Evaluation.
717
 These 
Principles are not yet formally adopted. However, if adopted, the Principles would set a 
strong normative framework and benchmark for democratic elections in the EAC. In this 
document, the EAC proposes to adopt the following as the key principles for the conduct of 
democratic elections:  
(a) Free expression of the will of the people; 
(b) Genuine elections 
(c) Periodic elections; 
(d) Universal suffrage; 
(e) Equal suffrage; 
(f) Right to participate in public affairs; 
(g) Right to vote; 
(h) Right to be elected; 
(i) Secret ballot; and 
(j) Right to an effective remedy (fair and impartial resolution of election related disputes).718  
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The document provides for electoral standards not just for the election day but for the whole 
context in which an election is held, including the pre-election period. It sets principles that 
should accompany the electoral process through out.
719
  It also prescribes standards for 
institutions involved in the conduct of elections. For example, in relation to Electoral 
Management Bodies, it requires that such bodies should be: 
(a) Independent, financially and administratively autonomous; 
(b) Representative of society and gender sensitive; 
(c) Composed of professional people of integrity appointed through a fair and transparent 
process; 
(d) Guarantee security of tenure of its members; and 
(e) Accountable to the people’s representatives.720 
The document further sets standards for the media; the use of public resources; the role of 
security forces; political party financing; as well as civic and voter education.
721
 Despite all 
these high standards set, the document seems to have a weak enforcement mechanism 
available. The only way these standards will be enforced seems to be election observation 
and subsequent issuance of an election observers’ report.722 
Although the draft EAC Principles for Election Observation, Monitoring and Evaluation set 
high standards, it must be emphasized that the document is not yet formally adopted and 
therefore currently of little significance, except as a harbinger of what might come. As things 
currently stand, EAC has very little in terms of normative framework for the conduct of 
democratic elections. The urgency of such a normative framework for the sub-region cannot 
be overemphasised, considering that some member countries, such as Rwanda and Uganda, 
are experiencing instances of serious violations of basic democratic norms. In Rwanda, for 
example, the regime of President Paul Kagame routinely prevents genuine opposition leaders 
from contesting elections, usually through assassinations, intimidation and harassment.
723
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4.4.2 Economic Community of Western African States 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 with the 
adoption of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS Treaty) on 28 May 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty was later revised in 1993. 
The aims and objectives of ECOWAS were predominantly focused on economic integration, 
which it believed would lead to the creation of a strong economic union in West Africa “in 
order to raise the living standards of its people, and to maintain and enhance economic 
stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and 
development of the African continent.”724 Although the ECOWAS Treaty is more about 
economic integration, it incorporates as a fundamental principle, among other principles, “the 
promotion and consolidation of democratic system of governance in each member state.”725 
Considering that West Africa has been the epicentre of military coups and dictatorships in 
Africa, this was an important inclusion in the Treaty. 
The ECOWAS drive for setting community norms on democratisation stems from frequent 
experiences of military coups in member states, the desire to deter and prevent them, and 
assure regional security and stability.
726
 The main document adopted in this area is the 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace 
Keeping and Security, which was adopted on 10 December 1999, in Lome, Togo. The 
Protocol establishes a Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace 
keeping and security. 
727
 The objectives of the Mechanism include prevention, management 
and resolution of both intra- and inter-state conflicts; cooperation in the area of conflict 
prevention, early warning system and peace-keeping; and the organisation and coordination 
of humanitarian relief.
728
 
One of the remarkable achievements under the Mechanism is the setting up of the ECOWAS 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which has played a significant role in peace-
keeping and restoration of stability.
729
 The Mechanism, however, is not primarily concerned 
about setting democratic norms for ECOWAS but more with military and security threats to 
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peace. The promotion and consolidation of democracy is only mentioned in passing as one of 
the principles of the Mechanism.
730
  
ECOWAS shortly realised that sustainable peace cannot be achieved simply by focusing on 
military and security factors. Within about two years of adopting the Mechanism, ECOWAS 
adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol 
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
and Security (hereinafter the ECOWAS Democracy and Governance Protocol),
731
 having 
observed that in order for the Mechanism to be effective in preventing internal conflict, 
democracy, good governance and rule of law were essential.
732
 
The Democracy and Good Governance Protocol creates minimum constitutional principles 
that shall be shared by all member states. These include the requirement that “every accession 
to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections”733 and, therefore, there 
would be “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.”734 
The Protocol also requires “popular participation in decision making”735 and prohibits the 
military from running for elective office, restricting them to serve under a legally constituted 
civilian government.
736
 
Although the Democracy and Good Governance Protocol declares zero tolerance for power 
obtained by unconstitutional means, what constitutes “unconstitutional means” is not defined. 
Would, for example, amending a constitution to remove presidential term limits constitute 
“unconstitutional means”?  This ambiguity can have both advantages and disadvantages. On 
the negative side, it can allow for the provision to be narrowly interpreted, while on the 
positive side it leaves room for progressive interpretation according to changing 
circumstances. That ECOWAS is capable of construing unconstitutional changes of 
government in a progressive way is manifest in its handling of the Togolese succession 
dispute of 2005, taking the same stand as the AU in rejecting all attempts at giving legal 
legitimacy to a coup. 
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The ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance Protocol prohibits substantial modification 
to electoral laws in the last six months preceding an election, except with the consensus of the 
majority of political actors.
737
 This is an extremely progressive provision as amending laws 
too close to an election date allows for little time to educate the public in order that they act 
as informed participants in the democratic process. This has potential to vitiate the quality of 
public participation during elections. But apart from vitiating the quality of elections, 
incumbent governments in Africa have used constitutional and legal amendments to ambush, 
distract and disadvantage the opposition. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia, for 
example, in 2011 sought to introduce major electoral amendments to the Constitution just a 
month before the scheduled date of elections.
738
 The proposed amendments include reducing 
the residency requirements for the President and Vice President from ten years to five years; 
changing the date of election from the second Tuesday of October to Second Tuesday of 
November; and changing the electoral system by introducing a single round of first-past-the-
post voting for all legislative and municipal elections.
739
 The proposals, in line with the 
ECOWAS standard requiring popular consensus, were hastily put to a referendum on 23 
August 2011 but were rejected by voters.
740
 
Another positive provision of the ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance Protocol is 
the mechanism for observation and monitoring of elections in member states. When elections 
in a member state  approach, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary is required  to dispatch a 
fact-finding mission to the concerned member state.
741
 The fact-finding mission may be 
followed by an exploratory mission, which, inter alia, collects details of electoral laws, 
conditions under which elections are held, meets candidates and government officials; and 
assesses the preparations for elections.
742
 The actual observation mission follows the 
exploratory mission and is required to arrive in the country at least forty-eight hours prior to 
the conduct of elections.
743
 The observation mission is suppose to remain in the country until 
election results are announced.
744
 It is suppose to compile a report of its observation and 
                                                          
737
 Article 2(1) ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance protocol 2001 
738
 Bischoff “Pre-Election Reflection: Liberia 2011 Constitutional Referendum” 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/pre-election-reflection-liberias-2011-constitutional-referendum-2011-08-19 
(Date of use: 1 September 2014) 
739
 Ibid  
740
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberian_general_election,_2011 (Date of use: 9 April 2015) 
741
 Article 13(1) ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance protocol 2001 
742
 Article 13(2) ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance protocol 2001 
743
 Article 15(1) ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance protocol 2001 
744
 Article 16(1) ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance protocol 2001 
156 
 
submit it to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council for recommendations to be made 
to the concerned country and proposals for measures to be taken where necessary.
745
  
One major criticism against the ECOWAS election observation system is that it has rarely 
condemned fraudulent elections and it is, therefore, being used as a tool to give legitimacy to 
defective elections, which makes its effectiveness as a tool for promoting democracy and 
transparency in elections questionable.
746
 However, the election observation mechanism was 
put to good use recently in relation the Gambia 2011 elections. After a fact finding mission, 
which found the environment not suitable for a free and fair election in line with the 
ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance Protocol, ECOWAS decided not to send an 
election observation mission to the Gambia. It indicated that the political environment was 
unwholesome and tainted with clear machinations to manipulate the outcome of the 
elections.
747
 It also indicated that there was a lot of intimidation, lack of neutrality of state 
and parastatal institutions, unacceptable levels of control of electronic media by the 
incumbent regime; and repression and intimidation against the opposition and the public.
748
 If 
this approach applied to the Gambia takes root and becomes entrenched in ECOWAS, it 
would give credibility to the election observation mechanism and avoid the trend of election 
observation missions being used to give legitimacy to clearly defective elections. 
The ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance Protocol also requires that “adequate 
arrangements shall be made to hear and dispose of all petitions relating to the conduct of 
elections and announcement of results.”749  The notable weakness about this provision is that 
it does not oblige member states to ensure that election petitions are decided fairly and 
efficiently. If interpreted literary, the provision is of little or no significance. Further, the 
requirement that observation missions should only be in the country up to the announcement 
of results means that there is no ECOWAS observation of the electoral dispute resolution 
mechanism in the concerned country. 
Finally, the ECOWAS Democracy and Good Governance Protocol provides for the 
possibility of imposing sanctions where “democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any 
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means.”750  The sanctions may be  in the form of suspension of member states from all 
ECOWAS decision making bodies; refusal to hold ECOWAS meetings in the concerned 
state; and refusal to support candidates from concerned states for elective posts in 
international organisations.
751
  
 
4.4.3 Southern Africa Development Community 
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1992, with the 
adoption of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community.
752
  From a 
democracy perspective, SADC is established on principles that include requiring member 
states to be acting consistent with “human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”753  The 
objectives of SADC are, inter alia, the evolution of “common political values, systems and 
institutions.”754 
In 1996, as part of the furtherance of regional political integration, the SADC heads of state 
and government agreed to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security 
Cooperation (OPDSC or the Organ).
755
 However, the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and 
Security Cooperation, which formally established the Organ, was only adopted in August 
2001. The general objective of the Organ is “to promote peace and security in the Region.”756 
Specific objectives for setting up the Organ include political cooperation and evolution of 
common political values among member states;
757
 prevention, containment and resolution of 
inter- and intra-state conflict peacefully;
758
 and the promotion of the development of 
democratic institutions and practices within territories of member states.”759  
The Organ in 2004 adopted the SADC Indicative Plan for the Organ as a planning and 
implementation strategy for regional political integration and stability. The development of 
the Indicative Plan led to the development of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections, which were adopted in 2004. The SADC Principles and Guidelines 
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Governing Democratic Elections constitute the principal regional framework through which 
the quality of elections is assessed. 
The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections indicate that they are 
founded on the democratic principles and objectives of the SADC Treat, particularly those 
under Articles 4 and 5 which enjoin member states to adhere to the principles of respect for 
human rights, democracy, and rule of law; the promotion of common political values; and the 
consolidation, defence and maintenance of democracy.
760
  The SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections also indicate that they take cognisance  of the 
objectives of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, particularly the 
duty to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices.
761
 From this 
perspective, it can be stated that these Principles and guidelines were developed pursuant to 
binding provisions of the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation and in a way give flesh to the bare bones of the two treaties. This is an 
important point as shall be noted when discussing enforcement challenges of the SADC 
democracy norms. 
The SADC Principle and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections mainly focus on three 
areas where they set standards for the conduct of elections. These areas are principles for 
conducing democratic elections; SADC observation of elections in member states; and duties 
of member states holding elections. 
In terms of principles guiding the conduct of elections, member states are required to observe 
the following: 
 Full participation of the citizens in the political process; 
 Freedom of association; 
 Political tolerance; 
 Regular intervals for elections as provided in the respective national constitutions; 
 Equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media; 
 Equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for; 
 Independence of the judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions; 
 Voter education; and  
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 Acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been 
free and fair by the competent National Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law of 
the land.
762
 
Apart from these listed principles, which are not elaborated further in the document, there is 
no further guidance on how elections should be managed. The rest of the document is 
dedicated towards election observation. The document could, therefore, be criticised for 
paying too little attention to setting concrete standards and guidelines for managing elections 
(covering both the pre-election and post-election phases). 
The second focus area of the document is the setting of guidelines for election observation. 
The document sets guidelines that are aimed at ensuring that observers are competent and 
impartial, and adhere to a Code of conduct.
763
 The final focus area of the document is on the 
duties of the country holding elections.  Such a country has the responsibility of ensuring that 
ultimately the whole election is held in a transparent, competent, free and fair manner, taking 
into account the respect for human rights of individuals as well as the competence and 
impartiality of the responsible electoral institutions.
764
 The host state also has the 
responsibility to formally invite SADC to observe its elections at least 90 days before the 
polling day.
765
  
The futility of the provision requiring the host state to formally invite SADC to observe its 
elections was demonstrated in 2005 when Zimbabwe had initially refused to formally invite 
SADC to observe its elections. Zimbabwe only sent the invitation after intense diplomatic 
negotiations, and just within a month of holding the elections.
766
 This demonstrates a 
weakness in the enforcement mechanism of the document. A country that wishes to avoid its 
election being measured against the SADC standards can simply avoid inviting observers to 
its elections. As the document provides for no other clear enforcement mechanism apart from 
election observation, this lacuna is problematic. 
There is also uncertainty about the legal status of the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections, that is, whether the document is considered as legally 
binding or is simply a mere declaration of lofty intents but not intended to bind member 
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states. The Zimbabwean Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, for example, has argued that the 
SADC Principles and Guidelines are simply a declaration of lofty political intent without 
binding force.
767
 Some scholars also seem to confuse the issue of legal status of the document 
with that of lacking adequate enforcement mechanism. Khabele Matlosa, for example, seems 
to argue that because the document lacks or is not “equipped with penalties for non-
compliance” it is therefore not legally binding.768 It is submitted that the better and more 
nuanced view, the issue of the inadequate enforcement mechanism notwithstanding, is that 
the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections were developed 
pursuant to the principles and objectives of both the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, both of which are binding treaties. Therefore, to 
the extent that the document simply gives flesh to the two binding treaties and is not ultra 
vires or does not veer away from the standards of those two treaties, then its standards are 
binding on member states. 
It should also be noted that apart from the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections, there are two other frameworks that are routinely used within the 
SADC region as yardsticks for assessing the credibility of elections. These are the Norms and 
Standards for Elections in the SADC Region
769
 and the Principles for Election Management, 
Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region.
770
Both documents are not treaties 
concluded between SADC states and make it clear that their contents are simply 
recommendations for the management of elections. The SADC Parliamentary Norms and 
Standards focus mainly on setting standards for the respect of individual voters; the role of 
government in elections; and the fostering of transparency and integrity in the electoral 
process.
771
 The Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation in the 
SADC Region, on the other hand, take a more technical and chronological approach in the 
management of elections and offers guidance for the management of elections in the three 
phases of an election: the pre-election phase; the election phase; and the post-election 
phase.
772
 Both documents concentrate on the more technical aspects of elections, and, unlike 
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the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Elections, both offer more concrete standards 
for the management of the elections than the mere observation of elections. 
Although the two documents are not legally binding treaties of SADC, they have some 
persuasive and moral authority considering that they were adopted by key stakeholders in the 
elections sector. The SADC Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region is a 
document adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum, which included both ruling and 
opposition parliamentarians from the SADC member states. The Principles for Election 
Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region were adopted by 
representatives of the Electoral Commissions of SADC member states under the Electoral 
Commissions Forum of SADC (ECF), the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), and 
leading SADC based NGOs working in the field of elections and democracy. 
 
4.4.4 The Economic Community of Central African States  
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was created following the 
adoption of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States.
773
  
The Treaty entered into force the following year in 1984. The member states are Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo DR, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe. Due to virtual lack of political 
commitment, concomitant with virtual lack of financial contributions by member states, the 
ECCAS went into abeyance from 1993 to 1998.
774
 It was re-launched in 1998.
775
  
The main aim of ECCAS is to provide and strengthen the harmonious cooperation and ensure 
an evenly balanced development across all economic and social fields in member states.
776
  
These include the fields of industry, transport and communications, energy, agriculture, 
natural resources, trade, customs, financial matters, tourism, science and technology and 
culture. Ultimately, it is hoped that engagement around these sectors would raise the standard 
of living of people in member states, increase and maintain economic stability and bring 
about close and peaceful co-existence among member states.
777
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The ECCAS Treaty stands out for lacking any reference to democracy and committing its 
member states to any democratic norms, particularly as regards the conduct of elections in 
member states. Unlike ECOWAS and SADC which have dedicated and specific instruments 
setting standards for democratic elections, ECCAS does not have one. 
However, it should be noted that the peace and security architecture of ECCAS sub-region 
has a casual reference to democracy. The Protocol Relating to the Council for Peace and 
Security  in Central Africa (COPAX)
778
 includes, inter alia, as a principle of the Council for 
Peace and Security of Central Africa the “promotion and consolidation of the  democratic 
institutions and constitutional legality of  every state.”779 Therefore, “in the event of 
overturning or attempt to overturn the constitutional institutions of a member state,” joint 
armed forces of member states may be deployed to restore peace, security and offer 
humanitarian assistance.
780
 However, exactly what constitutes overturning constitutional 
order for which military intervention may be considered is not defined. 
 
4.4.5 The Arab Maghreb Union 
The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) was formed following the adoption of the Treaty 
Establishing the Arab Maghreb in Marrakech, Morocco, in 1989.
781
 Its member states are 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. 
The aims of establishing UMA are to: 
 Reinforce the fraternal links that unite the member states and their peoples; 
 Realise the progress and prosperity of member societies and the defence of their rights; 
 Contribute to the preservation of peace founded on justice and equality; 
 Pursue a common political policy in different domains; 
 Work towards the progressive realisation of the free movement of persons, services, goods 
and capital.
782
 
Like ECCAS, UMA lacks its own sub-regional framework setting standards for democratic 
elections. It is perhaps no mere coincidence that most of the UMA member states in 2011 
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witnessed popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes, demanding democratic 
governance. 
 
4.5 The Challenge of Enforcing AU Democratic Norms in Relation to Disputed 
Presidential Elections 
This section briefly discusses the mechanisms available to the AU of enforcing its norms on 
democratic elections where elections have been disputed or considered to have been in 
violation of its norms. It focuses mainly on the enforcement mechanism envisioned by both 
the AU Constitutive Act and the ACDEG. 
ACDEG, as the AU Treaty that comprehensively provides for democratic norms, provides for 
mechanisms by which member states may comply with its standards. These include requiring 
member states to domesticate ACDEG standards,
783
 sending AU election observation 
missions to member states conducting elections,
784
 providing advisory missions o assist states 
parties to strengthen their electoral institutions and processes;
785
 and requiring states parties 
to report every two years on the legislative or other relevant measures taken in order to give 
effect to the norms set in ACDEG.
786
 
These mechanisms if implemented in good faith and observed diligently can contribute 
significantly towards holding credible democratic elections that reflect the will of the people. 
Their significance, however, lies in being applied pro-actively to stave off potential short-
comings in an election. 
However, none of these mechanisms is of any help where elections have been disputed in a 
member state. The only enforcement mechanism that might have some relevance to disputed 
elections is the possibility of imposing sanctions on unconstitutional changes of government 
as provided for by both the Constitutive Act and the ACDEG. 
Both the Constitutive Act and ACDEG provide for the imposition of sanctions in the case of 
unconstitutional changes of government. In the case of the Constitutive Act, it simply 
provides that governments which come to power “through unconstitutional means shall not 
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be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.”787 ACDEG develops and elaborates 
further the AU sanctions regime against unconstitutional changes of government. Whenever 
there has been an unconstitutional change of government, the AU Peace and Security Council 
is required to suspend the concerned state from participating in AU activities.
788
  The 
suspended state shall, however, continue to fulfil its obligations to the AU and the AU shall 
maintain diplomatic contacts and initiatives aimed at restoring democratic governance.
789
 
Sanctions may also be imposed against states that instigate or support unconstitutional 
changes of government.
790
 
ACDEG goes further and requires that authors and perpetrators of unconstitutional changes 
of government shall not be allowed to contest elections held to restore democracy or hold any 
position of responsibility in political institutions of their state.
791
 This provision may have 
been actuated by the realisation that the sanctions set under the Lome Declaration which 
ended at non-recognition of unconstitutional governments and their suspension from AU 
activities were inadequate to deter prospective coup plotters. This is because perpetrators of 
unconstitutional changes of government easily found a way of circumventing the sanctions by 
organising elections which they generally win, thereby using elections to launder themselves, 
and benefit from their own wrong and give an initially unconstitutional act a coat of 
legitimacy.
792
  Such was the case, for example, in Togo in 2005 when Faure Gnassingbe, who 
had assumed office unconstitutionally, won subsequent elections called to normalise the 
situation. 
ACDEG also nebulously provides that perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government 
may be tried before a competent court.
793
 Bu without a penal or criminal AU statute which 
defines elements of crimes and an operational court vested with criminal jurisdiction, this 
provision simply creates a possibility that cannot be implemented currently.  
It should be recalled at this stage that these sanctions only apply to what ACDEG defines as 
unconstitutional changes of government. Of the five strands defined as constituting 
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unconstitutional changes of government, only one relates to the conduct of elections, that is, 
where an incumbent refuses to vacate office, having lost an election.
794
 But where an election 
is disputed, without a common appreciation of facts by contesting parties or candidates, there 
is no way of knowing whether an incumbent truly lost or the opposition truly won the 
election, and qualify that situation as an unconstitutional change of government. The general 
consequence is that it is unlikely that sanctions as contemplated by both the Constitutive Act 
and ACDEG will be imposed in a situation of contested or disputed elections. At least this 
was the case in Kenya in 2007 and in Zimbabwe in 2008, both situations which led to 
widespread violence and regional instability. 
Take, for example, the 2007 election situation in Kenya. Two days before Mwai Kibaki was 
hastily declared winner of the election, opposition candidate Raila Odinga was leading by 
more than one million votes.
795
 However, suddenly Kibaki overtook Odinga and was hastily 
sown in as president. Electoral Commission of Kenya’s then chairperson, Samuel M. Kivuiti, 
later indicated that he declared Kibaki winner out of pressure from the ruling party officials 
and that he actually did not know who had won the election because there were problems 
with the tallying of votes.
796
 When this occurred, Raila Odinga refused to accept the results 
and declined to petition the courts on the basis that they were staffed by Kibaki sympathetic 
judges. Odinga’s supporters took to the streets and the ensuing violence led to the death of 
more than 1,000 people, with more than 300, 000 displaced.
797
  
In such a situation, how would the AU have applied its sanctions regime, considering that the 
actual winner of the election was not known? It is submitted that such a situation requires the 
AU to have an adjudication mechanism that should sift through competing claims and come 
to a reasonable, fair and objective conclusion of who has a better claim according to the law 
and weight of evidence. Only then can it know if someone lost an election and failed to 
relinquish power to the legitimate winner. 
ACDEG has further provisions relating to violations of any other standards of the document, 
not rising to the level of unconstitutional changes of government, for which the AU Peace 
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and Security Council “shall determine the appropriate measures to be imposed...”798  The 
vagueness about this provision means that the AU does not have precise and clear cut 
measures to be taken in the event of a violation of any of the ACDEG standards other than 
unconstitutional changes of government. 
Ultimately, as Mangu has argued, ACDEG “has no efficient enforcement mechanism,” for 
implementing its standards.
799
 This is more conspicuous in relation to election disputes, 
which does not easily fit the definition of an unconstitutional change of government. 
However, even if the definition of unconstitutional change of government were to be 
construed expansively to include disputed elections, in the absence of a fair and competent 
adjudication mechanism it becomes difficult to make informed decisions about the imposition 
of sanctions. It is the contention of this research that ACDEG should have provided for the 
adjudication of disputed elections at a supranational level. This idea is explored further in the 
next chapter. 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the democratic normative frameworks in Africa. It considered 
both the sub-regional and continental standards. At the continental level, the OAU initially 
approached the subject of democracy and elections with indifference and routinely 
recognised governments that came to power through military interventions. Legitimate 
winning of elections was not a pre-requisite for OAU recognition of regimes. 
This slowly began to change. The adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in 1981 was the first continental framework that had provisions relevant to the conduct 
of democratic elections. Although assailed with drafting weaknesses, the Charter provided for 
the rights to political participation and self-determination. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which has responsibility for enforcement of the Charter 
developed progressive jurisprudence in favour of democratic elections. Despite this, the OAU 
continued to recognise governments that came into office by other means other than free and 
fair elections. 
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In the 1990s, however, the OAU began to shift its stance in favour of democratic constitution 
of government by rejecting governments that came to power through military coups. The first 
instance to trigger a unanimous OAU response occurred in 1997 when President Kabbah was 
ousted by the military in Sierra Leone. The OAU for the first time unanimously condemned 
the coup and authorised military action to restore democracy and President Kabbah was dully 
restored to office the following year. 
The OAU in 2000 crystallised its emerging rejection of military coups into the Lome 
Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government. This became the first continental 
document to formally reject unconstitutional governments. The Declaration recognised four 
instances of assumption of office it categorises as unconstitutional changes of government. 
These are military coup against a democratically elected government; intervention by 
mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; replacement of a democratically 
elected government by armed dissidents and rebels; and the refusal by an incumbent 
government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.
800
 
In 2000 the OAU heads of state and government adopted the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, which transformed the OAU into the AU.  The Constitutive Act’s objectives and 
principles include rejection of unconstitutional changes of government and the enshrining of 
provisions to the effect that the will of the people expressed through regular, free and fair 
elections is the sole basis upon which legitimate governments should base their authority for 
assuming office. The AU has taken a strong stance against unconstitutional changes of 
government and has since 2003 consistently rejected all such governments. In some cases, it 
has imposed sanctions and authorised military interventions. 
In 2007 the AU adopted the ACDEG, a comprehensive continental democratic treaty. It 
generally consolidates and pools into one binding document all the major AU norms around 
democracy and elections. ACDEG, however, is more heavily weighted against military coups 
at the expense of defective elections. While it provides for sanctions for unconstitutional 
changes of government, it provides no discernible enforcement mechanism where an election 
is in dispute and there is need to find out the legitimate winner. 
The Chapter also looked at democratic normative frameworks at sub-regional level. Five sub-
regions were discussed and these are the East African Community (EAC), the Economic 
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Economic Community 
(SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA). In terms of the level of advancement in the development of sub-
regional norms, there is no single thread that runs through all the sub-regions. Perhaps what 
can be said with certainty is that ECOWAS and SADC generally have more advanced 
frameworks setting standards for democratic elections white at the other extreme end, UMA 
and ECCAS completely lack any reasonable standard on democratic elections. EAC is in the 
process of developing its own sub-regional democratic standards. However, even ECOWAS 
and SADC with relatively more advanced frameworks still struggle with enforcement issues. 
Therefore, without an effective enforcement of democratic norms at both continental and sub-
regional level, the norms are of little use. The next chapter takes up the issue of the 
inadequacy of the enforcement mechanism of the AU standards by proposing the creation of 
a supranational electoral dispute resolution mechanism under the AU. 
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Chapter Five 
Exploring the Viability of Establishing an African Elections 
Supranational Court 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed African electoral and democratic normative frameworks in 
place. The frameworks establish valuable electoral standards. However, it was indicated there 
that the whole framework lacks an efficient enforcement mechanism. This section is an 
attempt at overcoming that challenge. It proposes the establishment of a continent 
supranational mechanism for adjudication of disputed presidential elections. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section discusses the value or benefit of 
supranational adjudication. The second section reviews sub-regional courts to understand 
how far their establishment and experience would support the idea of a continental 
supranational court. In the third section, the views from the review of sub-regional courts are 
synthesised to draw common lessons. The fourth section discusses the continental judicial 
framework and proposes ways of how supranational adjudication could be integrated into the 
already existing judicial framework. The fifth section looks at the possible relations the 
proposed court would have with other AU organs, particularly the Assembly, the Pan-African 
Parliament, the Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission. The sixth section 
highlights some of the major shortcomings or criticisms of supranational adjudication. The 
seventh and final section is the summary of the chapter. 
 
5.2 The Value of Supranational Adjudication 
The concept of supranationalism has already been extensively discussed in the second chapter 
of this thesis. There it was indicated that supranationalism ultimately constitutionalises 
international law by passing laws and creating institutions that are enabled to exercise 
binding and authoritative power over member states. Supranational law thus has direct effect 
in member states; is considered superior to municipal law; and pre-empties the application of 
municipal law in areas where it applies.
801
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This section looks at the value or benefit of supranational adjudication. This is particularly 
significant considering that in the previous chapter, it was shown that despite having fairly 
good democratic norms in Africa that would support the holding of free and fair elections, 
there is no efficient enforcement mechanism for those standards. At the heart of supranational 
adjudication is a supranational tribunal or court. Alter considers that a supranational court has 
at least five properties or characteristics. These are that: 
 It must be a permanent institution 
 Composed of independent judges 
 Adjudicates disputes between two or more entities, including member states or 
international organisations 
 Works on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure; and 
 It renders decisions that are binding.802 
Manifestly missing from Alter’s list is that supranational adjudication confers on litigants in 
member states direct access to the court. The state, therefore, does not play a gate keeping 
role to prevent its citizens from accessing the court. 
In order to appreciate the value of supranational adjudication, it is important to understand 
what constitutes effective supranational adjudication. Effective supranational adjudication 
means the ability of a legitimate court to compel litigants and other concerned parties to 
comply with its decisions.
803
 A court whose decisions are routinely disregarded serves no 
purpose. In order to be effective, a court will need to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
litigants and this legitimacy is considered as the court’s ability “to command acceptance and 
support from the community so as to render force unnecessary.”804 The factors that contribute 
to a supranational court’s legitimacy and effectiveness have already been discussed in chapter 
two above. 
Effectiveness of a tribunal or enforcement of its decisions is always work in progress. Koh 
considers that the concept of enforcing international law entails its obedience. Koh postulates 
at least four related stations in the continuum of enforcement.
805
 The first is coincidence, 
which means that behaviour that appears to conform to certain rules or standards may not 
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actually be occasioned or directly triggered by that rule or decision but may be mere 
behavioural coincidence. The second is conformity, which simply indicates that people are 
aware of a rule and conform their behaviour to the rule when it is convenient, but disobey 
when it is inconvenient.
806
 The third is compliance, which denotes obeying a rule or decision 
because doing so has benefits or at least avoids certain sanctions.
807
  Finally, the fourth is 
obedience. Obedience means that a person or entity adopts and internalises the rule or 
decision and makes it part of their inner value system.
808
  
According to Koh the move on the continuum from coincidence to obedience is accompanied 
with norm internalisation. This basically means that one passes from begrudgingly ‘obeying’ 
a rule to habituated obedience of the rule as a matter of internal imperative.
809
  The rule or 
decision, therefore, is no longer seen as an external command or sanction but gets integrated 
into someone’s value or normative system. 
The value or benefit of supranational adjudication flows from the very nature of 
supranational adjudication. At least three benefits can be noted here. The first, is the ability of 
supranational adjudication to interact directly with litigants within states and make directly 
binding decisions. This demonstrates that the norms the states jointly agree upon are not just 
lofty declarations, but serious undertakings that must be realised.
810
 Allowing supranational 
adjudication over norms and standards set by states shows clear commitment by states to 
those norms. It demonstrates that states are serious in pursuit of their collective aims and are 
prepared to let those standards directly shape their national policies, political and legal 
choices.
811
  Supranational tribunals, therefore, enhance the credibility of undertakings states 
make with each other at the international level. 
Second, unlike diplomatic ways of resolving conflict, adjudication determines an outcome on 
the basis of evidence and applicable law. As such, adjudication ensures that violations of 
agreed upon common standards are correctly “detected and accurately labelled as non-
compliance.”812 Correctly detecting violations may ultimately lead to future compliance with 
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the relevant normative standards. Helfer and Slaughter consider that the drive towards 
compliance in the long term may be spurred on by two costs any legitimate state would wish 
to avoid. The first cost is that where the violation is a major one, it increases the possibility of 
sanctions on the erring state. This could either be through the tribunal itself imposing a 
sanction such as a fine or it could be through a unilateral or multilateral process such as 
reduction in aid, trade and other areas of cooperation.
813
 The second cost is that states that are 
correctly labelled through the adjudication process as having violated set norms suffer loss of 
reputation.
814
 This in turn means that very few states and international organisations would be 
willing to enter into future agreements with the affected state. 
Third, and finally, judges of independent supranational tribunals are not chosen by one state. 
The process of selecting, electing or appointing judges involves a shared task involving all 
member states. As a result, a supranational tribunal is generally insulated from the direct 
control or influence of any interested state in a specific matter.
815
 The insulation of judges 
from direct influence of individual states makes it more likely that their decisions will be 
based on the merits of a case than on extraneous political considerations. 
In the case of this research, the proposal is to subject African democratic norms, especially as 
relates to the conduct of democratic presidential elections, to supranational adjudication. This 
implies that the values of supranational adjudication discussed here will coalesce with other 
existing efforts aimed at concretising democracy into enhanced realisation of democratic 
elections in Africa in the long term. Supranational adjudication is, therefore, not being 
proposed as a magical wand that would resolve all problems relating to disputed presidential 
elections in Africa and would not take away the existing municipal and international 
mechanisms for realising democratic standards. Instead, supranational adjudication, like a 
strand in a rope, would work with other strands to ensure the strength of the entire rope.
816
 
As will be seen when discussing sub-regional courts, supranational adjudication is a 
contextual endeavour as it is undertaken to address specific challenges in each region. 
Although this section has highlighted some advantages of supranational adjudication, it does 
not mean that there is universal consensus about them. Many criticisms have been raised and 
these are discussed later within this chapter. 
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5.3 Building on the Experiences of Current African Sub-Regional Courts 
This section seeks to locate the proposal for supranational adjudication of presidential 
elections in the experiences of the current sub-regional efforts. It discusses the experiences of 
five sub-regional tribunals, that is, the Court of Justice of the East African Community, the 
Court of Justice of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, the ECOWAS Court, 
the SADC Tribunal, and the OHADA Common Court of Justice. These have been chosen 
because they are relatively the best established and functioning sub-regional courts on the 
continent. Each of these courts has been in existence for more than a decade and has evolved 
its own jurisprudence. The courts also give a feel of the experience of supranational 
adjudication across the continent as these courts generally represent the major regional blocs 
of the continent. The East African Court, the ECOWAS Court and the SADC Tribunal are 
sub-regional courts with member states largely geographically connected, while the OHADA 
Common Court of Justice and the COMESA Court are primarily about market (economic) 
integration. 
The discussion of the experiences of these sub-regional courts will help in understanding 
what is already acceptable, and what areas still need consensus building and agreement in the 
process of integration and supranational adjudication. 
This discussion of sub-regional courts will focus on the following elements, which have a 
bearing on the concept of supranational adjudication: 
 Establishment and Organisation of the Court; 
 Jurisdiction of the court (focusing more on jurisdiction rationae materiae or material 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction rationae personae or personal jurisdiction; 
 Enforcement of Court Decisions and Relations with National Courts 
 Independence and Relations with National Governments of Member States 
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5.3.1 The East African Court of Justice 
 
5.3.1.1 Establishment and Organisation of the Court 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was established as one of the seven organs of the 
East African Community (EAC).
817
 It is the judicial body responsible for interpreting and 
applying the EAC treaty law.
818
 Although the court was created by the 1999 treaty, it was 
only formally inaugurated  on 30 November, 2001, when the first judges and the Registrar of 
the court, were sworn in.
819
 The temporary seat of the court is in Arusha, Tanzania, and the 
decision as to the permanent seat of the court is yet to be made.
820
  
The court is divided into two chambers or divisions, which are the First Instance Division and 
the Appellate Division.
821
  The First Instance Division hears and determines all matters 
relating to the interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty, and appeals from there lie to 
the Appellate Division.
822
 
There is, however, a lacuna as regards the appropriate court in which to file references from 
either national courts or partner states and also requests for advisory opinions, as the EAC 
Treaty is silent on the issue. The problem was occasioned by the 2007 amendment to the 
treaty which introduced the Appellate section without taking into account the need to provide 
for these matters. In order to overcome the ambiguity, the Court took it upon itself in the 
Rules of Procedure to require that both requests for advisory opinion and references from 
national courts and partner states shall be filed in the Appellate Division.
823
  
The Court has also clarified that the Appellate Division only has competence to hear appeals 
from the First Instance Division and only in relation with matters affecting the interpretation 
of the EAC Treaty. In Sitenda Sebalu
824
 case, a Ugandan national had applied to the EACJ 
against a decision of the Ugandan Supreme Court that went against him in a parliamentary 
election petition. The court indicated that the appellate jurisdiction of its Appellate Division 
was internal, within the EAC itself, that is, from the First Division to the Appellate 
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Division.
825
 The Court is, therefore, not competent to hear appeals from decisions of national 
courts. 
The EACJ is composed of a maximum of 15 judges, whereby not more than 10 are appointed 
to the First Instance Division and not more than five are appointed to the Appellate 
Division.
826
 Two judges of the Appellate Division are designated by the Summit (of heads of 
state) as the President and Vice-President respectively, and are responsible for the 
supervision of functions of the Appellate Division. Similarly, the Summit designates two 
judges of the First Instance Division as Principal Judge and Deputy Principal Judge 
respectively to oversee the affairs of the First Instance division.
827
  
Once appointed into office, judges serve a maximum and non-renewable term of seven 
years.
828
 Judges are required to vacate office upon attaining the age of 70 years.
829
 The 
requirement for judges to serve only a maximum of seven years without any possibility of 
reappointment is problematic as it means the expertise and experience on the bench keeps 
being lost. This was well stated by the President of the EACJ, Justice Harold Nsekela: 
The current arrangement where judges work on a non-renewable seven years term does not 
help the Court or the Community and has to be revisited. The Court is slowly becoming a 
training ground for judges to undergo intensive capacity building with a view to preparing 
them for effective discharge of their mandates, but before they can deliver, their terms come 
to an end.
830
 
In order to improve the accessibility of the Court, the Rules of Procedure provide for the 
establishment of sub-registries within national judiciaries of partner states.
831
 Sub-registries 
were formally launched in all five member states in 2012, starting with Rwanda and closing 
with Burundi.
832
 The opening of sub-registries makes the EACJ reasonably accessible as 
litigants do not have to travel to the seat of the Court in order to file documents.  
In addition to the opening of sub-registries in partner states, the Court has also developed the 
practice of hearing and delivering judgments, where possible, in partner states where the 
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litigants are based. The Appellate Division in August 2010, for example, delivered a 
judgement in Nairobi, Kenya, where all the parties were based.
833
 
The EAC Treaty states that EACJ judges serve on an ad hoc basis until such time as the 
Council of Ministers shall determine otherwise.
834
 Only the Registrar of the Court served full 
time while judges maintained their full-time assignments in their home countries. In 2011 the 
Council of Ministers decided that the President and Principal Judge of the EACJ should serve 
fulltime, starting from 1 July 2012.
835
 However, the fact that the other judges are still ad hoc 
still makes it difficult to compose panels of judges as their full time assignments home dictate 
when they shall be free to attend to the EACJ business. The EACJ recognises this challenge, 
and has requested that it be attended to as “litigation before the EACJ has been building up 
but cases cannot be heard as they come....”836 
 
5.3.1.2 Jurisdiction of the Court 
Jurisdiction clauses determine which cases a court is competent to hear and determine. 
Jurisdiction is usually clustered into three categories. These are jurisdiction rationae materiae 
(or material jurisdiction) which indicates the norms and facts over which a court may 
adjudicate; jurisdiction rationae personae (or personal jurisdiction), which determines parties 
to cases or persons who are competent to litigate before the court; and jurisdiction rationae 
temporae (temporal jurisdiction) which denotes the time during which the facts in issue are 
said to have occurred.
837
 Of interest to this section are jurisdiction rationae materiae 
jurisdiction rationae personae. 
In terms of jurisdiction rationae materiae, the EAC Treaty provides as follows:  
1. The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty: 
Provided that the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret under this paragraph shall not include the 
application of any such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of 
partner states. 
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2. The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as 
will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date. To this end, the partner states 
shall conclude a protocol o operationalise the extended jurisdiction. 
838
  
This provision on the jurisdiction of the Court makes it clear that it only has jurisdiction to 
interpret and apply the EAC Treaty. The jurisdiction of the Court to interpret other matters 
under the jurisdiction of Organs of partner states is expressly ousted. This provision ousting 
the jurisdiction of the Court over actions of organs of partner states would be problematic 
where these actions appear to be contrary to other provisions and spirit of the EAC Treaty. 
Where this has occurred, it seems the EACJ has resolved the dilemma in favour of granting 
itself jurisdiction and thus competence to hear and determine such matters. As seen above 
when discussing the evolution of the concept of supranationalism, this development 
resembles the approach that was taken by the European Court of Justice when it crafted the 
doctrine of direct effect. 
Two cases can be given as examples. The first case is that of Anyang’Nyong’o.839 This case 
involved the election of Kenyan representatives to the East African Legislative Assembly, 
which is the legislative organ of the EAC. The EAC Treaty, in the relevant part, prescribes 
how the election should be conducted as follows: 
The National Assembly of each partner state shall elect, not from among its members, nine 
members of the Assembly, who shall represent as much as it is feasible, the various political 
parties represented in the National Assembly, shades of opinion, gender and other special 
interest groups in that partner state, in accordance with such procedures as the National 
Assembly of each partner state may determine.
840
 
In furtherance of this provision Kenya passed “The Treaty for the Establishment of the East 
African Community (Election of Members of the Assembly) Rules 2001.” Pursuant to these 
Rules three political parties eligible to send candidates under the Rules submitted names to 
the House Business Committee of the Kenyan National Assembly. However two parties had 
submitted two parallel lists. One party withdrew the second list while the other party did not. 
With regard to the party that still had two lists, one list was submitted by the party leader 
                                                          
838
 Article 27 (1)(2) Treaty for the Establishment of the East  African Community 1999 
839
 Peter Anyang’Nyong’o and Others Vs Attorney general of Kenya and Others [East African Court of Justice] 
Reference No. 1 of 2006 [Judgment of 30 March 2007] 
840
 Article 50 (1) Treaty for the Establishment of the East  African Community 1999 
178 
 
while the other by the government chief whip. The House Business Committee, without 
advancing any reasons, approved the list that was submitted by the government chief whip.
841
 
The list approved by the House Business Committee was then tabled in the Kenyan National 
Assembly on the same day in a ministerial statement by the Vice President, in his capacity as 
leader of Government Business Committee, and subsequently submitted to the EAC as 
members of the EAC Assembly elected by the National Assembly.
842
  
The Kenyan government contended that the procedure of electing its representatives was 
under its own discretion and included an option for the National Assembly to assign that 
function to any other body. The EACJ disapproved. It held that the requirement under Article 
50(1) of the EAC Treaty for the National Assembly to “elect” members of the Assembly 
meant that the National Assembly of each partner state constituted itself into an electoral 
college for electing its representatives to the EAC Assembly. The Court found that the 
Kenyan National Assembly did not, therefore, “carry out an election within the meaning of 
Article 50 of the Treaty” and thus its Rules and behaviour infringed Article 50 of the 
Treaty.
843
 
The second case example is that of The East African Law Society.
844
  This case arose from the 
circumstances of the Anyang’ Nyong’o case, where the court had granted an injunction 
restraining the inauguration of the EAC Assembly, pending the hearing and determination of 
the case.
845
 In response to this development, the then three partner states (Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania) speedily amended the EAC Treaty to broaden grounds for the removal of judges 
and introduced an Appellate Division in the Court. 
Article 150 of the EAC Treaty confers on partner states exclusive jurisdiction in amending 
the Treaty and prescribes the procedure thereof. The applicants in this case challenged the 
manner the treaty was amended, alleging that it violated both the spirit of the Treaty and 
settled practice in the Community of consulting the people on major developments in the 
Community. The respondents contended that the claim was barred on the ground of 
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sovereignty of partner states as the duty of amending the Treaty was under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the partner states, and not open to the review of the Court.
846
  
The Court held that to the extent that the application alleged that the prescribed procedure of 
amending the Treaty was not followed, that would have amounted to infringement of the 
Treaty and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. In the view of the 
Court, although the partner states have exclusive authority to amend the Treaty, the question 
as to whether or not the amendment process “amounts to an infringement of the Treaty is 
justifiable and cannot be barred on the ground of sovereignty of the partner states.”847 The 
Court then went on to hold that the speedy procedure used to amend the Treaty violated the 
spirit of the Treaty and the settled practice in the Community of consulting the people on all 
intended major developments. 
848
 The people, therefore, had the right to be consulted and the 
governments of the member states had the duty to consult widely before amending the 
Treaty. 
Another issue to be noted about Article 27 is that it indicates that at some future dates the 
Court’s jurisdiction will be expanded to, inter alia, include human rights.849  To achieve this, 
it would require elaborating and adopting a Protocol to that effect. The Court, has, however, 
taken a somewhat expansionist approach to its human rights jurisdiction. A good example is 
the James Katabazi 
850
 case. 
The James Katabazi case involved Ugandan nationals who were being tried for treason and 
misprision of treason. While the Ugandan High Court was in the process of granting them 
bail, the Court premises were surrounded by military officers who re-arrested the claimants 
and charged them with unlawful possession of firearms and terrorism, both offences arising 
from the same facts which led to the treason trial.
851
 The Ugandan Constitutional Court had 
ruled that the actions of the military were unconstitutional, but the military still did not 
release the claimants and hence the application to the EACJ. 
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 The EACJ admitted categorically that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with human 
rights.
852
 The Court, however, indicated that while it will not assume jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on human rights violations, it will not abdicate “from exercising its jurisdiction 
under Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes allegations of human rights 
violations.”853 It held that interventions by the Ugandan forces to prevent the Court from 
issuing lawful orders violated the principles of the rules of law and, therefore, contravened 
the EAC Treaty.
854
 
The personal jurisdiction of the EACJ is restricted to the following categories of persons as 
competent to litigate before the Court: 
 Partner states;855 
 The Secretary General of the EAC;856 
 Legal and natural persons;857 
 Employees of the EAC in matters of employment contracts;858and  
 Parties to arbitration or special agreements which confer jurisdiction on the EACJ.859 
A partner state can refer a matter to the court for adjudication where it considers that another 
partner state or an organ or institution of the EAC has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
EAC Treaty.
860
 
Although the Secretary General is empowered to refer a matter to the EACJ, the process is 
circuitous, such that it is rendered of very little practical value. Where the Secretary General 
considers that a partner state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the EAC Treaty or has 
violated a Treaty provision, he or she is required to submit the finding to that effect to the 
concerned partner state and request it to submit its observations.
861
If the concerned partner 
state fails to respond within four months, or the Secretary General finds the response 
unsatisfactory, he or she shall then refer the matter to the Council of Ministers, which in turn 
has to determine whether to handle the matter itself or authorise the Secretary General to 
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immediately submit it to the Court.
862
 Where the Council of Ministers fails to resolve the 
matter, it shall then direct the Secretary General to refer the matter to the Court.
863
  
Of much significance, however, is the Treaty’s provision giving legal and natural persons 
direct and unconstrained access to the Court thus: 
Subject to the provisions of Article 27 of this Treaty, any person who is a resident in a partner 
state may refer for determination by the Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, 
decision or action of a partner state or an institution of the Community on the grounds that 
such act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or an infringement of the 
provisions of this Treaty.
864
 
The provision is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it confers access to any person 
“resident” in a partner state. Therefore, litigants do not necessarily have to be citizens of 
partner states. Mere maintenance of residence suffices. Second, the provision has no 
requirement for exhaustion of local remedies. So a concerned litigant complaining of 
violation of a Treaty provision does not have to, for example, first litigate in municipal courts 
before approaching the EACJ. The EACJ confirmed this position when it held that the 
provision confers on a litigant in any partner state the “right of direct access to the Court” 
and, therefore, there was no requirement for exhaustion of local remedies.
865
   
Third, the provision does not require a litigant to “show a right or interest that was infringed 
and/or damage that was suffered as a consequence of the matter complained of.”866 It is 
sufficient to allege that the matter complained of violated a provision of the EAC Treaty.
867
 
 
5.3.1.3 Enforcement of the Court’s Decisions and Relations with National Courts 
The EAC Treaty requires a partner state or Council of Ministers to take, without delay, the 
measures required to implement a decision of the EACJ.
868
 As regards judgments of the 
Court that impose a monetary obligation, the Treaty requires that the execution of such shall 
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be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in a partner state in which the execution 
is to take place.
869
 What is required is simply a verification of the authenticity of the 
judgement by the Registrar, whereupon the party in whose favour the execution is to take 
place may proceed to execute it.
870
 This provision is progressive as it ensures that decisions 
of the EACJ are not subject to further litigation at national level before being recognised. 
This is more advantageous, for example, compared to the rules under the defunct SADC 
Tribunal where its judgements are considered as foreign judgments and therefore subject to 
registration requirements in member states, and potentially, further litigation.
871
  
The EACJ has confirmed that although the EAC Treaty has no express provision allowing it 
to hold anyone in contempt of Court for disregarding its orders, it has inherent jurisdiction to 
do so. In the case of Sitenda Sebalu,
872
 for example, the Court had made orders as to costs in 
favour of the applicant which orders were not obeyed. The Court held that “in the absence of 
any plausible explanation, the Court holds that disobedience of those orders...constitutes 
contempt of court.”873  
Another area of interface between the National Courts and the EACJ is the practice or 
process of preliminary rulings. A court or tribunal in a partner state is required to request the 
EACJ to give a preliminary ruling where a question is raised before it concerning the 
interpretation or application of the EAC Treaty or the validity of the regulations, directives, 
decisions or actions of the Community.
874
  The reference, however, is only required if the 
national court or tribunal considers it necessary to enable it give appropriate judgment in the 
parent mater.
875
  
The preliminary ruling mechanism is a great opportunity for collaboration between the 
national courts and the EACJ and ensures the joint shaping and development of the EAC 
jurisprudence and integration of the EAC. It is also an opportunity for increased integration 
of EAC law into the municipal sphere. Statistics, however, indicate that national courts have 
not seized this opportunity. Between 2001 and 2012, only one case (from Kenya) was 
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referred by a national court to the EACJ for preliminary determination.
876
 John Ruhangisa, 
the Registrar of the EACJ, has suggested that this poor record is not due to indifference of the 
national courts but is actually due to the ignorance of EAC law in partner state judiciaries.
877
 
The EAC Treaty grants national courts of partner states jurisdiction to settle disputes 
concerning EAC law in the following words: 
1. Except where jurisdiction is conferred on the court by this Treaty, disputes to which the 
Community is a party shall not on that ground alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
national courts of the partner states. 
2. Decisions of the court on the interpretation and application of this treaty shall have 
precedence over decisions of national courts on a similar matter.
878
 
Although national courts retain jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning EAC 
law, the provisions makes it clear that decisions of the EACJ shall have precedence over 
decisions of national courts. The EACJ has suggested that it may actually not just have 
primacy but supremacy over the interpretation of the provisions of the EAC Treaty.
879
 The 
purpose of this is “obviously to ensure uniform interpretation and avoid conflicting decisions 
and uncertainty in the interpretation of the same provisions of the Treaty.”880 
 
5.3.1.4 Independence and Relationship with National Governments 
Independence of the Court for present purposes denotes the court’s ability for independent 
fact finding capacity, without undue political influence or considerations. To this effect, this 
section looks at three possible areas where a court is potentially open to external influence. 
These are the appointment of judges, the removal of judges and the possibility of backlash or 
efforts from partner states to deliberately influence the outcome of judicial process. 
The judges of the Court are appointed by the Summit of heads of state, from among persons 
recommended by partner states.
881
 Judges should be persons of proven integrity, impartial, 
independent minded and qualified to be judges under rules applicable in their home countries, 
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or must be jurists of recognised competence.
882
 No more than two judges in the First Instance 
Division and no more than one judge in the Appellate Division shall be appointed on the 
recommendation of the same partner state.
883
  
Limiting the number of judges appointed on the recommendation of one state reduces the 
possibility that one state will exert overt influence on the court. But, as shall be discussed 
below, the EAC heads of state have demonstrated that they are capable of mobilising to 
collectively undermine the independence of the Court where it passes a decision unfavourable 
to anyone of the member states. 
Initially, judges of the EACJ could only be removed by the Summit of heads of state on 
grounds of misconduct or inability to perform the functions of their office due to infirmity of 
mind or body.
884
 The removal process requires the setting up of an ad hoc independent 
tribunal composed of three eminent judges from the common wealth tradition, who should 
carry out an independent investigation. A judge would then only be removed where the 
tribunal recommends his or her removal.
885
 
The grounds for removal of judges were expanded in 2006 when the EAC Treaty was 
amended to include the following further grounds: 
(b) in case of a judge who holds judicial office or other public office in a partner state— 
(i) Is removed from that office for misconduct or  due to inability to perform the 
functions of the office for any reason; or 
(ii) Resigns from the office following allegations of misconduct or inability to perform 
the functions of the office for any reason; 
(c) if the judge is adjudged bankrupt under any law in force in a partner state; or  
(d) if the judge is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or fraud or moral turpitude under 
any law in force in a partner state.
886
 
The amendment further requires that where the tribunal has been seized with the process of 
removal of a judge, the Summit may suspend such judge from performing judicial 
functions.
887
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The amendments were a reprisal by heads of state of partner states in response to the Court’s 
decision in Anyang’ Nyong’o case, where the Court’s injunction effectively suspended the 
inauguration of the EAC Assembly. Soon after the Anyang’ Nyong’o decision, the Summit 
directed that the EAC Treaty be reviewed with the aim of introducing an appellate division as 
well as to increase the grounds for removal of judges in order to include “all possible reasons 
for removal than those provided in the Treaty.”888 
It should be understood that the amendments were targeted primarily at two members of the 
bench who were also judges in their Kenyan national courts. The two judges were victims of 
the “radical surgery” on Kenyan judiciary in 2003 which led to the suspension of 23 judges 
on general allegations of corruption.
889
 The allegations were supposed to be investigated by a 
Tribunal. However, one of the judges was cleared of the allegations even before the Tribunal 
started its work. He subsequently voluntarily retired from the Kenyan judiciary. The inquiry 
against the other judge had not progressed for at least five years preceding the Anyang’ 
Nyong’o decision.890 
To its credit, the EACJ found a creative way of handling the situation which avoided 
escalation and direct confrontation with the heads of state. In the East African law Society
891
 
which challenged the legality of the heads of state to amend the treat in that manner, the 
EACJ held that the amendment was a violation of the spirit and intendment of the EAC 
Treaty as well as the established practice of consulting people. Despite this finding, the court 
did not go ahead to annul the treaty amendment. It held that not all the amendments were 
incompatible with the Treaty objectives, and those which were incompatible, were capable of 
rectification.
892
 It creatively invoked the doctrine of prospective annulment, whereby its 
decision will only have prospective application.
893
 The Court justified this approach as 
“particularly beneficial for our stage of developing integration and the emerging Community 
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jurisprudence.”894 This is a very significant statement as it signifies the contextual nature of 
supranationalism and supranational adjudication.  
The approach taken by the Court to resolve the matter seems to have benefitted the Court in 
the long run as the heads of state since then have not taken any further measures to encroach 
on the court, despite the Court making strong decisions against governments of partner states 
in subsequent cases.
895
  
 
5.3.2 The Court of Justice of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
 
5.3.2.1 Establishment and Organisation of the Court 
The Court of Justice of the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA Court) 
is created as one of the eight organs of COMESA.
896
 Although the Treaty establishing the 
Court was adopted in 1994, the Court only became operational in 1998 when on 30 June of 
the same year the first judges of the Court were appointed.
897
 The Court was initially, 
although temporarily, seated at the COMESA secretariat in Lusaka. In 2003, however, 
COMESA decided that Khartoum, in Sudan, should be the permanent seat of the Court.
898
  
The COMESA Court of Justice was created to ensure adherence to law in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty Establishing the Common Market of East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA Treaty).
899
 It is composed of seven judges (one of whom is appointed as President 
of the Court).
900
 The Authority (composed of heads of state and government of member 
states) may appoint more judges, upon the request of the Court.
901
 The President and judges 
of the COMESA court hold office for a period of five years and are eligible for re-
appointment for a further final period of five years.
902
 
Having judges serve uniform and un-staggered terms is manifestly problematic as their terms 
of office all expire at the same time. This can have a disruptive effect on the smooth running 
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of the Court. In 2003, for example, the terms of office of all the initial judges appointed in 
1998 expired at the same time. Due to bureaucracy, it took two years for new judges to be 
appointed by the Authority, thereby sending the Court into abeyance for two years.
903
 
The COMESA Court is required to deliver only one judgment in respect of every matter 
referred to it, which shall be the decision of the majority.
904
 This effectively means that 
dissenting judgments or opinions are not allowed. The rule banning dissenting opinions is not 
unique to the COMESA Court as it is also practiced by the European Court of Justice.
905
 It is 
usually argued that its main benefits are to allow the Court to speak as a uniform voice of 
law, and to insulate individual judges from political pressure from their governments.
906
 This, 
however, may make judgments less clear cut as judges try to make compromises in order to 
accommodate each other. It has the potential consequence of engaging judges into diplomatic 
exchanges which may affect the development of the law. In common law traditions, 
dissenting opinions are usually respected as they may indicate the likely future direction of 
the law. 
The COMESA Court has no appellate jurisdiction. It is, however, entitled to revise its 
judgement provided the application for revision is made within three months of the passing of 
the judgment and it is based: 
... upon the discovery of some fact which by its nature might have had a decisive 
influence on the judgment if it had been known to the Court at the time the judgment 
was given, but which fact, at that time, was unknown to both the Court and the party 
making the application, and which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered by that party before the judgment was made, or on account of some 
mistake or error on the face of the record.
907
 
The Court thus can only revise its judgment either on discovery of some new facts or on 
account of some mistake on the face of the record. What constitutes these ingredients 
warranting revision was propounded by the COMESA Court in the case of Mwencha v. 
Kabeta
908
 where it stated that: 
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In our view, a mistake or error on the face of the record is not a matter that affects the 
substance of the issues before the Court or the validity of its judgment. They must be 
formal such as a misnaming of parties, errors in calculation, clerical mistakes or 
obvious slips that appear on the face of the record which can be corrected without 
changing the validity or effect of the judgment.
909
 
This means that the Court may not reverse its judgment, even if sound and convincing 
arguments were presented which may ordinarily have compelled an appellate court to reverse 
an earlier decision. The Court emphasized this point by noting that “an error on the face of 
the record, justifies a revision. An erroneous view, justifies an appeal, where an appeal 
lies.”910 But since the COMESA Court lacks appellate jurisdiction, there is no opportunity for 
the Court to correct an erroneous view that may have been passed at first instance. 
 
5.3.2.2 Jurisdiction of the Court 
With regard to jurisdiction rationae materiae, the COMESA Treaty simply states that “the 
Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all maters which may be referred to it 
pursuant to this treaty.”911 This means the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on all matters 
brought before it in relation to the interpretation and application of the COMESA Treaty, 
provided the cases are brought by persons entitled to audience of the court. 
The Court has personal jurisdiction with respect to five categories of institutions or persons. 
In the first instance the COMESA Court is competent to hear and determine a reference from 
any member state, where a member state alleges that another member state has failed to fulfil 
an obligation under the COMESA Treaty or has violated the same Treaty.
912
 A member state 
may seek the determination of the Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive or 
decision of the Council of Ministers on the ground that such act, regulation, directive or 
decision is ultra vires, unlawful or in violation of the provisions of the COMESA Treaty.
913
 
The second person entitled to bring a case before the Court is the Secretary General of 
COMESA. Just as under the EAC, the process of the COMESA Secretary General referring 
the matter to the Court is circuitous. Where the Secretary General considers that a member 
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state has failed to fulfil or has actually violated a provision of the COMESA Treaty, he or she 
shall submit his or her finding to that effect to the concerned state.
914
 The concerned state is 
in turn required to submit its observations to the Secretary General. Where the concerned 
state fails to submit its observations to the Secretary General within two months, or if the 
observations from the state are unsatisfactory, the Secretary General shall then refer the 
matter to the Bureau of the Council of Ministers which shall then determine whether the 
matter shall be referred to the Council of Ministers or allow the Secretary General to refer the 
matter immediately to the Court.
915
 If the Council fails to resolve the matter, it shall then 
direct the Secretary General to refer the matter to the Court.
916
 
The third categories of persons entitled to audience in the COMESA Court are legal and 
natural persons. Any resident of member state may bring an action before the Court 
challenging the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of the Council or of a 
member state that violates a provision of the COMESA Treaty.
917
  Just like under the EAC 
Treaty, mere residence in a member state suffices; the person bringing the action does not 
need to be a citizen of any member state. The Court re-affirmed this in the case of Republic of 
Kenya and Another vs Coastal Aquaculture
918
, where the applicant, a corporate entity 
registered in Kenya sought to prevent the compulsory acquisition of its land by the Kenyan 
government. The Court dismissed the Kenyan government’s argument that the applicants, as 
a corporate entity, lacked locus standi. It held that any legal person resident in a member state 
had locus standi to bring an action before the COMESA Court.
919
 
Unlike the EAC Treaty that gives persons in member states unconstrained access to the 
Court, the COMESA Treaty requires that such persons should first exhaust local remedies in 
national courts and tribunals. The COMESA Court in the case of Polytol Paints and Adhesives 
Manufacturers  Co. Ltd Vs The Republic of Mauritius
920
  has, however, ruled that, where legal or 
natural persons have exhausted national remedies, they are entitled to audience in the 
COMESA Court even if the member countries of their residence have not passed any 
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enabling legislation allowing them to approach the COMESA Court.
921
 Member states should 
therefore not use national laws to deny residents recourse to the Court when they have a 
grievance related to a provision of the COMESA Treaty. 
The fourth category persons entitled to bring an action before the COMESA Court are 
COMESA employees who can bring an action in relation to employment disputes.
922
  The 
provision also entitles any person aggrieved by acts of COMESA employees committed in 
the course of their duties to bring an action. 
The fifth and final categories of persons entitled to seek audience of the Court are parties to 
an arbitration or special agreement which confers competence on the court to preside over 
their disputes.
923
 
 
5.3.2.3 Enforcement of the Court’s Decisions and Relations With National Courts 
Where the COMESA Court makes a judgement, except in relation to an advisory opinion, a 
member state concerned or the Council of Ministers shall take necessary measure to 
implement the judgment of the Court, without delay.
924
 The Court has power to impose 
sanctions it considers necessary against a party which defaults in implementing its 
decision.
925
 The possible sanctions open to the Court are, however, not mentioned. 
Where the Court renders a judgment which imposes a pecuniary obligation on a person, 
execution shall be governed by the rules of procedure in force in a member state where the 
execution shall take place.
926
 This rule is the same as under the EAC Treaty. The decision of 
the Court is, therefore, considered as one that has been rendered by a national court in a 
member state. 
Like the EAC treaty, the COMESA Treaty provides for connection between the national 
courts and the COMESA Court through the practice of national courts referring cases to the 
COMESA Court for preliminary rulings.
927
 A national court faced with the question of 
application or interpretation of the COMESA Treaty or the validity of the regulations, 
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directives, and decisions of the COMESA, and if the Court considers it necessary to enable it 
to give judgment in the main matter, shall request a preliminary ruling from the COMESA 
Court.
928
  
National courts may also hear and determine disputes relating to the interpretation and 
application of the COMESA Treaty. However, decisions of the COMESA Court on the 
interpretation of the Treaty take precedence over those of national courts.
929
 This provision 
aims at uniform interpretation and application of the Treaty law across all member states. 
 
5.3.2.4  Independence and Relations With National Governments 
The appointment and removal process of the COMESA court judges is identical to that of the 
EACJ.
930
 There is, therefore, no need to repeat here. Perhaps, in terms of experience, the only 
major difference is that the COMESA Court has not faced any open hostility or backlash 
from governments of member states as a result of any decisions rendered. 
 
5.3.3 The Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African 
States 
 
5.3.3.1 Establishment and Organisation of the Court 
The Community Court of Justice of West African States (ECOWAS Court) was provided for 
in the original 1975 ECOWAS Treaty but never took off until the late 1990s. It has been 
argued that the Court failed to take off because it was understood then that the main goal of 
ECOWAS regional integration was largely to foster economic development, which was 
considered to generate very few disputes requiring adjudication.
931
The few disputes that 
might arise could then be resolved through arbitration and other non-contentious forms of 
dispute resolution. 
It was only in 1991 that ECOWAS adopted the Protocol
932
 formally establishing the Court. 
The 1991 Protocol entered into force in November 1996. The Court, however, existed only 
on paper as no judges were appointed. The first set of seven judges were appointed in 
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December 2000, and sworn into office in January 2001.
933
  Notwithstanding the appointment 
of judges, the Court, however, remained largely idle for the next three years, mainly due to 
rules restricting access, as shall be discussed below. 
The ECOWAS Court is one of the nine institutions of ECOWAS, and is created as the 
principal judicial organ of the community.
934
The ECOWAS Court is without an appellate 
division and is composed of seven judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same 
state.
935
  Judges were initially appointed for a period of five years and were eligible for 
another final five years term.
936
 In order to ensure that the terms of judges do not all expire at 
the same time, the terms of four members from the first set of judges, picked by lot, were to 
expire at the end of three years.
937
 The five year renewable term was abandoned in 2006 in 
preference for a four year non-renewable term.
938
 When the term of office of a judge expires, 
he or she remains in office until the replacement judge is appointed.
939
 
The judges of the Court elect from among themselves a President and a Vice-President who 
serve renewable terms of two years.
940
 The seat of the Court is Abuja, Nigeria. 
 
5.3.3.2 Jurisdiction of the Court 
 
Compared to both the EACJ and the COMESA Court, the ECOWAS Court has much broader 
jurisdiction rationae materiae. Originally the Court’s material jurisdiction only related to the 
interpretation and application of the ECOWAS Treaty.
941
 This interpretation and application 
was limited to inter-state disputes. 
The 2005 Protocol expands on this jurisdiction. It first of all broadly, but specifically, lists 
aspects of jurisdiction that would ordinarily constitute interpretation and application of the 
                                                          
933
 Alter, Helfer and McAllister “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice” 747 and 748 
934
 Articles 6(1)(e) and 15(1) Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States 1993  
935
 Article 2 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice 2006 
936
 Article 4(1) Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (A/P.1/7/91) 1991 
937
 Ibid  
938
 Article 4(1) Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice 2006 
939
 Article 4(3) Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice 2006 
940
 Article 3(2) Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice 2006 
941
 Article 9(1) Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (A/P.1/7/91)1991 
193 
 
ECOWAS Treaty.
942
 But more significantly, the 2005 Protocol vests the Court with 
jurisdiction “to determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in member states.”943 
Considering that ECOWAS does not have a sub-regional human rights treaty for the Court to 
apply, this provision gives the Court an expansive and indeterminate human rights 
jurisdiction. 
Although the Court has an indeterminate human rights jurisdiction, many cases that have 
been brought under this head of jurisdiction have often cited violation of human rights 
provisions of the African charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For example, in the case of 
Manneh,
944
 a national of the Gambia state brought an action before the Court following his 
indefinite incommunicado detention by government security agencies. He, inter alia, cited 
violations of Articles 6 (right to liberty) and 7 (right to be heard and presumed innocent) of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.945 The Court upheld his claim and 
ordered the Gambia to release and compensate him.
946
 
The Court has clarified that its jurisdiction over human rights, relates only to the violation of 
the rights of individual human beings and not corporate entities. In Ocean King,
947
 the Court 
dismissed the case of a corporate entity which had brought a case of violation of its rights 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights following seizure of its vessel on 
the high seas and its subsequent sale. The Court held that its human rights jurisdiction did not 
extend to violations against corporate entities.
948
 
With regard to personal jurisdiction, the Court started out with very narrow jurisdiction. Only 
a member state, on behalf of its nationals, could institute proceedings against another state or 
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institution of the Community, relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of 
the Treaty.
949
 Individuals, therefore, could not directly approach the Court. 
The case of Olajide Afolabi
950
 is credited with having sparked the drive that led to reforms 
which provided for individuals’ direct access to the Court.951 In this case, the applicant, 
Afolabi, was a Nigerian businessman who had secured business interests in the Republic of 
Benin. In furtherance of his business interests, he left for Benin, but found the border between 
Nigeria and Benin had been closed by Nigerian authorities and was thus blocked from 
entering from Benin. Aggrieved, Afolabi brought an action before the ECOWAS Court 
seeking, inter alia a declaration that the closure of the border was unlawful and in breach of 
the ECOWAS Treaty and a clear violation of his freedom of movement as guaranteed by the 
same Treaty.
952
  
The Court struck out the case for lack of jurisdiction; that it was only clothed with 
jurisdiction to hear and determine cases instituted by member states on behalf of its nationals, 
and not the other way round.
953
 
The dismissal of the case revealed the inherent flaw of the Court’s personal jurisdiction in 
that governments, which had the capacity to bring cases before the Court, had no incentive to 
do so.
954
  But at the same time individuals aggrieved by violation of their human rights and 
other Community norms had nowhere to seek redress. The case also exposed an anomalous 
situation where Nigeria, if it had brought the case on behalf of Afolabi, would have been both 
defendant and plaintiff, as it was the culprit and subject of the complaint. 
Despite dismissing the case, the Court, with support of bar associations and NGOs, engaged 
in advocacy urging member states to amend the Court Protocol  and allow for individual 
access to the Court.
955
  The 2005 Protocol was largely in response to this advocacy. Under the 
2005 Protocol, access to the Court is now open to member states, the ECOWAS Secretary 
General, The Council of Ministers, corporate bodies, and individuals.
956
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In relation to individuals and corporate entities, the Protocol gives them access to the Court 
without indicating any requirement as to their nationality or citizenship in a member state. 
They can bring an action for determination by the Court simply by alleging that “an act or 
inaction of a Community official...violates the rights of individuals or corporate bodies.”957 
Arguably, any person or corporate entity from anywhere can bring an action before the Court, 
provided they allege violation of their rights by an act or omission of any ECOWAS official. 
However, since the Court is set up for the ECOWAS integration process, it seems reasonable 
to assume that access may be restricted to persons or corporate entities with at least a 
residence connection to any of the ECOWAS member states. 
Individuals have also been granted a further access point to the ECOWAS Court. Individuals 
have been granted access to the Court “on the application for relief for violation of their 
human rights.”958 Access to the Court on the basis of alleged human rights violations, as 
noted above (Ocean King case), does not extend to corporate entities. 
Access to Court for individuals alleging violation of human rights has two conditions to it. 
First, the application should not be anonymous; 
959
 and second, the application should not 
relate to a matter which has been instituted already before another court for determination.
960
 
Although not expressly prohibited to hear and determine cases that have been heard by 
national courts, the ECOWAS Court has evolved jurisprudence that excludes it from 
determining cases on national matters that have already been settled by national courts.  
For example, in the case of Sa’adatu Umar,961 the applicant brought an action about violation 
of her right to the ECOWAS Court, the substance of which she had filed in a Nigerian High 
court, which in fact found in her favour and awarded her some damages. The Court noted that 
the substance of the allegations and reliefs sought before it were essentially the same as those 
sought  and decided upon by a Nigerian High Court.
962
 The Court, therefore, declined to be 
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seized with the matter since it “had already been adjudicated upon in a National Court of a 
member state.”963 
Although the ECOWAS Court evolved jurisprudence declining to be seized with cases 
already adjudicated upon by national courts, there is at the same time no requirement for 
applicants to the ECOWAS Court to exhaust national remedies before approaching the 
ECOWAS Court. As the ECOWAS Court stated in Ocean King, the provisions granting 
individuals access to the Court, “do not require, directly or even indirectly, the exhaustion of 
local remedies before an action could be brought before this Court.”964 
 
5.3.3.3  Enforcement of the Court’s Decisions and Its Relations with National Courts 
The ECOWAS Court is bound to give only one judgment arrived at in secret.
965
  It therefore 
allows for no dissenting judgments or opinions. The judgments of the Court are binding on all 
member states, institutions of the Community, individuals and corporate bodies.
966
  When a 
dispute has been submitted to the Court for settlement, member states and institutions of 
ECOWAS are to desist from any action that is likely to aggravate or militate against its 
settlement.
967
 And once judgment has been rendered, member states and institutions should 
take immediate and all necessary measures to ensure the execution of the decisions of the 
Court.
968
 However, consequences for disobeying a decision of the Court are not stated. 
Judgements of the Court with financial implications for nationals of member states and 
member states themselves are binding. The judgments of the Court are executed in form of a 
writ of execution, according to the relevant rules of procedure in each member state.
969
  This 
means that decisions of the Court are enforced as if they were rendered by a national court 
and, therefore, do not require a registration or recognition process, as is usually with the case 
with the execution of foreign judgments. All that is required is verification that the said 
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judgment was in fact rendered by the ECOWAS Court.
970
 A writ of execution duly issued by 
the ECOWAS Court can only be revoked by the same Court. 
The main mechanism linking national courts with the ECOWAS Court is the device of 
references to the ECOWAS Court. The 2005 Protocol states that: 
Where in any action before a court of a member state, an issue arises as to the interpretation 
of a provision of the Treaty, or other Protocols or Regulations, the national court may on its 
own or at the request of any of the parties to the actions refer the issue to the Court for 
interpretation.
971
 
The manner this provision is crafted is problematic in at least two ways. First of all, it is 
crafted in discretionary terms, such that it is up to the Court to decide to refer or not refer. 
There are no mandatory circumstances envisioned requiring a national court to refer a matter 
to the ECOWAS Court. In fact, even where a reference has been made, and opinion given by 
ECOWAS Court, there is no clarity as to the status of such decision. Are national courts 
bound by to decide cases in line with opinion given by the ECOWAS Court or these are mere 
guidelines national courts could forego? Where national courts handling disputes relating to 
the interpretation of ECOWAS instruments do not refer or even defer to the ECOWAS Court 
on the interpretation of certain provisions, it makes it difficult to evolve uniform or common 
jurisprudence to aid the legal integration process of member states. 
Second, the provision, unlike in the case of the EACJ, does not clarify which of the Courts 
(national or ECOWAS court) has precedence or superiority. This lack of clarity can easily 
lead to avoidable misunderstandings between the roles and status of the national courts and 
the ECOWAS Court. However, since as stated above, member states and institutions are 
unconditionally required to implement the decisions of the ECOWAS Court, it can only be 
assumed that they take precedence over national Court’s decisions. 
In order to build relations of mutual respect with national courts, the ECOWAS Court has 
developed jurisprudence to the effect that it would not interfere with decisions of the national 
courts, because such matters are largely in the exclusive competence of the national courts.
972
 
                                                          
970
 Article 6(3) Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending Protocol (A/P.1/7/91) Relating to the 
Community Court of Justice 2005 
971
 Article 6(3) Article 6(3) Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending Protocol (A/P.1/7/91) Relating to 
the Community Court of Justice 2005 
972
 Alabi Analysis of the Role of the ECOWAS Court in Regional Integration in West Africa 216 
198 
 
The Ugokwe
973
 case is a good example of this approach. In this case, Ugokwe had his 
election to the Nigerian House of Representatives annulled by an Elections Tribunal, whose 
decision was also upheld by the Nigerian Court of Appeal. Ugokwe then brought this action 
before the ECOWAS Court alleging violation of his right to fair hearing by the manner the 
Nigerian courts handled his case.
974
 The ECOWAS Court held that the kind of relationship 
existing between it and national courts is not of a vertical nature and, therefore, the 
ECOWAS court does not entertain appeals against decisions of national courts.
975
 
This, however, does not mean that the ECOWAS Court will automatically decline to 
entertain every case that has been litigated in national courts. In Sikiru Alade
976
, the applicant 
was held in detention indefinitely on the basis of “holding charges”,977 under which the 
Nigerian magistrate’s court remanded him into indefinite custody lasting from 2003 until the 
determination of this case by the ECOWAS Court in 2011. The Court considered the case 
admissible and found the Nigerian state to have violated the applicant’s right to fair trial 
within a reasonable time, his presumption of innocence and personal liberty. It ordered his 
immediate release and compensation.
978
 The Nigerian government released the applicant in 
line with the ECOWAS Court decision.
979
 
 
5.3.3.4  Independence and Relations with National governments 
Initially, the appointment and removal process of ECOWAS Court judges was largely in the 
hands of the Authority (of heads of state). The Authority appointed judges selected from a list 
of persons nominated by governments of member states.
980
 The appointment process did not 
indicate how member states were to nominate candidates in order to ensure the selection of 
credible, competent and well respected judges. In the absence of such standards, the process 
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could turn to political considerations and consequently, potentially affect the independence of 
judges appointed to the ECOWAS Court. 
With regard to the removal of judges, the 1991 Protocol required that: 
In the event of gross misconduct, inability to exercise his functions or physical or mental 
disability on the part of one of its members, the Court shall meet in plenary session to take 
cognisance of the fact. The Court shall then draw a report which shall be transmitted to the 
Authority which may decide to relieve the member in question of his duties.
981
 
Although on the face of it this provision seems to give the Court a prominent role in the 
removal process, a careful look at it reveals that the role of the court is perfunctory and 
superficial. The Court simply meets “to take cognisance” or in other words, makes itself 
aware of the allegations or the situation. It does not give the Court power to investigate, call 
witnesses or make its own findings. It is simply required to render a report to the Authority. It 
is then at the sole discretion of the Authority to determine whether to remove a judge or not. 
This removal process, did not shield judges from the likely reach of disgruntled member 
states. 
Both the appointment and removal processes were reformed by the 2006 Protocol. The 2006 
reforms were informed by the felt need for a recruitment criteria that “would allow for 
selection of the most suitable persons as judges” who are capable of “consolidating and 
speeding up the regional integration process.”982 At the heart of all this change is the 
establishment of the Judicial Council of the Community (JCC) which plays a significant role 
in both the recruitment and removal process of judges. 
Under the new system, member states are allocated vacant posts by the Authority. The JCC is 
composed of Chief Justices of Supreme Courts of member states to which the vacancy or 
posts have not been allocated. It then selects three candidates per country from nationals of 
countries to which posts have been allocated.
983
 The JCC has made the recruitment and 
selection process very transparent. Vacancies are advertised in the Official Journal of the 
Community as well as in some widely circulated newspapers in member countries to which 
                                                          
981
 Article 4(7) Protocol (A/P.1/7/91) On the Community Court of Justice 1991  
982
 Preamble to the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 Amending the Protocol on the Community Court of 
Justice 2006 
983
 Article 2 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/06/06 Amending the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice 
2006 
200 
 
the vacancies have been allocated.
984
 The adverts indicate the needed qualifications and are 
open to all eligible citizens of the concerned countries.
985
 The JCC then shortlists, interviews 
and recommends one candidate per state for appointment to the allocated vacancy.
986
  
This appointment process ensures that judges are not nominated by governments of their 
countries. They consequently do not have the pressure to make decisions out of a sense of 
loyalty or for political considerations. The transparent and elaborate nature of the recruitment 
process in the long term would increase public esteem and legitimacy of the Court as judges 
are seen to be appointed on merit and not political considerations. 
The JCC is equally involved with the removal of a judge for cause or on disciplinary grounds. 
When engaged in the removal process, the JCC is composed of the Chief Justices of Supreme 
Courts of member states without representation on the ECOWAS Court bench, plus one 
representative of the judges elected by the judges themselves.
987
 Thus composed, the JCC is 
vested with powers to hear allegations of misconduct, inability to perform functions or 
commission of crimes by judges. After examining such cases, the JCC makes 
recommendations to the Authority.
988
  
Just like the EACJ, the ECOWAS Court has received an amount of backlash from some 
governments of member states. Perhaps the most noteworthy has to do with the government 
of the Gambia. The Gambian Republic has generated several cases of serious human rights 
violations of its nationals and the court has made decisions finding its behaviour short of the 
ECOWAS Treaty standards. For example, in the case of Manneh,
989
 the Court found the 
Gambia to have violated the rights of the applicant who it had detained incommunicado and 
indefinitely without charge or trial. It ordered his immediate release and payment of damages 
to the applicant of USD 100,000.
990
 
In response to such decisions, The Gambia in 2009 submitted a proposal to reform the 
ECOWAS Court Protocol. It specifically proposed that individuals’ access should be subject 
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to the exhaustion of the local remedies rule.
991
 It also proposed that access to the Court on 
allegations of human rights violations should be restricted to human rights instruments 
member states have specifically signed.
992
 The second proposal was particularly concerning 
because  The Gambia at the time was facing another human rights case in the ECOWAS 
Court which had allegations of torture, while Gambia is not a state party to the UN 
Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment.
993
 However, in 
October 2009, the Council of Ministers of Justice of ECOWAS as well as the Council of 
Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS in November 2009 unanimously rejected the proposals from 
the Gambia.
994
 
 
5.3.4 The OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration 
 
5.3.4.1  Establishment and Organisation 
The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (OHADA Court) is the Judicial arm of the 
Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (Organisation Pour 
L’harmonisation en Afrique du Croit des Affaires), which is better known by its French 
acronym of OHADA. OHADA was created through the adoption of the Treaty on the 
Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa.
995
  Although membership is predominantly French 
speaking African countries, it is open to AU members, as well as any other state invited on 
the basis of a common agreement of all OHADA members.
996
  
The main purpose of OHADA is to harmonise business laws in member countries so as to 
reduce business uncertainty and expenses in order to encourage investment. This is largely 
through the passage of Uniform Acts, which cover a wide array of commercial areas.
997
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These areas include company law, trade, credit and debt recovery, bankruptcy, receivership, 
arbitration, employment law, accounting and transportation laws.
998
  
The OHADA Court, as the judicial arm of OHADA, is tasked with the realisation of the 
OHADA objectives through its interpretation and application of both the OHADA Treaty and 
the subsequent Uniform Acts.
999
 The Court has no appellate chamber or division. It is 
composed of seven judges, elected for a seven year term, from member states.
1000
 Once 
elected, judges are eligible to serve one more term. The terms of the initial seven judges were 
staggered, ranging from a minimum of three years to a maximum of nine years.
1001
 This 
ensures that the mandate of the judges does not expire at the same time, as happened under 
COMESA Court. 
Judges elect from among themselves, for a term of three and a half years, the President and 
two Vice-Presidents. The Court has its seat in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. 
 
5.3.4.2  Jurisdiction of the Court 
The OHADA Treaty lacks specific clauses vesting   both material and personal jurisdiction. 
Instead, indications of material and personal jurisdiction are weaved through other provisions 
throughout the document. In terms of material jurisdiction, the Court is competent to hear and 
determine matters related to the OHADA Treaty itself as well as the implementation of 
Uniform Acts.
1002
  In relation to Uniform Acts, the OHADA Court does not only handle 
disputes arising from them but is supposed to be consulted in their development and 
adoption.
1003
 Before the Uniform Acts are formally adopted, they are forwarded to the Court, 
which gives its opinion on the draft Uniform Acts.
1004
 The OHADA Uniform Acts, 
implementation over which the OHADA Court has jurisdiction, are directly applicable in 
member states and override any contrary municipal laws.
1005
 
The Court has personal jurisdiction in cases brought by member states, the Council of 
Ministers, national courts and private litigants who are parties to a contract out of which a 
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dispute has arisen. The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters brought before it 
relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the OHADA Treaty as well as the Uniform 
Acts.
1006
 Although it is not expressly stated, it seems the member states can only bring such 
cases against other member states, as it would be unconscionable for a state to bring an action 
against an individual for not implementing the Treaty standards. 
National courts may also make a reference to the OHADA Court with regard to matters it is 
seized with, without having to wait for the case to be disposed of and appealed to the 
OHADA Court.
1007
 The national courts can also send cases to the OHADA Court by way of 
appeal, either at the request of litigants or of the Court’s own motion, provided the matters 
concerned relate to the application of Uniform Acts.
1008
 
Parties to any dispute in national courts that relate to the application of Uniform Acts may 
approach the OHADA Court. However, this can only be by way of appeal from decisions of 
national courts.
1009
 This effectively means that, in matters where it has jurisdiction, the 
OHADA Court displaces Supreme Courts of member states as the final courts of appeal.
1010
  
This is radically different from the situation under the ECOWAS Court and the EACJ, where 
these Courts do not sit as appellate courts over decisions of national courts. 
Parties to a contract that provides for arbitration or who wish to settle a dispute out of court 
may approach the OHADA Court, provided at least one party to the dispute is domiciled or 
has habitual residence in a member state.
1011
  The Court itself does not arbitrate but simply 
appoints arbitrators from a pre-approved list of arbitrators.  An arbitrator appointed by the 
OHADA Court is required to submit his/her proposed award or finding to the OHADA court, 
which can propose amendments to his/her proposed awards.
1012
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5.3.4.3 Enforcement of the Court’s Decisions and Relations with National Courts 
Decisions or judgments of the OHADA Court are considered “final and conclusive.”1013 
Member states are required to execute and enforce them in their territories. It is further 
required that a decision contrary to the judgment of the OHADA court shall not be lawfully 
executed in the territory of a member state.
1014
 Decisions of the OHADA Court are enforced 
as if they were rendered by national courts. 
The main device by which national courts interface with the OHADA Court is the practice of 
referrals and appeals (from national courts to the OHADA Court). The OHADA Treaty 
provides for three different situations of how this could occur. In the first instance, parties to 
a dispute can directly appeal to the OHADA Court, once the domestic appeal processes have 
been completed. Where the OHADA Court quashes a decision of the national court, it means 
the case will commence afresh in the national courts.
1015
  
In the second instance, parties to a dispute in a national court may appeal to the OHADA 
Court, arguing that the national court veered into the sphere of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the OHADA Court. If the OHADA Court agrees that the national court truly lacked 
jurisdiction, it will annul the decision.
1016
  In the third instance, a supreme court of a member 
state, when faced with matters that relate to implementation of the OHADA Treaty or the 
Uniform Acts, may stay its own proceedings and refer the case to the OHADA Court on 
subject-matter or material jurisdiction. Where the OHADA court finds that it (OHADA 
Court) has no jurisdiction to hear the referred matter, then the case will resume before the 
national court.
1017
 
The OHADA Court, therefore, in relation to matters where it has jurisdiction, sits as a final 
appellate court for all courts of member states. It is thus, somewhat integrated into the 
judicial hierarchy of each member state as a court of final resort and appeal. 
5.3.4.4 Independence and Relations with National Governments  
Only nationals of member states with a minimum of fifteen years of experience as judges, 
legal practitioners or law professors are eligible to be elected as judges of the OHADA 
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Court.
1018
  No more than one national of the same state shall be elected at the same time to 
the bench of the Court. Judges are elected by secret ballot by the Council of Ministers from a 
roll of candidates nominated by member states.
1019
 The Permanent Secretary of OHADA 
prepares a list of nominated candidates, in alphabetical order, and submits it to member states 
at least one month before the election.
1020
 
Once elected, judges take oath undertaking to discharge their functions impartially.
1021
 This 
effectively means that judges are not representatives of member states, but once elected, 
should perform their functions according to the law. The OHADA appointment method 
where states nominate candidates, unlike the situation under ECOWAS, could be criticised 
for not setting standards states should follow in recruiting the most competent candidates. 
States may, therefore, nominate candidates on the basis of political considerations than legal 
and judicial competence. 
When it comes to the removal of judges (for inability or cause), the OHADA Treaty vests the 
removal process largely in the hands of the Court itself. Outside the cases of death and 
resignation, where a judge has to be removed for whatever cause, the President of the Court 
shall invite the concerned judge to give his/her oral submissions to the Court. On the 
unanimous finding/recommendation of the court that the concerned judge should be removed, 
the President of the Court shall then inform the Permanent Secretary of OHADA, who shall 
then declare the seat held by the removed judge as vacant.
1022
 Having the Court itself at the 
heart of the removal process increases the stature and sense of independence of the Court as it 
reduces the possibility of judged fearing removal at the instigation of governments not happy 
with their decisions. 
The OHADA Court, unlike the SADC Tribunal, EACJ and the ECOWAS Court, has not 
faced any backlash from governments of member states as a result of its decisions. Perhaps 
this could be due to the nature of cases it handles, which are mostly commercial cases while 
the other courts have handled politically sensitive cases. It seems the biggest challenge the 
OHADA Court faces in terms of effectiveness is being inundated with cases. The Court in its 
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first 12 years rendered about 600 judgments and its docket has continued to swell.
1023
 As a 
result of the swelling docket, the Court is currently suffering from a huge case backlog.
1024
 
 
5.3.5 The SADC Tribunal 
 
5.3.5.1 Establishment and Organisation of the Court 
The Tribunal of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC Tribunal) was 
established as one of the institutions of the SADC.
1025
  At this point it is significant to note 
that the original SADC tribunal was dissolved and reconstituted by the SADC heads of state 
and government through the adoption of a new SADC Tribunal Protocol.
1026
 The 
reconstituted Tribunal is yet to be formally inaugurated. As will be discussed below, this 
change is a massive reversal not only to the project of legal integration, but the manner the 
Tribunal was dissolved signals lack of respect for rule of law, judicial independence and 
human rights. Circumstances leading to the dissolution are discussed later below. 
In terms of composition, there is no change between the original tribunal and the 
reconstituted one. The Tribunal consists not less than ten judges, appointed from nationals of 
member states of SADC and who possess qualifications required for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices in their respective member states or are jurists of recognised 
competence.
1027
  The Council of Minsters designates five of the judges as regular judges to sit 
on the Tribunal, while the additional five constitute a pool from which the president of the 
Court may invite a member to sit on the Tribunal whenever a regular member is temporarily 
absent or unable to discharge his or her responsibilities.
1028
  The number of judges may be 
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increased by the Council of Ministers on request by the Tribunal.
1029
 No more than two 
judges may be nationals of the same member state.
1030
 
Once appointed, judges ordinarily serve a term of five years, which may be renewed for 
another final five years.
1031
 The terms of judges are staggered by requiring that from the first 
pool of judges, two regular and two additional judges’ terms shall expire at the end of three 
years.
1032
 The judges of the Tribunal are part time.
1033
  
The Tribunal does not have an appellate division. While the SADC Secretariat has its seat in 
Gaborone, Botswana, the SADC Tribunal has its seat in Windhoek, Namibia. 
The first judges of the original Tribunal were appointed by the Summit (of heads of state and 
government) on 18 August 2005. Their swearing in ceremony and inauguration took place on 
November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia.
1034
  
 
5.3.5.2  Jurisdiction of the Court 
The material jurisdiction of the original SADC Tribunal was stated in the following terms: 
The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it in 
accordance with the Treaty and its Protocol which relate to:  
(a) The interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
(b) The interpretation, application or validity of the  Protocols, all subsidiary instruments 
adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of the institution of the 
Community; 
(c) All matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that Member States may 
conclude among themselves or within the Community and which confer jurisdiction on 
the Tribunal.
1035
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The provision is clear in conferring jurisdiction in the Tribunal to interpret and apply the 
SADC Treaty, subsequent Protocols and other agreements to be concluded by member states. 
A controversy arose as to whether or not the provision conferred the Tribunal with 
competence to hear and determine human rights violation cases. The issue arose in the 
Campbell
1036
  case where the applicants had their farms expropriated by the Zimbabwean 
government without compensation and under a law that ousted the jurisdiction of national 
courts to review the actions of the government.
1037
 The applicants challenged the 
Zimbabwean government’s action on grounds that it, inter alia, was a violation of their rights 
of access justice and was discriminatory. It was argued for the Zimbabwean government that 
the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because it lacked jurisdiction over human 
rights issues as SADC had not elaborated and adopted a specific human rights treaty 
enumerating applicable human rights.
1038
 The Court held that it did not “consider that there 
should be a Protocol on human rights in order to give effect to the principles set out in the 
Treaty.”1039 The fact that the SADC Treaty required member states to adhere to principles of 
“human rights, democracy and rule of law” was sufficient foundation for the Tribunal to 
adjudicate on human rights and develop its own jurisprudence.
1040
 
 The new 2014 Protocol, however, significantly revises the provision on material jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. The new Tribunal “shall have jurisdiction on the interpretation of the SADC 
Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between member states.”1041 The new SADC 
Tribunal is, therefore, only vested with jurisdiction to interpret the SADC Treaty and 
Protocols only in the context of inter-state disputes. This effectively means that the Tribunal 
shall never handle matters of human rights violations. 
In terms of personal jurisdiction, the Tribunal was empowered to receive applications from 
institutions of the SADC Community, member states and natural or legal persons.
1042
 No 
member state has brought a case against another at the Tribunal. Most of the cases were 
brought by natural or legal persons. Where legal or natural persons bring a case, it is required 
that the dispute should be between a natural or legal person and a member state.
1043
  This was 
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asserted by the Court in the Chirinda
1044
 case where the applicants sought to intervene in the 
Campbell case on grounds that they had an interest in that case. The Court dismissed their 
application on the ground that natural or legal persons could only bring cases against member 
states and not against other natural or legal persons.
1045
 
Natural or legal persons bringing an application before the SADC Tribunal against a member 
state had first to exhaust all available remedies under the domestic jurisdiction.
1046
  The 
rationale for the exhaustion of local remedies is “to enable local courts to first deal with the 
matter because they are well placed to deal with the matter because they are well placed to 
deal with the legal issues involving national law before them” and ensures that the 
international Tribunal does not deal with cases which could easily have been disposed of by 
national courts.”1047 
The Tribunal, however, has indicated that an applicant is not required to exhaust local 
remedies where “municipal law does not offer any remedy or the remedy that is offered is 
ineffective” or it is obvious that the procedure for achieving the remedy would be unduly 
prolonged.
1048
 The Tribunal has also held that the granting of interim orders to protect the 
rights of applicants is not subject to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies.
1049
 
The new Tribunal Protocol does not have a provision on personal jurisdiction. But the scope 
of personal jurisdiction of the new Tribunal is implied under Article 33 which provides for 
the material jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the following terms: “The Tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction on the interpretation of the SADC Treaty or Protocols relating to disputes 
between member states.” 
By clothing the Tribunal with competence to only deal with cases involving disputes between 
member states, it means natural and legal persons are now excluded from accessing the 
Court. Considering that during the life of the Tribunal no member state ever brought a case 
against another member state, this change effectively strips the Tribunal of its relevance in 
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the integration process. It will most likely just exist on paper without any meaningful 
prospect of any docket to process. 
 
5.3.5.3  Enforcement of the Court’s Decisions and Relations with National Courts 
Decisions of the SADC Tribunal are considered final and binding.
1050
 Unlike the EACJ and 
ECOWAS Court, decisions of the SADC Tribunal are supposed to be enforced under rules of 
procedure in national courts pertaining to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
1051
 Thus 
decisions of the SADC Tribunal potentially have to go through a process of registration and 
recognition as other judgment rendered by foreign Courts. 
This approach of enforcing the Tribunal’s decisions as foreign judgments is also problematic 
especially in countries where the subject matter of the judgment in the international Court is 
at variance with a matter of public policy at national level, where only the executive can 
venture (because, for example, the powers of the Courts have been ousted). At least such was 
the situation in the Campbell case relating to the situation in Zimbabwe. Where a domestic 
Court’s jurisdiction is ousted in this manner, it is impossible that a national court will then 
enforce a foreign judgement and allow it to override public policy considerations. 
Member states and institutions of the SADC are required to take all necessary measures to 
ensure the execution of decisions of the Tribunal.
1052
 Any party to a dispute may refer a 
failure by a member state to comply with a decision of the Tribunal to the Tribunal itself.
1053
 
Where the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its finding to the 
Summit for it to take appropriate action.
1054
  The new SADC Tribunal Protocol re-enacts 
these provisions on the enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions.1055  
Although the kind of action the Summit may take is not specified, the SADC Treaty’s 
provision on sanctions is indicative of what could be done in such circumstances. Sanctions 
may be imposed on a member state that, inter alia, “persistently fails, without reason, to fulfil 
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obligations assured under this Treaty.”1056 The applicable sanctions are not enumerated but 
are to be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis.
1057
 
Just like other sub-regional Tribunals discussed above, the SAC Tribunal’s main mechanism 
for interacting with national courts is through the process of references.
1058
 However, of all 
the cases handled by the Tribunal, there was none that was referred to the Tribunal by a 
national court. All the cases were brought by natural or legal persons against either the 
member states or SADC institutions, outside of the framework of reference by national 
courts.
1059
 
The mechanism of references by national courts has proved problematic in the SADC 
context, where in the majority of member states, international agreements are not self-
executing unless concerned states pass enabling legislation. Lorand Bartels, the University of 
Cambridge legal scholar who was engaged by SADC to review the Tribunal’s mandate in 
2010, discovered that actually none of the SADC member states had passed any enabling 
legislation “incorporating SADC law en bloc into its domestic legal system.”1060 Where 
international agreements are not self-executing and enabling legislation has not been passed, 
national courts will have no legal basis for referring cases to an international Tribunal. In this 
context, the effectiveness of the reference system turns on the willingness of member states to 
pass national laws enabling national courts to refer cases to the Tribunal. It goes without 
saying that without an effective reference mechanism, there is no effective reception of 
Community law into the municipal sphere and the integration process therefore suffers. 
Since the 2014 SADC Tribunal Protocol does away with the right of access for natural and 
legal persons to the Tribunal, it invariably removes the reference mechanism 
 
5.3.5.4  Independence of the Court and Relations National Governments 
The judges of the SADC Tribunal are appointed by the Summit on the recommendation of 
the Council of Ministers.
1061
 The Council of Ministers selects candidates from the list of 
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names nominated and proposed by member states for appointment.
1062
 The nomination and 
appointment process is required to give due consideration to fair gender representation.
1063
  
Unlike ECOWAS which has put in place a more transparent appointment system, SADC’s 
appointment system is solely in the hands of governments of member states. How each state 
identifies candidates for possible appointment is entirely under its discretion. The 2014 
Protocol makes no changes to the appointment mechanism of judges.
1064
 
When it comes to removal of judges from office, the 2000 SADC Tribunal protocol seems to 
only contemplate two circumstances under which judges could vacate office: death and 
resignation.
1065
 There is no provision for removal of judges on any other ground other than 
those two. The 2014 Tribunal Protocol, however, introduces a clause on removal for 
incapacity and misconduct. Under the 2014 Protocol, a judge may be removed from office if 
he/she is permanently incapacitated from exercising his or her functions or has committed a 
serious breach of his or her duties or a serious act of misconduct.
1066
 What constitutes a 
serious breach of duty or serious misconduct is not defined. It is, however, required  that a 
judge shall only be removed if the question of his/her removal from office  is referred  to an 
ad hoc independent tribunal appointed specifically for this purpose by the Summit, and the ad 
hoc tribunal recommends that the judge be removed from office following due process.
1067
 
Of all regional tribunals under consideration, the SADC Tribunal has suffered the most 
devastating backlash from the governments of member states, which in fact led to the 
dissolution of the original SADC Tribunal and the creation of a new one with a limited 
mandate. Circumstances leading to the dissolution merit narrating in summary here. 
The backlash against the SADC tribunal was triggered by the Tribunal’s decision in the 
Campbell
1068
 case. In this case a group of white farmers brought an action before the Tribunal 
challenging the Zimbabwean constitutional amendment and government policy that allowed 
for the expropriation of white-owned farms without compensation, and ousted the jurisdiction 
of the courts from reviewing this decision of government. The applicants alleged that the 
actions of the Zimbabwean government were in violation of human rights, particularly the 
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rights of access to justice and non-discrimination. The Tribunal found for the applicants and 
ordered the Zimbabwean government to halt the expropriation of farms and to compensate 
the affected farmers.
1069
 
The Zimbabwean government reacted angrily against the judgement. President Mugabe 
referred to the decision as an “exercise in futility.”1070 The Zimbabwean Justice Minister 
announced that Zimbabwe would withdraw from the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal and 
embarked on a tour of member states lobbying for their support against the decision of the 
Tribunal.
1071
  
When Zimbabwe failed to honour the decision of the Tribunal, the Tribunal on at least three 
occasions wrote to the Summit for it to take appropriate action against Zimbabwe. Instead, in 
2010, the Summit decided to defer action against Zimbabwe and ordered a review of the 
Tribunal’s role, responsibilities and terms of reference by an independent consultant.1072 The 
consultant who was engaged, Lorand Bartels, found no fault in how the Tribunal discharged 
its responsibilities and actually recommended reforms to strengthen the Tribunal.
1073
 
Zimbabwe’s lobbying against the Tribunal began to bear fruit as some member states began 
to speak openly against the Tribunal and in solidarity with Zimbabwe. The Tanzanian 
President, Jakaya Kikwete, for example, is reported to have stated that: “We have created a 
monster that will devour us all. Can our justice ministers make sure that his is destroyed 
before it devours us all.”1074 
In 2010 the Summit suspended the operations of the Tribunal, pending the review of its 
mandate and decided that it would not reappoint Tribunal judges whose terms of office had 
expired in August 2010, nor would it replace judges whose terms of office would expire in 
October 2011.
1075
 The Summit also ordered the Tribunal not to hear any new cases. In May 
2011, once again the Summit decided to extend the suspension of the Tribunal for another 
year and held to its earlier position not to reappoint judges whose terms were due to expire 
and asked the Tribunal not to hear any cases, whether new or pending. The Summit also 
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asked the SADC Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General to begin the process of amending 
the Tribunal Protocol and submit to the Summit a progress report.
1076
   
During a Summit meeting in August 2012 in Mozambique, the SADC heads of state and 
government received and considered a report from the Ministers of Justice and Attorneys 
General and agreed that a new Protocol on the Tribunal be developed and that “its mandate 
should be confined to the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to the 
disputes between member states.”1077 In August 2014 the SADC Council of Ministers during 
a meeting held at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe, approved a new draft Protocol on the Tribunal 
and recommended its adoption by the Summit.
1078
 The Summit, following the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers, adopted and signed the new Protocol on the 
SADC Tribunal.
1079
 The most significant change the new Protocol introduced, as already 
discussed, is the removal of access to the Tribunal by natural and legal persons.
1080
 
It should also be noted that there were advocacy and lobbying activities by civil society 
organisations within the SADC region to save the Tribunal from being dissolved. In one 
effort, civil society organisations sought an advisory opinion from the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on whether the decision of the SADC leaders to suspend the 
SADC Tribunal and terminate terms of office of judges was in line with the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.1081 Unfortunately the Court declined to give an opinion on 
the ground that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights had a case before it 
which was materially the same as this one presented to it.
1082
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5.4 The Viability of An Elections Supranational Tribunal Emerging From the 
Review of Sub-Regional Courts 
This section looks at the emerging picture from the review of sub-regional courts to see if it is 
favourable to the creation of a continental supranational court with a mandate to adjudicate 
presidential election disputes. 
As already discussed, supranational adjudication hinges on affording nationals of member 
states direct access to the supranational court or tribunal, which in turn is empowered to make 
binding decisions on individual litigants and member states concerned. Thus considered, then 
all the five sub-regional courts (with the exception of the recreated SADC Tribunal) qualify 
to be considered as supranational courts.  Therefore, outside of the new SADC Tribunal, it is 
clear that at sub-regional level, supranational adjudication is the dominant judicial model for 
resolving legal disputes in the integration process. 
These sub-regional courts, although on paper may have been established many years ago, are 
a new millennium phenomena in terms of actual operationalisation. All the tribunals assessed 
here, except COMESA Court (1998), had had the first set of judges appointed post-2000. 
Naturally, therefore, as a new phenomenon,  the courts are still trying to establish themselves 
and assert their legitimacy and build viable relations with national courts and other relevant 
stakeholders. 
Despite being relatively new, the sub-regional courts have rendered remarkable and valuable 
decisions that have aided the process of integration, at least at the legal level. Although some 
of the decisions rendered may not have been in the immediate or short term interests of 
member states, in the long term they stand to benefit the sub-regional integration process. 
These decisions have enabled holding member states to respect the standards they had agreed 
to in various constitutive documents and subsequent protocols. 
Although no regional economic community has given express jurisdiction to a sub-regional 
court to entertain election petitions, election cases as seen in the Ugokwe case above could 
still reach these courts by way of raising violations, such as human rights, over which the 
courts already have jurisdiction. It could , therefore, be argued that although governments 
may have adverse feelings about granting jurisdiction to supranational courts, certain aspects 
of the conduct of elections (such as the rights to participation, freedom of expression, 
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association as well as access to tribunals when aggrieved with the conduct of elections) will 
continue to reach these supranational courts. 
Although, with the exception of the recreated SADC tribunal, all the sub-regional courts 
reviewed would qualify as supranational tribunals, they have nuanced differences. For 
example, when it comes to accessing the Courts, ECOWAS and EACJ give unfettered access 
to the Courts, while for COMESA and SADC (before dissolution) access is subject to 
exhaustion of local remedies. The OHADA Court is unique in the sense that it serves as an 
appellate court for member states in relation to matters over which it has jurisdiction. 
Supranational courts, as noted already, are the dominant model of tribunals at the sub-
regional level. It can thus be argued that this model can easily be replicated at continental 
level, considering that regional communities are regarded as building blocks for ultimate 
continental integration. However, the experiences of the  SADC  Tribunal and to some extent 
EACJ and ECOWAS Court indicates that the more a supranational court asserts its authority 
over matters with significant political implications, the more  the court may suffer reprisals 
from governments of member states. In the case of ECOWAS, the backlash from The 
Gambia never materialised as other states rejected the proposals to constrain the jurisdiction 
of the Court. For the EACJ, the backlash and subsequent reforms appear not to have damaged 
the Court significantly. It could actually be stated that, on the contrary, the reforms 
strengthened the stature of the court by creating an appellate division. It is, therefore, only in 
the case of SADC that the backlash against the tribunal was fatal. 
Helfer and Slaughter propose at least two factors that could explain why the SADC Tribunal 
never survived the backlash. These are what they call “incrementalism” and “nature of 
violations” brought before the Court.1083 Incrementalism means that bold judgments against 
state interests must be tempered with awareness of political boundaries. The court thus should 
not act too fast and too far or else member states may act to curtail its jurisdiction or vary the 
composition of judges.
1084
 
But how fast and far a court pushes is in part dependent on the “nature of violations” that 
come before it for adjudication. It is argued that, while a supranational court is still young and 
still trying to assert its  legitimacy, this process is aided if only minor case of little 
consequence to the states are dominant. If from the start, a supranational court, which is not 
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yet engraved in the minds and hearts of many stakeholders, takes up politically sensitive 
cases, and then fails to tailor its judgments “incrementally” to balance with the immediate 
interests of the concerned states and individual litigants, then the court may suffer a fatal 
backlash.
1085
  
It would appear that the SADC judges failed this test while the EACJ judges passed it with 
distinction. The SADC Tribunal judges faced hard cases arising from the poor governance 
situation in Zimbabwe just two years after it became operational. The Tribunal made bold 
decisions, without tailoring the decisions to accommodate both the aggrieved litigants and the 
concerned state (without of course betraying its mandate).
1086
 
The EACJ judges, on the other hand, seem to have passed the test and enabled the court to 
survive the backlash and consolidate its legitimacy. In the East African Law Society
1087
  case 
the EACJ had to determine the validity of the amendments to the EAC Treaty. Although the 
court annulled the amendments introduced by member states, it creatively invoked the 
doctrine of “prospective annulment,” which effectively meant that the interests of both the 
member states and the litigants were taken on board.  
The approach taken by the EACJ demonstrates that it is possible for courts to make bold, but 
creative decisions that enable the balancing of immediate state (‘sovereign’) interests and at 
the same time serve the values or norms that underpin the regional integration process. It is 
not an easy task but it is necessary if the goals set between states, both at sub-regional and 
continental level are to be realised. The EACJ, in this respect aptly remarked: 
...we are constrained to say that when the partner states entered into the Treaty, they embarked on 
the proverbial journey of a thousand miles which of necessity starts with one step. To reach the 
desired destination they have to ensure that every subsequent step is directed forward towards that 
destination. There are bound to be hurdles on the way. One such hurdle is balancing individual 
state sovereignty with integration. While the Treaty upholds the principle of sovereign equality, it 
must be acknowledged that by the very nature of the objectives they set out to achieve, each 
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partner state is expected to cede some amount of sovereignty to the Community and its organs 
albeit in limited areas to enable them play their role.
1088
 
This review of sub-regional courts indicates that at the formal level, supranational 
adjudication is to a great extent already accepted at sub-regional level and is in fact the 
dominant judicial model as seen in the treaties and jurisprudence of sub-regional 
organisations reviewed. Although it seems difficult to gauge how popular supranational 
tribunals are with citizens of member states, it is clear that almost all cases settled by the 
courts were brought by private persons as opposed to member states. Although this is not 
conclusive evidence of popularity, it could be argued that private individuals who have had 
cause to litigate before the sub-regional courts are inclined favourably to the supranational 
tribunals. This, however, does not conclusively indicate the level of support in a particular 
state for supranational adjudication. In the case of the ECOWAS Court and the EACJ, as 
discussed above, the support for expanding the jurisdiction of the court or advocacy against 
narrowing its jurisdiction welled-up from private persons and civil society organisations 
within member states. Similarly, efforts to save the SADC Tribunal were undertaken by civil 
society organisations and bar societies in member states. In the next section, an attempt is 
made to escalate supranational adjudication to the continental level using the already existing 
continental judicial framework. 
 
5.5 Integrating the Elections Supranational Court Into the AU Judicial 
Framework 
This section looks at how the proposed supranational elections tribunal could relate to and be 
integrated into the AU judicial framework. It should be recalled that the elections 
supranational court is suggested to be at the continental level and have jurisdiction over the 
implementation of continental democratic and elections norms. This section, therefore, looks 
at the judicial structures already in existence at the continental level and proposes how they 
can be adjusted in order to accommodate supranational adjudication over presidential election 
disputes. 
The first African continental court to be established is the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR). The establishment of the Court sprung from a growing sense of 
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“the inadequacy of the protection and enforcement of human rights offered” by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Commission), the treaty body responsible 
for supervising the implementation of the ACHPRs.
1089
 The Commission has no power to 
make legally binding decisions and its decisions amount to nothing more than 
recommendations. It thus lacks power to award or order compensation to victims of human 
rights abuse.
1090
 In the words of Udombana: “The Commission stands as a toothless bulldog. 
The Commission can bark- it is, in fact barking. It was not, however, created to bite.”1091 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) was established through 
adoption by the African heads of state and government of the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR Protocol), which was adopted on 9 June 1998 in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso.
1092
 The ACHPR Protocol entered into force in January 2004. 
The ACtHPR was established to complement the protective mandate of the Commission.
1093
  
Its material jurisdiction extends to the interpretation and application of the ACHPR, the 
ACHPR Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by concerned 
states.
1094
 Presumably this includes human rights treaties agreed at sub-regional level. 
In terms of personal jurisdiction, the Court is accessible to the following entities: 
(a) The Commission; 
(b) The state party which has lodged a complaint to the Commission; 
(c) The state party against which the complaint has been lodged  at the Commission; 
(d) The state party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation; 
(e) African intergovernmental organisations.1095 
As can be seen, this list excludes individuals from direct access to the Court. Individuals and 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), however, may still access the Court, but only 
where the concerned member state has made a declaration to this effect when ratifying the 
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ACHPR Protocol.
1096
 In order for an NGO to access the Court, it must have observer status 
with the Court.
1097
  In the Association Juristes D’Afrique Pour La Bonne Gouvernance1098  
case the Court partly dismissed the case because the applicant organisation did not have 
observer status before the Court. 
Conditioning individuals’ access to the Court on state declaration is probably the biggest 
challenge to the effectiveness of the Court. Individuals (and groups) are usually the victims of 
human rights violations, and, therefore, would naturally be in the forefront to vindicate their 
rights. Subjecting the vindication of their rights to state declarations means that in practice 
many victims will not have a chance to present their cases before the Court. 
This has been the experience of the ACtHPR so far. Of the 26 member states, only a paltry 
six
1099
 have made declarations allowing their nationals and NGOs access to the Court.
1100
 The 
Court has actually reported that the majority of cases it has received have been brought by 
individuals whose states have not given the requisite declaration.
1101
 Lacking declaration 
from a concerned state is fatal to a case. This was the fate of the first case that confronted the 
ACtHPR. In the Michelot Yogogombaye
1102
 case, the applicant sought, inter alia, to prevent 
the former Chadian leader, Hissein Habre, from prosecution for crimes against humanity by 
Senegal on the basis that it was a retroactive prosecution contrary to the ACHPR. The Court 
held that since Senegal, the concerned state in this case, had not made the requisite 
declaration, it thus lacked jurisdiction to determine the case.
1103
 
The ACtHPR is composed of eleven judges who are nationals of AU member states, but 
elected in individual capacity, from among jurists of high moral standing and recognised 
competence in the field of human and peoples’ rights.1104  The judges are elected by the AU 
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General Assembly by secret ballot, taking into account and ensuring that the Court as a whole 
there is representation of the main regions and their principal legal traditions as well as 
adequate gender representation.
1105
  
Judges are ordinarily elected for a period of six years. However, the terms of four judges 
from the first set of judges expired at the end of two years and the terms of another four 
judges expired after four years.
1106
 The varying of terms of office of judges ensures that the 
terms of judges do not all expire at the same time. A judge of the ACtHPR cannot be 
suspended or removed from office unless the concerned judge has been found to be no longer 
fulfilling the requisite conditions to be a judge by a unanimous decision of the Court.
1107
 The 
seat of the Court is Arusha, Tanzania. 
Although the ACtHPR does not have express jurisdiction over electoral disputes, election 
disputes alleging violation of recognised human rights could still reach the Court. Such was 
the case in Mtikila,
1108
 where Mtikila, the applicant, challenged the Tanzanian Constitutional 
amendment restricting presidential candidacy to those sponsored by political parties, thereby 
excluding independent candidates.
1109
 The applicant, inter alia, alleged violation of the right 
to political participation as enshrined under the ACHPR. The Court found for the applicant 
and ruled that the restriction or prohibition of independent candidates was not proportional to 
the alleged aim of fostering national unity and was, therefore, a violation of the right to 
participate freely in the government of one’s country.1110 The Tanzanian government 
responded positively to this decision and omitted the impugned provision in its draft 
constitution, which shall be subjected to a referendum in April 2015. 
The second continental court established in Africa is the African Court of Justice (ACJ). The 
Court was established by the Constitutive Act of the AU and in July 2003 the AU Assembly 
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adopted the Protocol on the Court of Justice of the African Union.
1111
  The ACJ was 
established as the principal judicial organ of the AU.
1112
 
However, before the ACJ was inaugurated, the AU in July 2004 decided to merge the 
ACtHPR with the ACJ,
1113
 in order to create one continental court, the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). In 2008, the AU adopted the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
1114
  together with the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights (annexed to the Protocol), which formally merged the two 
Courts. 
There are several justifications given in support of the merger. These include the need to 
avoid splitting the already stretched human and financial resources towards supporting two 
courts; the need to avoid proliferation of international judicial institutions with overlapping 
mandates; and the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting jurisprudence from two 
continental courts.
1115
 
The ACtHPR will continue to operate and its judges will continue in office until the judges of 
the ACJHR are sworn in and take office.
1116
  Cases pending before the ACtHPR that would 
not have been concluded at the time of transitioning into the new merged Court will be 
transferred to the Human Rights Section of the ACJHR.
1117
 
The ACJHR is established as the main judicial organ of the AU.
1118
 It is composed of 16 
judges, with each geographical region of the continent, where possible, represented by three 
judges, except the Western Region, which shall have four judges.
1119
 Judges are elected from 
among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their country, or are jurists of recognised 
competence and experienced in international law and human rights law.
1120
  Each state party 
may nominate up to two candidates, taking into account gender representation. The 
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Chairperson of the AU Commission, from the nominated persons, draws two lists of 
candidates. One list (list A) contains the names of candidates with recognised competence in 
international law, while the second list (list B) contains the names of candidates with 
recognised competence in human rights law.
1121
 Judges are then elected by the Executive 
Council and formally appointed by the AU Assembly.
1122
  
Judges are elected for a period of six years and may be re-elected for one more term. The 
term of office of eight judges (four from each section of the court) from the first set of judges 
is designed to last four years.
1123
 All the judges, except the President and the Vice President, 
shall serve on a part-time basis.
1124
 A judge of the ACJHR shall not be suspended or removed 
from office, except on the recommendation of two-thirds majority of other judges on a 
finding that the concerned judge no longer meets the requisite conditions to be judge.
1125
 The 
Court and the judges, in performance of judicial functions, shall not be subject to the 
direction or control of any person or body.
1126
 
The ACJHR has two sections. These are the General Affairs Section composed of eight 
judges and the Human Rights Section composed of the remaining eight other judges.
1127
 
Although this is the current status, as shall be discussed below, the AU adopted another 
Protocol in 2014 that increases the sections of the Court to three. The 2014 Protocol is 
however, not yet in force. The Human Rights Section is competent to hear all cases relating 
to human and/or peoples’ rights while the General Affairs Section hears all other cases the 
Court is competent to hear.
1128
 The ACJHR has not yet become operational as the required 
minimum number of 15 ratifications to trigger it into operation has not been reached. By of 
end of February 2014, only five states had ratified the Protocol on the ACJHR.
1129
 These are 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Libya and Mali.
1130
 
The material jurisdiction of the ACJHR is set out in Article 28, which clothes the Court with 
competence to adjudicate on the following: 
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(a) The interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act; 
(b) The interpretation, application or validity of other Union Treaties and all subsidiary legal 
instruments adopted within the framework of the Union or the OAU; 
(c) The interpretation and application of  the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, the  Protocol to the African Charter on human and Peoples’ Rights of Women in 
Africa, or any other legal instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the state parties 
concerned; 
(d) Any question relating to international law; 
(e) All acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the Union; 
(f) All matters specifically provided for in any other agreement that states parties may conclude 
among themselves, or with the Union and which confer jurisdiction on the Court; 
(g) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an obligation 
owed to a state party or to the Union; 
(h) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.
1131
 
Although the Court’s competence to adjudicate over ACDEG, for example, is not expressly 
stated, it can be assumed to be competent to adjudicate on disputes relating to its provisions 
considering that it has jurisdiction over “other Union Treaties and subsidiary legal 
instruments.”1132  
In terms of personal jurisdiction, there are two sets of entities entitled to bring disputes before 
the Court. The first list opens the Court to state parties to the Protocol; the Assembly, 
Parliament and other AU organs; and AU employees in relation to labour disputes.
1133
 These 
can bring cases relating to the general material jurisdiction of the Court. 
The second list is for entities that can bring human rights violation cases before the Court. 
These are: 
(a) State parties to the Protocol; 
(b) The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; 
(c) The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; 
(d) African Intergovernmental Organisations accredited to the Union or its organs; 
(e) African National Human Rights Institutions; 
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(f) Individuals or relevant Non-Governmental Organisations accredited to the African Union or 
its organs, subject to Article 8 of the Protocol.
1134
  
As was with the ACtHPR, access of individuals and NGOs to the ACJHR is subject to the 
concerned state making a declaration to that effect. The challenges concomitant with this 
mechanism have already been discussed in relation to the ACtHPR. 
The ACJHR has a time limit within which to render a decision after hearing a case. It is 
required to give its judgement within 90 days of completing the hearing.
1135
  The decision of 
the Court shall be made by the majority of judges present.
1136
  However, where the judgment 
does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of judges, any judge is entitled 
to deliver a separate or dissenting opinion.
1137
  
Decisions of the ACJHR are final and binding on the parties. The parties are supposed to 
comply with the decisions of the Court within the time stipulated by the Court.
1138
 Where a 
party has failed to comply with a judgment, the Court is required to refer the matter to the AU 
Assembly, which should decide upon the measures to be taken to enforce the judgment. The 
Assembly may impose sanctions for failure to comply with a decision of the Court.
1139
  
It should be noted that the relationship between the ACJHR with national courts is not 
indicated anywhere in the ACJHR Protocol. This could be problematic when it comes to the 
execution of the decisions of the Court at national level, as only national courts are available 
on the ground to directly enforce its decisions. There is equally no indication of the 
supremacy or superiority of the ACJHR’s decisions in relation to matters where both itself 
and national courts have jurisdiction. However, considering that it is an established principle 
in public international law that states cannot plead inconsistence with their laws in defence of 
failure to comply with international obligations, it can thus be assumed that decisions of the 
ACJHR would take precedence over those of national courts. This also dovetails with the 
supranational aspirations of the African people through the AU. 
While this exposition represents the current status of the AU judicial framework in terms of 
treaties in force, there was a major development in 2014, when the African leaders decided to 
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cloth the ACJHR with criminal jurisdiction. This was done through the adoption of the 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (the 2014 Protocol) on 27 June 2014. The Protocol is yet to come into force. 
The development is largely in response to the indictment and trial of African leaders at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The African leaders’ mobilisation against the ICC began 
in reaction to the ICC indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir in 2009
1140
 for 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, and gained momentum with the 
indictment and trial of Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta and his vice, William Ruto for 
crimes against humanity since 2011.
1141
 The ICC, however, withdrew the charges against 
Uhuru on 5 December 2014.
1142
 
The 2014 Protocol renames the ACJHR as the African Court of Justice and Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR).1143  The Protocol vests the court with jurisdiction over 
international crimes.
1144
 The international crimes over which the court shall have jurisdiction 
are: 
 Genocide; 
 Crimes against humanity; 
 War crimes; 
 The crime of unconstitutional change of government; 
 Piracy; 
 Terrorism; 
 Trafficking in persons; 
 Trafficking in drugs; 
 Trafficking in hazardous wastes; 
 Illicit exploitation of natural resources; and 
 The crime of aggression.1145 
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Each of the listed crimes is further defined in the Protocol. But of interest to this research is 
the crime of unconstitutional change of government, which is defined further in the following 
terms: 
For the purposes of this statute, unconstitutional change of government means committing or 
ordering to be committed the following acts, with the aim of illegally accessing or 
maintaining power: 
a) A putsch or coup d’état against a democratically elected government; 
b) An intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; 
c) Any replacement of a democratically elected government by the use of armed 
dissidents or rebels or through political assassination; 
d) Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or 
candidate after free, fair and regular elections; 
e) Any amendment or revision of the Constitution or legal instruments, which is an 
infringement on the principles of democratic change of government or is inconsistent 
with the Constitution; 
f) Any substantial modification of the electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the 
elections without the consent of the majority of the political actors.
1146
 
These grounds of what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government are the same as 
those listed under ACDEG, except for ground (f) which is a new inclusion and seems to have 
been borrowed from the ECOWAS Governance Protocol discussed above. The decision by 
African leaders to prosecute unconstitutional changes of government as an international 
crime could be taken as fulfilling a growing desire of African peoples to ensure that Africa is 
rid of governments that ascend to power unconstitutionally. This then reinforces the 
importance of democratic elections as the sole legal basis for ascending into power in Africa. 
This notwithstanding, there are at least two points that need to be noted as they might militate 
against this development. 
First, while prosecuting those assuming office unconstitutionally might be a positive 
development, it leads to an anomaly. That is, it creates a situation where alleged perpetrators 
of unconstitutional change of government may be tried but there is at the same time no forum 
for those alleging, for example that the election was stolen by the incumbent, to seek redress. 
When an election is disputed, it is usually difficult to determine who truly won without a 
credible adjudication process. This is more significant, especially in relation to ground (d) of 
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unconstitutional change of government which relates to an incumbent refusing to relinquish 
power having lost an election. Where there are competing claims about who won, as was the 
case, in Kenya in 2007, there would be no basis for determining if an incumbent holds power 
legitimately unless there is first a determination of who won the election. 
The second point to note is that the 2014 Protocol provides for the prosecution of those who 
come into office unconstitutionally. Where the unconstitutionality alleged relates to disputed 
elections, such leaders will in reality not be prosecuted as the 2014 statute offers them 
immunity. The Protocol provides incumbent African leaders immunity in the following 
terms: 
No charge shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU 
Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or 
other state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.
1147
 
It was noted in chapter three that in many African countries, the president elect is promptly 
sworn into office, usually within 24 hours of the results being declared. Assuming the 
candidate announced as winner by the EMB is not really the winner but the declaration was 
orchestrated by the incumbent through coercion, threats or fraud, such a president clearly 
assumes office unconstitutionally. But once sworn into office, such a person becomes a 
sitting head of state and/or government and thus entitled to immunity from prosecution. 
Article 46B (2), however, states that “the official position of an accused person shall not 
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” This suggests that 
those who assume office unconstitutionally still face the prospect of prosecution after leaving 
office. This, however, carries with it the potential danger that such leaders may want to cling 
to power in perpetuity in order to avoid prosecution once they are out of office. 
In order to accommodate the criminal jurisdiction of the Court, changes have been made to 
the structure (sections) of the court, as well as the appointment and qualifications of judges. 
In addition to the General Affairs as well as the Human and Peoples’ Rights sections, a third 
section called the International Criminal Law Section
1148
 has been added which shall have 
primary responsibility over prosecution and adjudication of international crimes. When it 
comes to the appointment of judges, instead of just the two lists discussed above, there is an 
additional third list (list C) which shall contain names of candidates having expertise in 
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international criminal law.
1149
 Judges to the International Criminal Court Section of the Court 
shall then be elected from this list. 
In order to cater for the specific needs of criminal trials, the 2014 statute creates two new 
offices. These are the Office of the Prosecutor,
1150
 which shall be responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of international crimes, as well as the Defence Office which 
shall be responsible for ensuring respect for “the rights of suspects and accused and any other 
person entitled to legal assistance.”1151 
This overview of the continental judicial framework reveals at least four things in relation to 
supranational adjudication. The first point to note is that there is an existing judicial 
framework in place. The framework, however, is still relatively young and at the same time 
undergoing restructuring, following the merger of the ACtHPR with the ACJ to form the 
ACJHPR, and the adoption of the 2014 Protocol, which confers criminal jurisdiction on the 
court. Second, access of individuals to the ACJHPR is constrained by the requirement of state 
declaration. Although this could have been designed as an incentive to encourage ratification 
by states, it is at the same time constraining the Court from being fully supranational and 
relevant to individuals in member states. There can be no supranational adjudication where 
individuals have no access to an international court. 
Third, the ACJHPR, as well as the  two courts it subsumed, has no clear or express mandate 
to enforce the continental electoral and democratic normative frameworks (such as ACDEG). 
It was noted in the preceding chapter that ACDEG lacks an efficient enforcement mechanism. 
Giving the Court express mandate over the continental electoral and democratic norms would 
help mitigate the weak enforcement mechanism for ACDEG and other democratic norms. 
Fourth and finally, ACJHPR and its two predecessors, lack a clear indication of how to relate 
with national courts and sub-regional courts. Without a clear indication of relations with 
national courts, it is difficult to see how decisions of the Court could legally be enforced at 
national level. The lack of clarity with sub-regional courts could also be problematic for 
concerned states in situations where the continental and the sub-regional courts develop 
contradictory or inconsistent jurisprudence. Which one should a state follow? It could, 
however, be argued that since RECs are building blocks for  ultimate continental integration, 
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the promulgation of the Constitutive Act heralds an era where the AU institutions will 
supersede sub-regional and national institutions. In that case decisions of the AU courts will 
supersede those of sub-regional ones. 
In order to transform the current judicial framework into a fully-fledged supranational 
adjudication judicial framework, that can be counted on to support the resolution of 
presidential election disputes in Africa, it is suggested that the following two elements must 
be attended to: 
(a) The material and personal jurisdiction of the Court; and 
(b) Cooperation mechanism with national courts and sub-regional courts 
With regard to the first element (material and personal jurisdiction), it has already been noted 
that the ACJHPR does not have express jurisdiction to hear and determine electoral disputes 
in member states. The Court, however, has jurisdiction over the interpretation and application 
of “other Union Treaties and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the framework 
of the Union.”1152  This arguably includes all the binding AU electoral and democratic 
normative frameworks. If that were the case, it would mean the ACJHPR already has 
jurisdiction to hear and determine electoral disputes that would allege violation of AU 
normative frameworks like ACDEG. 
However, giving the Court express jurisdiction in the Court Protocol could arguably be 
advantageous as it would remove any ambiguity and clearly indicate how the Court should go 
about in resolving such disputes. It would also be advantageous in that it would possibly give 
the Court jurisdiction in electoral matters where a concerned state would have ratified the 
Court Protocol but not the democratic frameworks like ACDEG. This approach is affirmed in 
the jurisprudence of both the EACJ and the ECOWAS Court.
1153
  
However, even if the Court was clothed with jurisdiction over electoral matters, it would be 
of little use if individuals and civil society organisations had no direct access to it. Electoral 
disputes affect individuals and political parties. It is the nature of political disputes that 
claims would almost always be brought by the losing party or individuals. That being the 
case, it is unlikely that a government occupied by the ‘winning’ party would bring a case, 
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effectively against itself at the international level in order to vindicate the rights and claims of 
the ‘losing’ party or individual. That would make the concerned state both claimant and 
defendant in the same suit. The only way out of this quagmire is to allow individuals and civil 
society organisations (including political parties) unconstrained access to the Court, without 
the encumbrance of requiring state declarations.  
This proposal could be open to criticism that it risks opening the proverbial flood-gates as the 
Court would be inundated with elections disputes. While it is true that there would definitely 
be an increase in the case docket of the Court, the cases would at the same time be limited as 
the AU has a limited number of member states. With just 54 member states having elections 
approximately every five years means that at most there could only be about 10 election 
petitions per year. However, it is unlikely that every election would lead to a petition. It is 
also possible that even if a lot of presidential elections lead to petitions in the short and 
medium term, in the long run the number of petitions may reduce. Once the Court’s 
legitimacy is established and its jurisprudence settles down, national courts may start 
rendering more courageous and satisfactory decisions in line with the continental court and 
municipal institutions may begin adjusting to the continental standards. If this were to 
happen, the need to escalate disputes to the continental level may diminish. 
The second element that would require attention is the cooperation mechanism between the 
ACJHPR on the one hand with the national and sub-regional courts on the other hand. This 
would first of all require clarification on the status and primacy of ACJHPR decisions in 
national courts. Naturally decisions of a supranational court take precedence over those of 
national courts (and presumably over sub-regional courts). This would need to be expressly 
stated in the Court Protocol. 
It was seen when reviewing sub-regional courts that they generally allow for local courts to 
refer cases to sub-regional courts, and the latter directly depend on the former for 
enforcement of its decisions. In the case of the ECOWAS Court, the EACJ and the COMESA 
Court of Justice, their decisions are enforced as if they were rendered by national courts. In 
the case of the OHADA Court, it is set up as an appellate Court of member states. The 
ACJHR could adopt the approaches of these courts. Local courts handling election disputes, 
for example, could refer cases to the ACJHPR. 
The complication would still remain with regard to sub-regional courts, which in the 
supranational hierarchy could be considered as being in between national courts and the 
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continental court. Perhaps the puzzle can be resolved by applying the principle of 
subsidiarity. Subsidiarity in its basic sense denotes that “decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to citizens [...].”1154  Its objective is to ensure that social problems are dealt with at 
the most immediate or local level and only referred to the higher body if not resolved 
satisfactorily at the lower level.
1155
 
Applying the subsidiarity principle would require that when electoral disputes arise, national 
courts would take the first bite. Where sub-regional courts are empowered to hear and 
determine electoral disputes, then nationals and civil society organisations from concerned 
member states should be allowed to move the sub-regional courts to hear their cases when not 
satisfied with decisions of national courts. Where sub-regional courts lack this mandate, cases 
could then move directly to the ACJHPR. This suggested approach means there will be two 
mechanisms by which the supranational court will relate with national and sub-regional 
courts. These are by way of reference and by way of ‘appeal.’ The system of references may, 
if effective, even reduce cases that reach the ACJHPR by way of ‘appeal’. 
In order for the suggested mechanisms to be of benefit, there would be need for clear time 
limits and speedy resolution of disputes at every level. The ACJHPR is already enjoined to 
render a judgment within 90 days of completing the hearing of a case.
1156
 Perhaps what needs 
to be added to this is the need to also limit the time within which a case can be heard. 
As can be seen so far, the suggestion for supranational adjudication over electoral disputes 
does not propose the creation of a brand new court. Rather, the suggestion is to improve and 
expand the mandate of the existing judicial framework. The ACJHPR already has three 
sections, that is, the General Affairs Section, the Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
International Criminal Law Section.
1157
  To accommodate supranational adjudication over 
electoral disputes, it may not be necessary to create a new Democracy and Elections Section. 
The General Affairs Section could be assigned to handle election disputes. What may be 
required would be to ensure appointing at least some of judges with expertise in the 
continental democratic framework to the General Affairs Section. In that way, the expansion 
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of the mandate of the ACJHPR to cover elections disputes would not require stretching 
further the already stretched material and personnel resources of the Court.  
Before leaving this section, a word could be said on how supranational adjudication would 
work in countries like Morocco, Swaziland and Lesotho which practice the monarchical 
system of governance. With regard to Morocco, although geographically located on the 
African continent, it is not a member of the AU, as noted in the second chapter. It is, 
therefore, not bound by AU democratic normative standards. Swaziland and Lesotho, 
however, are states parties to the AU Constitutive Act and hence members of the AU.
1158
 
Lesotho is also a state party to ACDEG while Swaziland is yet to ratify the treaty.
1159
 
Although by not ratifying ACDEG, Swaziland is not bound by its provisions, to the extent 
that ACDEG articulates norms found in the Constitutive Act, which have been discussed 
above,  then Swaziland is bound. Moreover, Swaziland could still ratify ACDEG in future 
and be bound directly by its standards. In any case, both Lesotho and Swaziland are states 
parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter) and are bound by 
democratic norms enshrined in there. Assuming that supranational adjudication over AU 
democratic norms comes into force as advocated here; does it necessarily mean the end of the 
hereditary monarchical system of governance? It is submitted that it is not necessary to 
abolish hereditary monarchy system of governance in order to comply with requirements for 
democratic governance. What may be required, as noted when discussing Lesotho above, is 
that the monarch may remain with nominal and largely ceremonial powers while there ought 
to be an elected government that shall be responsible for routine running of government. An 
absolute monarch allowing for no or little participation of the people in the selection of their 
governors is manifestly at variance with democratic norms set in the Charter and the AU 
Constitutive Act. Lesotho already has a system for an elective government headed by a 
democratically elected prime minister. Swaziland will have to develop along the same lines. 
5.6 Possible Relationships with Other AU Organs 
The ACJHPR is not the only organ of the AU. The AU has many other organs which are 
dedicated to the realisation of the AU objectives in various ways. These various organs are: 
 The Assembly of the Union; 
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 The Executive Council; 
 The Pan- African Parliament; 
 The Commission; 
 The Permanent Representatives Committee; 
 The Specialised Technical Committees; 
 The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and 
 The Financial Institutions.1160 
Although all these organs are important as they are designed to assist in the realisation of the 
objectives of the Union, there are however four organs that either have or can potentially play 
a significant role in the life and operation of the Court. These are the Assembly of the Union 
(the Assembly), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), 
and the AU Commission. This is due to the fact that the current or prospective mandates of 
these institutions have direct relevance and possible influence on the work of the Court. 
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the Union.
1161
 It is composed of heads of state and 
government of member states.
1162
  The Assembly meets at least once in ordinary session. It 
may, however, meet in ordinary session at the request of a member state, provided that that 
request is approved by two-thirds of the members.
1163
 
The Assembly is vested with numerous powers and functions.
1164
  At least three of these 
powers have a direct or indirect relationship with the Court. The first is that the Assembly is 
tasked with responsibility to “monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the 
Union as well as ensure compliance by all member states.”1165 Arguably, the decisions and 
policies of the Union the Assembly has to ensure implementation and compliance with are 
not just those of the Assembly itself. The “Union” is constituted by its organs.  This, 
therefore, would mean that the decisions of the Court would fall within those decisions of the 
Union the Assembly has power to ensure concerned member states adhere to. Thus, if the 
Court were given power to adjudicate disputed presidential elections, the Assembly would 
have the power and responsibility to ensure compliance with the decisions of the Court. 
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Tasking the Assembly with the responsibility to ensure compliance with decisions of the 
Court in elections cases could be a double edged sword. In one sense, having the supreme 
organ of the Union perform this role raises the profile of the Court and could possibly help to 
ensure the decisions of the Court are taken seriously. On the other hand, the Assembly, 
composed of heads of member states, is a political body that may take a ‘diplomatic’ 
approach to the implementation of the decisions of the Court and instead negotiate 
compromises. Thus, where a Court may rule in favour of one candidate, the Assembly may 
instead decide, for example, to set up a “Power-Sharing government.” The SADC heads of 
member states’ response to the Campbell case discussed above could be an extreme example 
of that possibility of compromise. However, if the Assembly takes a robust stand to 
implement elections decisions of the Court, akin to the way the AU has taken strong positions 
against military coups since 2003, then that would give great effectiveness to the work of the 
Court. 
The second function of the Assembly relevant to the life of the Court is that of adopting the 
budget of the whole Union.
1166
 The relevance of this function requires little explanation. 
Without allocation of adequate funds, the Court cannot function efficiently and effectively 
and cases could stall. 
Finally, the Assembly has the power to “appoint and terminate the appointment of the judges 
of the Court of Justice.”1167 The appointment and removal of judges, as noted already, is an 
important ingredient of the independence of any Court. A transparent, fair and legitimate 
appointment and removal process enhances the stature and independence of the Court and 
potentially the quality of justice the Court dispenses. The Assembly’s power of appointment 
and removal, therefore, has potential to influence the quality of the justice that will be 
dispensed by the Court. It is suggested that the appointment and removal process of judges 
under ECOWAS is preferable and the AU should consider adopting it. If that fails, the task 
could be entrusted to the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), which will ultimately be the 
peoples’ representative. 
The second institution that has potential relevance to the work of the ACJHPR is the Pan-
African Parliament (PAP). PAP is provided for both under the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community (1991) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
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(2000).
1168
 However, the actual Protocol Establishing PAP
1169
 was only adopted in 2001, and 
entered into force in 2003. PAP was formally launched in March 2004 and its seat is in South 
Africa. In 2014 the AU adopted a Protocol to replace the 2001 Protocol Establishing PAP.
1170
  
The 2014 Protocol has not yet entered in force. 
PAP was established to “represent all peoples of Africa”1171 and its ultimate aim “shall be to 
evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by 
universal suffrage.”1172 However, until the member states decide otherwise, PAP for the time 
being only has consultative and advisory powers.
1173
 
All AU member states have equal representation in the PAP and each is represented by five 
members, at least one of whom should be a woman.
1174
  Members of PAP are currently 
elected or designated from the members of National Parliaments and the tenure of office runs 
concurrently with their term of office in their National Parliaments.
1175
  The 2014 Protocol, 
however, requires that of the five members from each member state, at least two shall be 
women,
1176
  and that the members shall be elected from outside the membership of the 
National Parliaments.
1177
 PAP members are required to vote in their personal and 
independent capacity and not representatives of their states. 
Although PAP was established to ultimately exercise full legislative authority, it was 
determined that this was to be done incrementally and, therefore, PAP started its first term as 
an advisory and consultative forum.
1178
 Its functions include discussing matters relating to 
respect for human rights and consolidation of democracy; discussion of its budget and that of 
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the Union; working towards the harmonisation of the laws of member states; and working 
towards the harmonisation of policies and activities of Regional Economic Communities.
1179
  
The 2014 Protocol takes minor steps towards making PAP a truly legislative body. It names it 
unconditionally as the legislative organ of the Union.
1180
 In exercising this power, the 
Assembly has power to determine which areas PAP shall focus on and propose model laws. 
PAP is also free to propose model laws and recommendations to the Assembly.
1181
 The 
language of the Protocol (2014) is unambiguous that PAP can only recommend and, 
therefore, does not have definitive powers over legislation. It is thus still far from being a 
fully developed legislative body even under the 2014 Protocol. 
Parliaments are symbols of democracy as they ideally represent popular democracy, provide 
oversight over public resources and hold the executive branch in check. Through parliament, 
the people are able to influence how they are governed. PAP in its current form is clearly 
constrained from performing this role. As Walraven has rightly observed in relation to the 
current functions and powers of PAP: 
The powers are essentially external: they relate to what is happening in member states or 
outside bodies, not to the internal functioning of the Union and its organs. Arguably, what 
makes for a real parliament are control of the budget and supervision of the executive.
1182
 
More specifically, in relation with PAP’s legislative and budget oversight, the 2014 Protocol 
categorically exempts the Assembly and the Court from the powers and functions of the 
PAP.
1183
 As it is, there is very little, if not nothing, linking PAP and the Court. It is suggested 
here that PAP should have power over the Union budget, including allocation of budgets to 
the Court. PAP could also be assigned some role in the appointment process of judges. It 
could have the role of vetting applicants and passing their names to the Assembly for formal 
appointment. Removing these functions from the Council and Assembly and assigning them 
to PAP potentially mean that the Assembly is deprived of tools that could be used in reprisal 
against the Court or to unduly control the Court. Thus heads of state, whose elections may be 
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challenged before the Court, would not have the power to choose the judges who may 
determine their legitimacy to hold power. 
The suggested role of PAP in the appointment of judges reflects what obtains in other well 
established independent supranational tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council of Europe (the Assembly) is 
responsible for electing judges of the ECHR.
1184
 It follows a process which requires that 
vacancies are openly advertised in wide circulating media in concerned member states. 
Applicants are then shortlisted and interviewed by a special parliamentary committee to 
ensure they meet the minimum qualifications. Thereafter, the Assembly proceeds to vote on 
the candidates in a secret ballot.
1185
 
The third organ of the AU which has potential relevance to the work of the Court is the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC), established through the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) of the African Union of 9 
July 2002.
1186
  It was created as a “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts” and that it shall be “a collective security and early-
warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations 
in Africa.”1187  
The PSC is composed of 15 members elected by the Assembly on the basis of equitable 
regional representation and rotation.
1188
  The functions of the PSC are stated as: 
a. Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; 
b. Early warning and preventive diplomacy; 
c. Peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and inquiry; 
d. Peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to Article 4(h) and (j) of the 
Constitutive Act; 
e. Peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; 
f. Humanitarian action and disaster management; and  
g. Any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.1189 
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Although none of these functions indicate a clear relationship between the PSC and the 
Court, there is a possibility of a relationship between the two organs. The PSC has power to 
“institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a 
member state.”1190  It should be recalled that an unconstitutional change of government can 
be committed by an incumbent refusing to relinquish power having lost an election. In the 
event that the Court is granted jurisdiction over disputed presidential elections, as proposed 
under this research, and the Court finds against the incumbent in an election petition, but the 
incumbent refuses to abdicate, this should trigger the role of the PSC. This is because the 
refusal would be a clear unconstitutional change of government. Thus the PSC has a 
potentially significant role in ensuring the enforcement of the Court’s decisions in disputed 
election petitions by instituting sanctions against regimes that may disregard judgments of the 
Court and as a result hold power unconstitutionally. 
The fourth and final organ of the AU that has relevance to the mandate of the Court is the AU 
Commission. It was established as the secretariat of the Union and replaces the former OAU 
secretariat seated in Ethiopia.
1191
 The Commission is composed of the chairperson, the deputy 
chairperson and eight other commissioners.
1192
 The tenure of office for the members of the 
Commission is four years, renewable once.
1193
 
The Commission is assigned more than 30 functions relating to the routine management of 
the affairs of the Union.
1194
 Of all those functions, the following may impact the operations of 
the Court: 
a. Initiate proposals for consideration by other organs; 
b. Implement the decisions taken by other organs; 
c. Coordinate and monitor the implementation of the other organs of the Union; 
d. Prepare the Union’s programmes and budget for approval by policy organs; and  
e. Manage the budgetary and financial resources including collecting the approved 
revenues from various sources.
1195
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These functions can be clustered into three categories: a) initiating proposals for 
consideration by other organs; b) implementing and supporting the implementation of 
decisions made by other organs of the Union; and c) preparing and managing the budget and 
financial resources of the Union. The Commission’s mandate to initiate proposals for 
consideration by other organs places it in a strategic position to raise the recommendations of 
this research of introducing supranational adjudication of disputed presidential elections. The 
Commission could potentially play a cardinal role in advocating for reform of the mandate of 
the continental Court in order to allow it resolve disputed presidential elections. 
The second cluster relates to the implementation of the decisions of other organs of the AU. 
This implies that the Commission will have a role in the implementation of the decisions of 
other organs of the Union and presumably this includes judgments of the Court. In order to 
do this, the Commission would have to collaborate with the concerned member states as well 
as other AU organs such as the PSC and the Assembly. 
The third cluster relates to the management of budgets and finances of the Union. In order for 
the Court to receive sufficient funds to ensure it carries out its mandate efficiently and 
effectively, it needs a Commission that is convinced and appreciates its role and sees the need 
to allocate the Court adequate funds. Although the Commission can only plan and propose 
the budget figures, an indication of the need for sufficient funding to the Court by the 
Commission could be persuasive and influence the Assembly to approve the funding. 
Although the Commission has wide functions that could contribute to the welfare and stature 
of the Court, its powers are limited. The AU is still largely an intergovernmental organisation 
whose key decisions are made by political representatives of member states through organs 
such as the Assembly. This effectively means that even if the Commission may be well 
intentioned about something, if it is at variance with the wishes of the Assembly or if there is 
no consensus in the Assembly, the good intentions of the Commission will most likely not 
materialise. 
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5.7 Criticism Against Supranational Adjudication 
Supranational adjudication is not a perfect venture. Like every significant undertaking, it has 
its own challenges. The major criticisms of supranational adjudication have usually been 
around the following three ideas: 
 That supranational adjudication is expensive as international tribunals  need a lot of 
resources to run; 
 That supranational adjudication can unwittingly be a danger to international 
cooperation;   
 That supranational adjudication is ill-equipped to solve underlying issues that gave 
rise to a legal dispute; and 
 That supranational adjudication may scare away many states from ratifying or 
acceding to human rights and democratic governance norms. 
The first major criticism of supranational adjudication relates to costs, that supranational or 
international tribunals are extremely expensive and gobble resources that could be applied in 
other needy areas. The expenses of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are usually 
given as examples. Within the first ten years of their existence, the two tribunals were 
consuming more than USD250 million per year, which constituted about 15 percent of the 
United Nations general budget.
1196
 The ICTY alone is estimated to have been spending about 
USD10 million per defendant,
1197
 and collectively, within the first eight years both tribunals 
had gobbled more than USD1.6 billion.
1198
 
Considering these figures, and taking into account that many organs of the AU are 
persistently underfunded, partly due to many member states who routinely default on their 
annual contributions to the organisation,
1199
the arguments to forego establishing 
supranational tribunals on account of costs look persuasive. However, it can be argued, to the 
contrary, that securing peaceful resolution of electoral disputes through a legitimate process 
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of adjudication cannot be too expensive as compared to the price states would pay if disputed 
elections led to the eruption of violence and instability. In any case, this research, as noted 
above, does not propose the creation of a new AU court but simply to expand the mandate of 
the existing court. 
The second criticism against supranational adjudication is that it may inadvertently engender 
conflict between states and endanger international cooperation. Adjudication by its nature 
leads to the passing of a legally binding decision which may require other states to act against 
another state in order to enforce the decision. This view has been strenuously argued by 
Posner and Yoo. According to the two authors, supranational adjudication is simply an 
attempt to submit international politics to judicial powers and the tyranny of the judges.
1200
 In 
their view, independent supranational tribunals have a weaker incentive to serve the interests 
of states “and are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives...to influence 
their judgment.”1201 The authors are of the view that instead, states should choose from a 
wide range of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms such as diplomacy, mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration in order to resolve disputes.
1202
 They argue that states will 
ultimately evaluate their cooperation with the tribunal and either opt out of such a tribunal or 
significantly water down its powers.  
It is not clear why interests of an independent supranational tribunal are considered at 
variance with the interests of states. Equally, supranational adjudication is not mutually 
exclusive with other non-contentious traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. However, 
looking at what happened to the SADC Tribunal in the aftermath of the Campbell case, one 
could be tempted to agree with Posner and Yoo. President Jakaya Kikwete’s words, that “we 
have created a monster that will devour us,”1203 would seem to render further credence to this 
view.  But a nuanced reading of the Campbell case as noted above clearly indicates that the 
judges acted within the confines of the SADC Treaty and not in pursuit of moral, personal 
interests or ideological imperatives of their own. 
The third criticism of supranational adjudication is directly related to the second one. It 
argues that supranational adjudication is “at variance with the main purpose of dispute 
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settlement.”1204 This is because adjudication is considered as ill-equipped to settle underlying 
problems that gave rise to the legal dispute and instead focuses more on answering legal 
questions and clarifying the law.
1205
 Adjudication is further seen as an escalation of a dispute 
as it implies failure to amicably settle a dispute. It is argued that diplomatic approaches are 
more appropriate to resolving disputes than resort to adjudication.
1206
 
This argument is somewhat self-negating. If adjudication is seen as an indication of failure to 
resolve disputes amicably, it surely suggests that there may be disputes bitterly contested and 
thus impervious to amicable resolution. Thus it would not make much sense to remit such 
cases back to diplomatic mechanisms. Even at municipal level, alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms have not displaced the need for litigation and adjudication. It is, however, 
conceded that the nature of adjudication is to resolve disputes on the basis of reasoned legal 
argument, based on evidence, predetermined procedural rules and law. This may not 
necessarily address the underlying historical, institutional and political factors that gave rise 
to a dispute. However, there is nothing about adjudication that would prevent addressing 
those underlying factors in addition to adjudication. If anything, adjudication can clearly 
show where the problems lie.  
The fourth criticism against supranational adjudication is that it may scare away states from 
ratifying international human rights and democratic governance treaties. This is because 
adjudication may be perceived as a strict form of enforcing norms that leaves little or no 
room for negotiated settlement of disputes. African countries already have problems ratifying 
or acceding to human rights and democratic governance treaties. For example, the AU 
adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in January 
2007. It, however, took five years to secure a minimum of 15 ratifications needed for the 
treaty to enter into force in 2012.
1207
 By March 2014, out of 54 AU member states, only 23 
had ratified the treaty.
1208
 This represents less than half of the AU membership. It is thus 
possible that further subjecting such normative standards to enforcement through adjudication 
may further scare away African states from acceding to such norms, which they are already 
reluctant to fully embrace. 
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This criticism appears to have merit and needs to be had in mind. But the other side to that 
argument is that it implies that African states ratify treaties they have no intention of 
implementing. If that is the case, it could be argued that there is no major value in having as 
many states as possible to ratify treaties they have no genuine intention of implementing.  
However, in the case of the AU, subjecting human rights and democratic norms to 
adjudication, as seen above, has already been set in motion. As seen, the AU recently added 
criminal jurisdiction to the mandate of the continental court. This research simply urges 
expanding that mandate of the Court to include jurisdiction over presidential elections. 
 
5.8 Summary 
Africa has developed valuable treaties, such as ACDEG, setting democratic standards for 
conducting credible elections. However, these frameworks lack an efficient and effective 
enforcement mechanism. When presidential elections are disputed, and domestic courts are 
unable to offer impartial and credible adjudication, the continental ‘judiciary’ has equally 
been an unavailable to offer meaningful assistance. 
The chapter proposes that the continental judicial system should play a role in enforcing 
continental electoral standards and thus help in resolving disputed presidential election 
disputes, which have for long bedevilled the continent. The review of sub-regional courts 
indicates that Africa already has a valuable experience with supranational courts. At 
continental level, there is very little in terms of experience with supranational adjudication as 
individuals have generally been constrained from accessing the courts. In order for the 
continental judicial mechanism to be of help, it will require turning the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights into a fully-fledged supranational court accessible to 
nationals of concerned states; with clear material jurisdiction over electoral disputes; and a 
defined mechanism for cooperation with both national and sub-regional courts. 
An effective continental supranational court offers the possibility of strengthening domestic 
courts, especially in states where courts lack democratic space for independent fact finding 
and decision. Such national courts may be enabled to “to take risky and courageous steps by 
relying on a continental jurisprudence.”1209 The very nature of supranational adjudication 
entails that the continental court ‘pierces’ the state veil of judicial sovereignty and interacts 
directly with nationals of the concerned state. This ultimately ensures that standards agreed 
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upon by African leaders do not just end up as paper commitments, but that people participate 
meaningfully in their realisation and effectuation.  
The next chapter, which is the conclusion, will pool together suggestions that have emerged 
in this chapter on how the suggested supranational Court would be concretely organised and 
turns them into recommendations.  
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Chapter Six 
General Conclusion and Recommendations 
“If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere”1210 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Africa is still struggling to perfect its electoral democracy. Although a lot has been achieved 
since decolonisation, many African countries still suffer from the scourge of defective and 
fraudulent elections. When elections are disputed as a result of these defects, domestic 
judiciaries have routinely been unable to resolve the disputes in a fair, transparent and well-
reasoned manner. At the same time, African leaders have set fairly progressive democratic 
normative standards at the continental, and in some cases, sub-regional levels as well, for the 
conduct of democratic elections. These standards, however, lack an efficient and effective 
enforcement mechanism. To overcome this deficiency, this research has proposed setting up 
supranational mechanisms to adjudicate disputed presidential elections. 
The purpose of this final chapter of the thesis is to pool together what has been discussed in 
the chapters preceding it. It does this by way of giving a summary of key finds of the research 
and makes recommendations in relation to the proposed supranational adjudication of 
disputed presidential elections in Africa. 
 
6.2 Summary of Key Finding 
This research started with a discussion of three key concepts that underpin the whole study. 
These are the concepts of regionalism (or regional integration), supranationalism, and 
elections. Regional integration has been defined by Haas as “the process whereby political 
actors...are persuaded to shift their national loyalties, expectations and political activities to a 
new larger centre.”1211  In the African context, regional integration is rooted in the idea of 
pan-Africanism, which originally appeared during colonialism as a form of the African 
people’s reaction to domination, racism, oppression and exploitation. In order to overcome 
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these challenges, Africans considered it necessary that they unite and develop collectively. 
The formation of the OAU was in furtherance of the pan-African idea and it sought to 
completely rid the African continent of colonial oppression and set it in motion towards 
development and progress as a united continent.  
The concept of supranationalism represents a more advanced form of regionalism. It entails a 
formal penetration of international or regional standards into the domestic sphere, whereby 
these take pre-eminence over domestic laws and policies. This research, however, is 
primarily concerned about supranational adjudication.  In essence, under supranational 
adjudication, international courts or tribunals created by states are allowed to operate 
independent of the direct influence of states and are accessible to both state and non state 
entities and individuals. This differs significantly from traditional or classical international 
adjudication where adjudication only involved inter-state litigation.  
It was shown that because supranational adjudication is beyond the direct and immediate 
influence of states, supranational courts have a rare opportunity “where regular politics and 
the power disparities in the world do not shape how the law is interpreted and applied.”1212 
Thus, unlike traditional international adjudication where states control access to international 
tribunals, supranational courts are protected from the direct interference of individual states 
and, on the basis of pre-determined rules, make autonomous binding decisions on all the 
parties. 
The final concept is that of elections. In a democratic state, elections are an institutionalised 
method of realising the democratic norm of “rule of the people by the people.”1213 Elections 
are the only democratically legitimate procedure for translating popular sovereignty into 
workable executive and legislative powers.
1214
 For purposes of this research, it was indicated 
that an election is considered as a method or means by which eligible nationals or citizens of 
a state choose the person or persons to assume the highest office in government, particularly 
the presidency.  
The discussion of the three concepts was followed by a historical analysis of the context in 
which presidential elections in Africa have been held. It was shown that since the era of 
independence, the African continent has gone through various leadership trends. The 
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independence era of the 1950s and 1960s was pregnant with euphoria and great expectation 
for genuine democratic governance. This era, however, was disappointingly followed by the 
negation of the promise of independence through the establishment of dictatorships, military 
and one-party regimes from the 1960s to the 1980s. The wind of change in the 1980s and 
1990s, which was characterised by the demise of dictatorships and one party-rule, led to a 
wave of democratisation. In this era several countries reformed their electoral laws and held 
defining elections, which in some cases led to replacement of old regimes. The democratic 
wave of the 1980s and 1990s has, however, not resolved all underlying problems to 
democratic consolidation in Africa. Military coups, defective elections and violence still 
occur in many countries on the continent. 
The approaches or systems used to elect or choose leaders of government were discussed in 
the second chapter. There it was shown that there are structurally three broad systems under 
which heads of government or state are elected in Africa. These are the presidential, 
parliamentary and ‘monarchical’ systems. Under the presidential system, the president is 
elected directly by the people while under the parliamentary system, the president or prime 
minister is elected by members of the legislative branch of government. In case of the 
monarchical system, a hereditary monarch is head of state, leaving only room for the 
possibility of electing a prime minister as head of government. The examples of this are 
Swaziland, Morocco and Lesotho. 
The second chapter also discussed factors that have had a negative bearing on the conduct of 
presidential elections in Africa. It was established that these factors are ethnicity; the simple 
majority electoral system; the military engaging in partisan politics; and compromised 
electoral management bodies. 
The third chapter looked at the challenges associated with adjudicating disputed presidential 
elections in domestic courts. Defective elections are still common in Africa and election 
results are in many countries usually disputed. When this occurs it usually falls on the 
judiciary to protect the right of people to choose their leaders in a free and transparent 
atmosphere. The research has shown that the record of the judiciary in Africa has been 
overwhelmingly disappointing. The judiciary has routinely upheld clearly defective elections, 
erroneously considering it their duty to salvage defective elections as a matter of public 
policy. To achieve this, the courts have largely applied two techniques. The first one is to 
simply dismiss election petitions on flimsy procedural technicalities, without considering 
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merits of the case. Second, the courts have wrongly applied the substantial effect rule to 
uphold disputed elections, even in the face of glaring evidence indicating serious violations of 
Constitutional and other statutory provisions. In other circumstances, judges have simply 
constrained themselves from making an appropriate decision. Further, while in some 
countries judges have been exemplary in determining cases efficiently, in many countries, 
such cases are still characterised by inordinate delays that negate the whole purpose of 
adjudication. 
There are several possible reasons that may account for this poor judicial record on 
presidential election disputes. These may include judicial corruption; intimidation of judges; 
and lack of independence and impartiality. This has consequently led to erosion of public 
confidence in the judiciary as an impartial custodian of the rule of law; the entrenchment and 
rewarding of culprits as they continue to benefit from their wrong doing; and in extreme 
cases the breakdown of violence and threat to national cohesion. Ultimately, consolidation of 
democracy suffers a setback with the full complicit of the judiciary. 
The fourth chapter looked the democratic normative frameworks in Africa. It considered both 
the sub-regional and continental standards. At the continental level, the OAU initially 
approached the subject of democracy and elections with indifference and routinely 
recognised governments that came to power through military interventions. Legitimate 
winning of elections was not a pre-requisite for OAU recognition of regimes. 
This slowly began to change. The adoption of the ACHPR in 1981 was the first continental 
framework that had provisions relevant to the conduct of democratic elections. Although 
assailed with drafting weaknesses, the Charter provided for the rights to political participation 
and self-determination. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which has 
responsibility for enforcement of the Charter developed progressive jurisprudence in favour 
of democratic elections. Despite this, the OAU continued to recognise governments that came 
into office by means other than free and fair elections. 
In the 1990s, however, the OAU began to shift its stance in favour of democratic constitution 
of government by rejecting governments that came to power through military coups. The first 
instance to trigger a unanimous OAU response occurred in 1997 when President Kabbah was 
ousted by the military in Sierra Leone. The OAU for the first time unanimously condemned 
the coup and authorised military action to restore democracy, and President Kabbah was 
dully restored to office the following year. 
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The OAU in 2000 crystallised its emerging rejection of military coups into the Lome 
Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government. This became the first continental 
document to formally reject unconstitutional governments. The Declaration recognised four 
instances of assumption of office it categorises as unconstitutional changes of government. 
These are military coup against a democratically elected government; intervention by 
mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; replacement of a democratically 
elected government by armed dissidents and rebels; and the refusal by an incumbent 
government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.
1215
 
In 2000 the OAU heads of state and government adopted the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, which transformed the OAU into the AU.  The Constitutive Act’s objectives and 
principles include rejection of unconstitutional changes of government and the enshrining of 
provisions to the effect that the will of the people expressed through regular, free and fair 
elections is the sole basis upon which legitimate governments should base their authority for 
assuming office. The AU has taken a strong stance against unconstitutional changes of 
government and has since 2003 consistently rejected all such governments. In some cases, it 
has imposed sanctions and authorised military interventions. 
In 2007 the AU adopted the ACDEG, a comprehensive continental democratic treaty. It 
generally consolidates and pools into one binding document all the major AU norms around 
democracy and elections. ACDEG, however, is more heavily weighted against military coups 
at the expense of defective elections. While it provides for sanctions for unconstitutional 
changes of government, it provides no discernible enforcement mechanism where an election 
is in dispute and there is need to find out the legitimate winner. 
The fourth chapter also looked at democratic normative frameworks at sub-regional level. 
Five sub-regions were discussed and these are the East African Community (EAC), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Economic 
Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the 
Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). In terms of the level of advancement in the development of 
sub-regional norms, there is no single thread that runs through all the sub-regions. Perhaps 
what can be said with certainty is that ECOWAS and SADC generally have more advanced 
frameworks setting standards for democratic elections while at the other extreme end, UMA 
and ECCAS completely lack any reasonable standard on democratic elections. EAC is in the 
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process of developing its own sub-regional democratic standards. However, even the 
ECOWAS and SADC which have more advanced frameworks still struggle with enforcement 
issues. 
The fifth chaptered explored the viability of setting up an elections supranational court at the 
continental level. Africa has developed valuable treaties, such as ACDEG, setting democratic 
standards for conducting credible elections. However, these frameworks lack an efficient and 
effective enforcement mechanism. When presidential elections are disputed, and domestic 
courts are unable to offer impartial and credible adjudication, the continental ‘judiciary’ has 
equally been an unavailable to offer meaningful assistance. 
The chapter proposes that the continental judicial system should play a role in enforcing 
continental electoral standards and thus help in resolving disputed presidential election 
disputes, which have for long bedevilled the continent. The review of sub-regional courts 
indicates that Africa already has a valuable experience with supranational courts. At 
continental level, there is very little in terms of experience with supranational adjudication as 
individuals have generally been constrained from accessing the courts. In order for the 
continental judicial mechanism to be of help, it will require turning the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights into a fully-fledged supranational court accessible to 
nationals of concerned states; with clear material jurisdiction over electoral disputes; and a 
defined mechanism for cooperation with both national and sub-regional courts. 
An effective continental supranational court offers the possibility of strengthening domestic 
courts, especially in states where courts lack democratic space for independent fact finding 
and decision. Such national courts may be enabled to “to take risky and courageous steps by 
relying on a continental jurisprudence.”1216 The very nature of supranational adjudication 
entails that the continental court ‘pierces’ the state veil of judicial sovereignty and interacts 
directly with nationals of the concerned state. This ultimately ensures that standards agreed 
upon by African leaders do not just end up as paper commitments, but that people participate 
meaningfully in their realisation and effectuation. This may also potentially play a major role 
in ensuring that nationals of AU member states are aware of the transnational institutions. 
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6.3 Key Recommendations 
From the foregoing discussions, this section pools together four recommendations deemed 
necessary in order to realise an effective supranational adjudication of presidential election 
disputes. It also makes short to medium term recommendations to member states. 
6.3.1 Jurisdiction of the court 
It has been shown that the current framework for the ACJHPR does not expressly vest the 
Court with material jurisdiction over the enforcement of continental democratic norms (such 
as ACDEG) and adjudication of disputed presidential elections. It has also been established 
that the Court does not give unconditional access to individual litigants and civil society 
organisations, except where concerned states have given an appropriate declaration allowing 
such access. It is here recommended that the Protocol establishing the ACJHPR be amended 
to give the Court express jurisdiction over disputed presidential elections. This amendment, 
however, would be of limited value if individuals and civil society organisations are not 
given access to the Court as states are unlikely to bring a case against another state with 
regard to the conduct of elections. It is, therefore, recommended that individuals and civil 
society organisations, including political parties, be allowed unconditional access to the 
Court. 
 
6.3.2 Relations With National Courts 
It has been shown that the ACJHPR lacks a mechanism for cooperation with national courts. 
Without this mechanism, it becomes difficult for continental laws and decisions to penetrate 
into the domestic sphere. It is recommended that the ACJHPR Protocol be amended in order 
to provide for national courts to refer cases for preliminary rulings to the ACJHPR. It should 
further be required that where the ACJHR has rendered a ruling, it should be mandatory for 
the domestic courts to follow it. 
 
6.3.3 Appointment and Removal of Judges 
Under the current arrangement, the Assembly has ultimate power over the appointment and 
removal of judges. This potentially creates a conflict of interest as the Assembly is a political 
body made up of heads of state and government whose elections could potentially be 
challenged before the Court. It is proposed that the appointment and removal of judges be in 
the hands of an independent organ which should have transparent and fair appointment and 
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removal process. It is recommended that the ECOWAS model of the Judicial Council of the 
Community be adopted, with the necessary modifications. This will allow for judges to be 
appointed in the most transparent and meritorious way. It will also allow for a fair and 
transparent removal system that will increase the sense of independence and insulation of 
judges. 
 
6.3.4 Easing Access to the Court 
International courts tend to be difficult to access by many people largely because of travel 
and logistical expenses involved. It is recommended that the Court should adopt the practice 
adopted by the EACJ of opening or using registries of courts of member states as sub-
registries of the Court. The Court may, for example, designate the registries of Supreme 
Courts of member states as sub-registries of the Court. That way, litigants would not need to 
travel long distances to file documents. The Court could further adopt the EACJ’s flexibility 
which allows it to sit in member states where the case has originated from and render 
judgment in that country. This will not only allow justice to be done but will enable the 
citizens of the concerned country to see that justice is done.  This, however, should be subject 
to the security and safety of the judges. 
6.3.5 Short and Medium Term Recommendations to AU Member States 
Pending the establishment of the continental supranational mechanism for the adjudication of 
disputed presidential elections, it is recommended that AU member states take measures to 
enhance the conduct of democratic elections. Member states that have not yet done so should 
promptly ratify all AU norms on democracy, including ACDEG. They should also ratify the 
Protocols establishing the continental Court and make declarations allowing their nationals 
access to the Court. Further, African states should pass enabling legislation translating AU 
norms into the domestic sphere, and consequently allowing for the reception of continental 
norms. 
 
6.4 Contributions to Practice 
Although this research has predominantly applied legal analysis skills, it has at the same time 
integrated skills from other related disciplines. Within the field of law, the research has 
integrated the approaches of public international law, human rights law, jurisprudence and 
legal theory, as well as comparative constitutional law. Apart from these legal approaches, 
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the study has benefited from the application of skills from other disciplines such as 
international relations, history, political science and political philosophy. This multi-
disciplinary approach has enriched the research and enabled it to make findings and propose 
solutions that would benefit scholarship not just in the legal field but in these other 
disciplines.  
While the subject of this research, that is, disputed presidential elections in Africa, has been 
subjected to a fair amount of scholarly inquiry, there does not seem to be any existing 
scholarly literature that has inquired into how African courts resolve such disputes. Where 
literature on disputed elections does exist, it is usually narrowly focused on one case study 
such as Kenya (in 2007) and Zimbabwe (in 2008). This study has, therefore, cut a new 
approach in that it has demonstrated that defective and disputed elections are a general 
problem in Africa and that domestic courts have generally made decisions that do not 
advance electoral democracy on the continent. 
The research has also not just exposed weakness and challenges but has proposed a radical 
solution, that is, supranational adjudication of presidential election disputes under the AU 
judicial framework. This radical approach may unsettle some as it is novel and has not been 
tried elsewhere, but it has been demonstrated that at sub-regional level supranational 
adjudication is already a relatively common practice (although it does not extend to deciding 
disputed elections). However, without serious efforts to try new ways to resolve challenges, 
human progress would stagnate and human society would surrender to the spirit of fatalism. 
The radical approach proposed under this research dovetails with the immortal words of Lord 
Denning: “If we never do anything which has not been done before we shall never get 
anywhere.”1217  
It is hoped that this study will not only bring a new idea into scholarly discourse but it will 
also stimulate further debate and more research on how the African regional integration 
frameworks and mechanisms can be adjusted to respond to democratic challenges and serve 
the hopes, aspirations and interests of the African people. 
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